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I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Prelude: Chevron Case and the Challenge of Governing
Transnational Corporations Through "Soft Law"
After 18 years of litigation, on February 14, 2011 an Ecuadorian
judge ordered the oil conglomerate Chevron to pay 18 billion dollars in
damages, "the largest judgment ever awarded in an environmental
lawsuit," 1 in the oil contamination case Afectados ('the Affected') v.
1.

See Patrick R. Keefe, Reversal of Fortune,
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Chevron. 2 The judgment was affirmed on appeal a year later, 3 yet the
case is far from over. The liable parties remain to be called to account
and the environmental damage is still to be remedied. Chevron no
longer has considerable assets in Ecuador, 4 it has lodged an appeal with
the Ecuadorian Supreme Court, and an UNCITRAL arbitration before
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague has witnessed
a number of interim awards in favor of Chevron. 5 In the media the case
has been described as a local plaintiffs' apparently fruitless legal
struggle in a society with a corrupt judiciary and political and economic
dependence on foreign oil companies. 6
The Chevron case evidences the difficulties in properly governing
transnational corporations (TNCs), sometimes even to prevent the most
egregious of abuses. Multiple international and domestic laws may be
applicable, but that often seems detrimental rather than helpful.
Weaknesses in the content, implementation and enforcement of laws
may allow the politically and economically powerful parties to
dominate the situation. Thus, in cases such as Chevron, alternative
means of governance are desperately needed to address the failures of
classic international and domestic law in protecting the environment and
human rights. "Soft law" is then often hailed as the remedy. Chevron,
for example, is indeed an active participant in several voluntary
initiatives and schemes, such as the Social Responsibility Group of the
International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation
Association (IPIECA). 7 Chevron was also one of the companies
consulted during the drafting of UN Special Representative John

available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/0l/09/120109fa_fact_keefe (last
visited Mar. 26, 2014).
2. Aguinda y Otros v. Chevron Corp., (2011) Trial No. 2003-0002, Provincial Court of
Justice of Sucumbios (Ecuador), available at http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2011-0214-Aguinda-v-ChevronTexaco-judgement-English.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
3. Aguinda y Otros v. Chevron Corp., (2012) Case No. 2011-0106, Provincial Court of
Justice of Sucumbios (Ecuador), available at http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2012-0103-appeal-decision-english.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
4. See Patrick R. Keefe, Why Chevron will Settle in Ecuador, THE NEW YORKER (Jan.
4, 2012), available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/0l/whychevron-will-settle-in-ecuador.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
5. Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador (U.S. v.
Ecuador), 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013) ("Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures");
Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador (U.S. v. Ecuador), 200923 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012) ("Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility").
6. Reversal of Fortune, supra note 1, at 2.
7. See International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association
(IPIECA), available at http://www.ipieca.org/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
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Ruggie' s UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 8
Proposing "soft law" as the solution in more effectively governing
transnational giants such as Chevron leads, however, to a fundamental
conundrum: it remains quite unclear what the notion of "soft law"
entails, and why and how it could be able to provide an adequate policy
response. The objective of this paper therefore is to clarify the
discussion through a detailed theoretical analysis of "soft law", and to
test the findings in the practically pivotal area of the environmental and
human rights conduct of TNCs.

B. The Thesis and the Objectives
This paper claims, using the fields of environmental protection and
human rights as examples, that "soft law" is conceptually and
substantively inadequate and misleading in filling the voids left by
classic "hard law" in governing TNCs. A reconceptualization of, and a
more systematic approach to, soft instruments is required if they are to
play a constructive part in filling the void.
The paper proceeds in five steps to prove its thesis and to propose
remedies to the identified shortcomings. The first objective is to show
that what has been called classic "hard law" - state laws and the formal
sources of international law - seems to fail in adequately governing
transnational corporations (TNCs). Second, the paper explains why
other, "soft law" instruments are believed to address the void, but
reveals as the third step that the current way of understanding such
other, "soft law" instruments is inadequate and too general for assessing
the successes or failures of such a very diverse group of instruments.
The paper therefore seeks as its fourth objective to create and assess
better methods for approaching the void, and proposes to that account a
tool that re-conceptualizes and systemizes the soft law discourse. Fifth,
preliminary tests of such a new tool are conducted by applying it to
practical case studies of TNC behavior in the fields of environmental
and human rights protection. The paper concludes by showing how the
notion of "soft law" is not only obscure and inadequate, as has been
previously contended by other scholars, but that it also is conceptually
deceptive in ways that risk leading towards ineffective policy
instruments. "Softness" on the other hand does seem instructive for
better understanding and reacting to the challenges of managing
transnational corporations.

8. Obviously, the "soft law" instruments cited here date from after the relevant facts of
the Chevron case.
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II. THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNING TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS (TNCS)
A. Business Across the Borders
The first objective of this paper is to show how classic "hard law"
seems to fail in adequately governing transnational corporations
(TNCs). The UN's Special Representative on business and human
rights has stated that TNCs come in many varieties on a scale from little
The
to almost complete reliance on transnational activities. 9
qualification of a company as a TNC is thus not based on its legal
personality; corporations of various legal forms can be included in the
category of TNCs. More important than an undisputable definition of a
TNC is, however, that there are important factual and regulatory
problems that arise as a consequence of corporations pursuing activities
in multiple jurisdictions. Globalization of the marketplace has driven
companies to operate across borders. Many companies have become
TNCs, and many TNCs have become global actors. This is no longer
limited to developed country based businesses; numerous TNCs are
Asian or South American companies. With the emergence of multiple
trade areas (such as ASEAN in South-East Asia or the Andean
Community in Latin-America) the TNC has truly 'gone global.'
B. The Sanctuary of Multiple Jurisdictions
The activities of TNCs are spread among the territories of many
so-called host states. In the majority of cases, and often due to
requirements in domestic laws, they are nonetheless based in a single
home state. In contrast to domestically operating businesses, however,
they do not fall under the complete control of a single jurisdiction, not
even that of their home state. They are partially subject to the domestic
legal systems of their home state and of all the host states in which parts
of their fragmented, networked activities take place or have effects.
Domestic laws are to an increasing extent harmonized by
international law, such as customary law and conventions. On many
issues, however, domestic legal systems still vary considerably, in
particular in the implementation and enforcement of law. This variance
may create a void: activities in a particular jurisdiction risk escaping the
(legal) consequences that would and should have followed.
A
hazardous part of waste treatment activities may be located in a country
9. See Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the U.N. Human
Rights Council, 8th Sess., Protect, Respect and Remedy, 116-7, 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5
(2008) (by John G. Ruggie).
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where such activities are not subject to (stringent) standards, for
example, or labor-intensive work in the textile sector is set up in a
country where labor laws permit longer working hours, or the part of
operations that is subject to high taxes in the company's de facto home
state is formally relocated to a tax haven.
Innovative judges may find ways around the issue of multiple
jurisdictions with different substantive standards. In some of the recent
judgments from the lower court and the court of appeals in the Chevron
case, for example, the judges were not held back by the fact that neither
environmental standards nor legal protection of the areas belonging to
indigenous people existed in Ecuador at the time of the tort. Yet the
judges reasoned that it was enough that "the existence of damages has
been verified," combined with "the right to obtain compensation for
damages suffered in its various forms, which was recognized by the
Civil Code well before the start of Texpet [Texaco, predecessor of
Chevron] activities in the Amazon." 10 Thus, a specific prohibition of an
environmental harm was not deemed necessary to establish a tort. In
various Westem jurisdictions, arguments are being forwarded that the
home state standards should apply to 'their' TNCs' activities in the host
states as well. 11
C. Resistance Towards the Implementation and Reform of
Domestic Law and International Law
The opportunities of globalization have made many transnationally
operating companies extremely wealthy, superseding in economic terms
many nation states. The largest TNCs have become especially
influential economic and political players, both in the various domestic
jurisdictions where they operate, as well as on the global level. For
example, many developing countries rely on TNCs to use their
resources. The TNCs may thereby have a clear advantage over local
actors in influencing the creation or implementation of law by domestic
authorities, although this will vary case by case. Unlike local
companies, TNCs can often rather easily shift their activities from one
country to another, should a local government advocate for instance to
10. Aguinda, Case No. 2011-0106 at para. 9 (further arguing by the Appeals Court
found "the fact that there is no express mention of environmental damages in references to
contingent damages in the Civil Code does not mean that environmental damages cannot be
contingent damages, nor does it mean that the legislature wished to exclude the possibility
that environmental damages could be considered to be contingent damages.").
11. See Jonathan Verschuuren, Overcoming the Limitations of Environmental Law in a
Globalised World (Tilburg Univ. Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Paper No. 20, 2010),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssm.1582857 (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
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more stringently enforce costly environmental standards. TNCs are also
often backed by Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs ), concluded
between their home state and their host state. The BITs may allow the
TNCs to threaten to sue the host state for expropriation, should the
enforcement of laws risk harming the company economically. Such a
BIT is also the basis for Chevron's claim before the PCA in the
Chevron case. 12
TNCs--especially when acting together through sectorial global
business associations or high-profile events such as the World
Economic Forum in Davos 13 - are also a powerful force influencing
the decisions made in international organizations and diplomatic
negotiations. The scope of the TNCs' organizations gives them a global
overview and a strategic grip of the policy discourse that particularly the
developing states may struggle to match. This power may allow the
TNCs to create or sustain a void on the global level, which moves or
keeps parts of the corporations' operations beyond the reach of the
domestic and international legal orders.

D. Domestic Law and the Legal Void in Regulating TNCs - Host
State and Home State Dimensions
The ability of the TNCs to escape full regulatory control and to
exert political pressure on decision makers clearly creates the risk of a
legal void. 14 This paper defines a legal void as a regulatory situation in
which a TNC behavior, permitted in a host state, would have been in
violation of the laws of the TNC home state or of international law. The
legal void may be viewed as part of a (wider) policy void, whereby the
public policy objective on the particular question is not reached.
The legal void reveals itself in a slightly different fashion in the
home states (where the company is incorporated) than in the host states
(where the TNCs operate). As De Peyter submits, "developing and
transition countries [i.e. often the 'host states'] compete to attract
12. Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Ecuador, Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 103-15.
13. The publicly visible tip of the proverbial iceberg of this political influence
occurred at the yearly World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. See Ellen Payne, The
Road to the Global Compact: Corporate Power And The Battle Over Global Public Policy
at The United Nations, GLOBAL PoL'Y FORUM (Oct. 2000), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF_The_road_to_the_global_compact_October_
2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). Incidentally, the 1999 Forum was also one of the
earliest occasions where the UN Global Compact was formally and informally discussed.
Id.

14. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights speak of "governance
gaps created by globalization." See Ruggie, supra note 9, at 3.
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foreign investment and technology to exploit natural resources, and are
often reluctant to impose human rights and other conditions on foreign
companies." 15 In the case of developing country host states, there thus
may be a system of laws that is applicable-the problem is that it either
sets very low standards (in which case the legal void is qualitative) or it
does not properly apply the higher standards (in which case the legal
void is one of enforcement).
On the other hand, De Peyter continues, "[t]he home state is faced
with the difficulty that, in principle, the reach of domestic law is limited
to its own territory." 16 To overcome the limits of home country
jurisdiction, some states exceptionally recognize universal or extraterritorial civil jurisdiction over torts outside their territory. 17 However,
the potential of such extra-territorial jurisdiction is for various reasons
quite limited. 18 Suffice it to say here that international law allows extraterritorial (or universal) jurisdiction only for a few crimes under
international customary law. These offenses may be enforced by any
state( s) regardless of their ties with the offense. 19
Another possibility to overcome the home state problem is the
active nationality principle, which allows a state to exercise prescriptive
and adjudicative jurisdiction over its nationals for offenses they commit
abroad. In practice, however, states are not likely to use this option
more than sparsely, and have done so in the past only for a limited
number of crimes. An important reason for this is that it conflicts with
competing jurisdictional claims of other states, primarily the
territoriality principle. Another reason is that international law does not
allow states to enforce such jurisdiction abroad, for example to collect
evidence or to make arrests.
E. International Law and the Legal Void in Regulating TNCs
If there is a void in domestic law regulating TNC activities, one
might assume that international law could better succeed in addressing
this distinct group of actors. Surely international law, which can

15. Koen De Feyter, Globalisation and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 68, 81-82 (Felipe Gomez Isa & Koen de Feiter eds., 2009).
16. Id. at 82 ( emphasis added).
17. See United States' Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011).
18. See also Donald F. Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of
Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 142-63 (2006).
19. Universal civil jurisdiction of U.S. courts remains nonetheless a tool of at least
some usefulness for the most gruesome abuses that remain unprosecuted in the states where
they occur.
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potentially contain universal or near-universal rules, 20 could help in
filling the void left by domestic law. In addition, it could be argued that
the international legal order is positioned 'close' to the transnational
sphere, where TNCs themselves operate.
There are four ways in which international human rights law may
apply or be applied to TNCs: 21 (1) it can be applied directly, (2) almost
directly, (3) transposed into national law or (4) applied indirectly. In
international environmental law, the picture is somewhat different,
because directly and almost directly applicable international law is
practically non-existent. The application of most international law to
individuals depends on transposition or indirect application.
Particularly those two means of application do not overcome a number
of obstacles to effectively regulating TNCs through international law.
As noted earlier, the matter is elaborated here through the examples of
international environmental and human rights law.

1. Lack ofInternational Law (Almost) Directly and Specifically
Applicable to TNCs
In contrast to states and intergovernmental organizations, TNCs are
generally not considered subjects of international law, and are as such
not directly bound by most of it. 22 TN Cs entertain only certain rights
and have a limited set of obligations 23 on the basis on international law
directly. These rights and obligations are similar to those directly
applicable to all private actors. 24 Direct applicability of international
law entails that both national judicial organs of home, host and
potentially other states, as well as international tribunals, enforce the
international law obligations directly, even without such provisions
being transposed into national law. 25 The direct applicability of
international law to the conduct 26of TN Cs as private actors is limited to
a few international human rights related crimes, such as genocide and

20. Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993).
21. This section uses the taxonomy suggested by J. Knox. J. Knox, Horizontal Human
Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008).
22. P.A. NOLLKAEMPER, KERN VAN HET INTERNATIONAL PUBLIEKRECHT 58-59 {5th ed.
2011 ). For human rights specifically see e.g. R. McCorquodale, Corporate Social
Responsibility and International Human Rights Law, 87 J. Bus. ETHICS 385 (2009).
23. If a legal provision requires an action or inaction from an actor, it is a legal
obligation.
24. See Knox, supra note 21, at 2 (speaking generally of private duties).
25. The question of extraterritoriality arises in the context of applying it in home
states, however. See infra Section 2.5.2.
26. The present paper does not focus on the rights of TN Cs.
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crimes against humanity, based on customary international law. 27 As
mentioned above, universal jurisdiction to enforce such obligations is
the least controversial.
There is another set of obligations that, in Knox's terminology, is
applied "almost directly" to private actors. These obligations are not
directly applicable, but they specifically instruct states-including
dualist states-how to place requirements on private actors and how to
enforce them through domestic laws. The transposition of such
provisions is thus strictly predetermined. 28 The Convention Against
Torture29 as well as the Convention on Child Labor30 contain examples
of such "almost directly applicable international law." However, the
limited number of these kinds of provisions leave many parts of the
legal void uncovered. Another reason for the void is that the provisions
do not tend to address the behavior of TNCs specifically. 31
As far as the international obligations that are placed "almost
directly" upon the individuals are specific, they de facto create quasiuniversal domestic criminal law. In other words, the global application
is decentralized, so that the direct applicability, and almost direct
applicability, approaches can make good use of domestic courts'
enforcement capacities, which are far superior to those of international
judicial institutions. Political will permitting, this seems the most
promising international law track to pursue in governing TNCs. It
could in theory combine a universal and precise prescription of

27. In the words of the human rights scholar John Knox, "virtually all of these duties
are found in international criminal law. The paradigmatic example is the Genocide
Convention, which states that 'genocide ... is a crime under international law' that the
parties 'undertake to prevent and to punish,' through both domestic tribunals and 'such
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.'" Knox, supra note 21, at 28. These
provisions are not only directly targeted at, but also internationally enforced upon individual
parties, including TNCs. Id. Direct applicability to companies is sometimes seen to be
contrary to the basic consensual premise of international law. Id. How can TNCs have
obligations on the basis of international law to which they have not consented?
28. Id. at 28-29. The obligations concern duties such as the prohibitions on slavery
(Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, April 30, 1956) and torture (Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984).
The states parties to these conventions are obliged to make slavery and torture criminal
offences under their domestic laws, and to enforce them upon private parties. Id.
29. Knox, supra note 21, at 28-29
30. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, June 17, 1999, 871.L.C. 182.
31. An example of the latter is arguably the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage ('CLC'), 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil,
Pollution Damage (Cosilidated Text of the 1969 Convention, Incorporating the Amendments
of 1976, 1992, and 2000), November 29, 1969, INT'L MARITIME ORG., available at
http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/Conventions%20English. pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
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obligations specifically for transnational commercial activities with the
high enforcement capacities of domestic authorities. A contracting state
would not fulfill its own international obligations, should it not enforce
the provisions against TN Cs under its jurisdiction.
2. Poor Domestic Implementation and Enforcement of
International Law - Back to Square One?

The third and fourth types of international law that deal with the
internal policies of developed western states, including international
human rights law and international environmental law, are not directly
applicable to TNCs. 32 International treaty provisions need to be
properly transposed into the domestic legal system in order to create the
intended legal effect on the TNCs. The states often retain a large
measure of freedom in this respect. For example, many environmental
treaty provisions, such as the provisions in the Montreal Protocol on the
downscaling of the production of ozone depleting substances, must be
first transposed into domestic law and then properly implemented if a
state is to meet its obligations under the treaty. The treaty will in this
way become binding, not only on the state in question, but also in the
form of national law on those operating a production facility of ozone
depleting substances within the jurisdictions.
The obligation to incorporate and enforce the international norm
rests on the states and it is left to the state in question to decide exactly
how it will incorporate and enforce the international law provisions.
This is problematic if the content of the international norm is too vague
to establish clearly whether a state has failed to discharge its duties or
not. This is often the case in international human rights law and
international environmental law.
Finally, international law may also be indirectly applicable on
TNCs. Indirect applicability means that the (existing) laws of the
domestic legal system are construed, i.e. interpreted in a manner that is
as much in conformity with international law as possible. 33 Most of the
international human rights law and international environmental law can
be considered indirectly applicable. 34
32. On indirect applicability, see infra note 33.
33. Andre Nollkaemper & Gerrit Betlem, Giving Effect to Public International Law

and European Community Law Before Domestic Courts. A Comparative Analysis of the
Practice of Consistent Interpretation, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 569 (2003).
34. The two general international human rights conventions- the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966 (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966 (ICESCR)- are
prominent examples of such international law obligations that apply indirectly to TNCs. The

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/1

22

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

2014]

"Softness" in International Instruments

269

For example, state parties must take the above noted provisions of
the Montreal Protocol on the down-scaling of the production of ozone
depleting substances duly into consideration in interpreting their
relevant domestic norms, to be consistent with their obligations under
the treaty. The interpretation will affect also the TNCs operating within
the jurisdiction.
There is certain hierarchy in the way that domestic courts rely on
direct and indirect applicability of international law. In striving to
achieve conformity with the international norm, the courts give priority
to consistent interpretation, i.e. indirect applicability. Only if the
domestic law is so inconsistent with international law that it is not
reconcilable by favorably interpreting domestic law, will the courts rely
on international law directly. 35 Indirect applicability of international
law is thus the primary means of trying to fill in the gaps of domestic
law on TNCs.
However, the value added of all the not-directly-applicable
provisions of international law in diminishing the void left by domestic
law is often quite limited. The very same "host state problem" that was
explained for law of purely domestic origin resurfaces, unsurprisingly,
in the transposition, implementation and interpretation of international
obligations in domestic law. 36 The broad and generic language of
international agreements often leaves states ample room for discretion
in incorporating international law into domestic legislation, and even
more in enforcing it. The TNCs are able to exert their clout as with any
other domestic law.
The indirect application of interpreting
international law by courts would be in a better position, should the
courts be more resilient to (external political) pressure than the
legislature. This is not necessarily the case in practice, however. Yet
even where free from external pressures, the fragmented, transboundary
nature of TNC activities may in the end preclude any nation state--or
multiple states-from effectively enforcing an international
obligation. 37
The international law obligations are thus rarely globally directly
and specifically applicable to TNCs. The policy void of TNCs cannot
same goes for international obligations on states in the realm of environmental protection:
they have ultimately some impact upon the legality of natural and legal persons' behavior.
This is true for both monist and dualist states.
35. R.H. LAUWAARS & C.W.A. TIMMERMANS, EUROPEES GEMEENSCHAPSRECHT IN KORT
BESTEK 100 (4th ed. 1997); see also Nollkaemper & Betlem, supra note 33, at 569.
36. Questions relating to the monistic versus dualistic systems in transposing
international law are left aside here.
37. De Feyter, supra note 15, at 81-82.
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be fully and effectively addressed through present international law.
3. Nigerian Farmers v. Shell - the Absence ofInternational Law in
'Home State' Cases
The Nigerian Farmers v. Shell case is a good example of how
international law is still absent in 'home state' court cases that involve
'home state' TNCs. In that case, four inhabitants of Oruma (Nigeria)
sued Shell and its subsidiary companies before a civil court in the
Netherlands, i.e. the 'home state' of Shell. 38 The case concerned an oil
leakage from a Shell pipeline that had, according to the plaintiffs,
caused damage to the local environment and to the incomes of
fishermen and farmers. The domestic court in The Hague 39 decided that
according to Dutch conflict of laws rules on tort cases, it had to apply
Nigerian law to the dispute. Indeed, the case is a classic attestation of
the home state problem, where only the below-par developing country
standards are applied to TNCs.
Having decided that Nigerian law was applicable, the Dutch court
took another important procedural decision: it denied the plaintiffs
access to documents solely in possession of Shell cum suis, even though
the documents could have given further insight into the causes and
consequences of the oil leakage. The court concluded that Shell and its
Nigerian daughter company had, on the face of the evidence already
available to the court, not acted in violation of any obligations under
Nigerian law.
In making its decision, the court did not check whether Nigerian
law was in accordance with international environmental, human rights
or labor law. For example, the court concluded that under Nigerian law,
an oil company does not seem to be under an obligation to replace
deteriorated pipelines. Yet, the court did not examine whether there
were international rules that would have forced Nigeria to enact such an
obligation, or that would have mandated it to interpret Nigerian law in
accordance with international law. The obligation would have existed
in the legal system of The Netherlands and other developed countries.
The court also disregarded all potential violations of international law in
concluding that under Nigerian law, only the owner of a polluted fishing
pond or property was able to claim losses, and that future losses could
not be claimed.
The stance taken by the Dutch court seems understandable from
38. Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Sell PLC and Shell Petroleum Development
Company, Merits Decision of 30 January 2013 (LJN: BU3535) [Language: Dutch].
39. To be clear, this is not one of the Hague international courts and tribunals.
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the viewpoint of sovereignty. It would be quite far-reaching if a court
were to rule on the compatibility of another country's law with
international standards. It is also doubtful whether any international
standards were sufficiently precise so as to enable a meaningful
conformity check. Still, it seems somewhat illogical that as soon as a
foreign law becomes applicable, international law will no longer be of
relevance. And what would be the difference between applying foreign
law and applying international norms to which the foreign state has
consented? Whatever the merits of the above considerations, it seems
unlikely both in practice and in legal theory that international law will
fill the legal void in cases like this.
F. "Hard Law" As an Insufficient Means to Address TNCs

To summarize, the current framework of domestic law and
international law appears incapable of fully managing the effects of
globalization, in particular the global nature of commercial activities.
The variation in domestic laws, together with the TNCs' economic and
political power and ability to partially avoid falling under the laws of a
specific state, allows the corporations to operate to some degree in a
legal void. As defined above, a legal void is a regulatory situation in
which a TNC behavior in a host state would have been in violation of
the laws of the TNC home state or of international law. There is very
limited directly applicable international law, and the transposition,
implementation and enforcement of international law usually leave the
several state institutions/branches with (considerable) room for
maneuver. International law is therefore unable to improve the
situation.
As a result of the problems that both national and international law
have in controlling TNCs, there is room for misconduct. In the words
of the UN Special Representative:
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today
lies in the governance gaps created by globalization-between the scope
and impact of economic forces, and the capacity of societies to manage
their adverse consequences. These governance gaps provide the
permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds
without adequate sanctioning or reparation.
The Chevron case, introduced at the outset of this paper, is a case
in point on these challenges. The Ecuadorian government had been in a
joint venture with the oil company at the time of the pollution. It thus
appears to have been at least silently complicit in the abuses. The whole
of the Ecuadorian economy had been dependent on the exploitation of
oil resources, so there was a counter-incentive to faithfully implement
Published by SURFACE, 2014
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national legislation or international rules. The Ecuadorian judicial
system offered no remedy, either, as it proved to be extremely weak and
corrupt. Several judges had to step down during the long process amidst
accusations of corruption, while others were seen to have a clear
allegiance with either side of the conflict. 40
In terms of environmental law, Chevron did acknowledge the
environmental pollution to some degree, but argued that its predecessor
Texaco had acted "completely in line with the standards of the day" and
that "[t]he practices did not directly violate Ecuadoran law; in fact, the
country had no meaningful environmental regulations at the time." 41 In
other words, behavior that presumably would have been illegal in the
United States at the time, 42 was in all earnestness claimed to be
perfectly legitimate in Ecuador. However, the courts in the United
States, where the case had originally been brought in 1993, found in
2001 that the case had "everything to do with Ecuador and very little to
do with the United States."43 It thereby refused an extra-territorial
application of U.S. law, affirming that a U.S. company did not have to
live up to U.S. standards as long as it acted abroad and the judicial
system there did not take issue with the activities.
It is telling that probably the clearest invocation of international
law in the Chevron case was on the part of the TNC-defendant Chevron.
The legal representatives of the company moved the forum to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration on the basis of the Bilateral Investment
Treaty between the U.S. and Ecuador. All in all, the Chevron case is a
tangible illustration of the failures of domestic, extraterritorial and
international law in governing TNCs in a global environment.
It has so far proven impossible to come to a formal international
agreement, or a treaty specifically addressing TNCs or transnational
commercial activities to alleviate the void. Perhaps such a treaty even
could not alleviate the matter, as it too may be bound to suffer from
many of the structural problems previously explained. It appears very
unlikely that the causes behind the void will disappear any time soon.
The governance of TNCs (or transnational commercial activities more
generally) clearly appears to require responses beyond classic "hard
law".

40. Reversal of Fortune, supra note 1, at 4.
41. Id. at 5.
42. "In the United States, it is standard practice, once the oil has been isolated from
this mixture, to 're-inject' the produced water, pumping it deep underground into dedicated
wells, in order to prevent damage to the local habitat." Id. at 5.
43. Id. at 6.
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III. FILLING WITH "SOFT LAW" THE VOID LEFT BY "HARD
LAW"?
The last two decades have witnessed a continuous proliferation of
instruments-public, private and any combination thereof-that
specifically address TNCs, but seem to do so by expanding beyond the
notion of classic "hard law". Strictly speaking, instruments that fall
outside the category of "law" cannot perhaps alleviate a legal void. But
they may, in more general terms, address the practical problem at stake,
which is abusive company behavior. Instruments other than legal ones
can, in other words, alleviate the policy void in question.
The term "soft law" has often been used to denote these types of
instruments. The multiplicity, volume and variance of such soft
instruments, as well as their coexistence with the "hard law" framework
has created a regulatory situation that is much more difficult to
understand than the 'straight-forward' formal agreements. 44 Scholarly
and practical attention seems necessary to better understand the
possibilities and shortcomings of using "soft law" instruments in filling
the void left by "hard law."
The reasons that are often presented for using "soft law" 45 may be
divided into three generic groups.
Necessity-there exists only limited binding and effective hard
now and in the foreseeable future;
Uniqueness-the coverage of "soft law" instruments is extensive,
and may influence TNCs in ways that "hard law" does not. They can be
much more specific to TNC behavior, and their adoption and adaptation
may be more flexible and quicker; and
Inevitability-the emerging transnational space renders it
inevitable that a separate transnational normative order emerges as well.
It inevitably consists of other types of instruments, as the non-state
actors who operate in this space cannot make "hard law."
A more careful look into these three, partly overlapping groups
appears instructive for properly understanding the reasons that have
been proposed to explain the emergence "soft law" (Sections A and B,
infra). It is important to shortly describe also the views of those more
pessimistic about the use of "soft law" as an alternative or a
complement to classic "hard law". Some authors see "soft law" rather as
working antagonistically against "hard law" (see Section C, infra).
44. The nonnativity of "hard law" also remains to a large extent a mystery. See Martti
Koskenniemi, The Mystery of Legal Obligation, 3 INT'L THEORY 319 (2011 ).
45. See also Jean d' Aspremont, The Politics of Deformalization in International Law 3
Goettingen J. INT'L L. 503 (2011 ).
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A. Turning a Political Necessity into a Virtue - "Soft Law" as an
Alternative or Precursor to "Hard Law"
First of all, non-binding instruments appear to be in many cases a
sheer necessity. As long as no directly applicable, legally binding
instruments specifically aimed at the behavior or TNCs will be adopted
by states, nor existing international and national laws reformed to this
effect, the rationalist perspective is to see "soft law" as the alternative. 46
The large and diverse array of non-legal instruments may simply be the
best attainable means to govern TNCs. A binding international
agreement to govern TNCs directly is indeed unlikely in the foreseeable
future, 47as many states and much of the private sector continue to resist
the idea for the reasons and with the means explained below. At the
same time, however, a certain willingness to adopt instruments of a
voluntary character can be observed.
A related point is to see soft instruments as precursors to formal
agreements. In a situation where an outright formal agreement is
politically unattainable, other types of instruments can be used as
intermediate steps towards it. These alternative instruments may be
used to, for example, experiment with a new rule or to innovatively
encourage changes in the behavior of relevant actors. Exposure to the
new ideas will, the theory assumes, prepare the regulators and
regulatees up to a point where they are ready to take the ultimate step
towards "hard law". 48 This is relatively common in areas with
considerable (scientific) uncertainty regarding the optimal contents and
effects of the policies in tackling a particular problem. 49 However, this

46. Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MrNN. L. Rev. 706, 722
(2010).
47. The last attempt, the 'Norms on Responsibility' did not make it above the level of
a sub-commission of the Human Rights Council. See, e.g., De Feyter, supra note 15, at 8182. And the more recent UN Guiding Principles make explicit that they are not intended as
the precursor to a binding international agreement. See Report of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and
other business enterprises & Report from the Special Representative of the Secretary
General to the U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human

Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework,
A/HRC/17 /31
(Mar.
21,
2011 ),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-l 7-3 l_AEV.pdf (last visited
Feb. 12, 2014).
48. JOHN J. KIRTON & MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK (eds.), HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW:
VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 28
(Ashgate, ed. 2004).
49. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271 (2008).
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type of precursory role for soft instruments is relatively weak in areas
where the obstacles to "hard law" are political, rather than relate to
uncertainty.
Finally, soft law instruments may be seen as a necessity also from
the perspective of non-state actors, in case they themselves act as
regulators: these parties obviously do not even have the direct means to
develop classic "hard law".
B. Unique Qualities of "Soft Law" - A Complement to "Hard
Law"

Soft law instruments often are unique in terms of their versatility,
scope and/or "depth." The large number of different kinds of soft
instruments means that they are many times aimed much more
specifically at the problems caused by the activities of TNCs than are
formally binding instruments. They may be used to address TNC
behavior in more elaborate detail than, for instance, international human
rights conventions, which have an evident legacy as acts aimed
primarily at state behavior and rarely are very specific as to what
amounts to proper or improper behavior. It seems important also for
these reasons to gauge whether and how this large body of instruments
may actually alleviate the policy void on TNCs.
Another, interlinked argument is that soft instruments possess
different qualities than formal international law. Many policy tools
work in ways that are not dependent upon the core characteristic of
"hard law", which is to create legally binding rights and obligations on
parties. Constructivists in particular argue that soft law can promote
discursive, experimentalist processes that can transform the way norms
are perceived and created. 50 Such means may even be preferable from
the perspective of responsive governance. 51 In comparison with rules
that need to go through the entire legislative or treaty-making process,
they may also be much faster to set up and to flexibly change
afterwards. But whether and how exactly such "soft law" could
complement "hard law" is precisely the question that deserves further
clarification. This is all the more so, considering that soft instruments
may even be inevitable or inherent in the phenomenon of globalization.
According to Nijman and Nollkaemper, "[o]ne of the challenges that
globalization poses to legal theory is precisely the emergence of 'nonState' legal orders, and the resulting need for a conceptual framework
50. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at 722.
51. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. Rev. 1015, 1019-20 (2004).
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which enables our discipline to accommodate different legal cultures." 52
In other words, these instruments may correctly reflect the fact that the
activities of TNCs are of such a special kind that they warrant a unique
approach. As noted, if TNCs, NGOs and other non-state parties act
themselves in these transnational normative orders as rule makers, then
there may not even be any other choice but to resort to soft instruments.
TNCs and NGOs simply do not have the capacity under international
law to make legal instruments, nor are they directly subjects of
international law.

C. Counter-Productive Uses of Soft Law- the Antagonist
Approach
Shaffer and Pollack claim that all three principle schools of
thought that address the strengths and weaknesses of soft law and "hard
law"-positivists 53 , rationalists 54 and constructivists 55-tend to see them
as alternatives or mutually supporting complements. 56 These authors
raise doubts about the proposition that new soft instruments are always
adopted with a view to decreasing the policy void. More attention
should be paid to "soft law" as an antagonist to "hard law", 57 because it
frequently leads to inconsistencies and conflicts among norms. Or
52. JAMES NUMAN & ANDRE NOLLKAEMPER, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE
BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW 349 (Oxford University Press, ed. 2007)
(paraphrasing WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 51 (Butterworths
2000)) ("Today, a picture of law in the world must deal with a much more complex picture
involving established, resurgent, developing, nascent and potential forms of legal ordering."
Id. Twining furthermore asks: "[c]an public international law, as traditionally conceived,
cope adequately with such problems as environment, international crime, and basic human
needs or rights at the global level?"); see also Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private
Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power (Osgoode
Paper
No.
45,
2012),
available
at
CLPE,
Working
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2 l 8503 l (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
53. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67 NORDIC J. INT'L. 381
(1998); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 413 (1983).
54. See, e.g., Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?,
INT'L ORGS. 495 (1991); Andrew Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 579 (2005); ANDREW GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONALIST CHOICE THEORY (Oxford University Press 2010); Kal Raustiala, Form and
Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581 (2005).
55. See, e.g., David Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark Nance, "Soft Law," "Hard Law,"

and

European

Integration:

Toward

a

Theory

of

Hybridity,

available

at

http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/Papers/EUC/trubeketal.pdf (last visited Apr. I, 2014).
56. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at 707-08.
57. This argument has been made by others before, albeit in a less comprehensive way.
For example, NGOs, who have long held this position, oppose voluntary instruments in part
because they tend to bring hard law" negotiations to a standstill.
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worse, this may have been the aim from the outset. The antagonistic
behavior has specific implications in a fragmented legal system,
resulting in a "strategic hardening of "soft law" regimes and softening
of hard-law regimes, or in a pre-emption of "hard law" through "soft
law." These kinds of situations arise under conditions of distributive
conflicts between states and in regime complexes, in particular. 58 They
also fit well the notion of legal pluralism, where numerous
heterogeneous legal orders coexist, interact and compete without clear
hierarchies. 59 "Soft law" in this sense is inevitably a part of
globalization.
D. Interactions Between "Soft Law" and "Hard Law"
The last-mentioned, antagonistic perspectives on "soft law" are not
at the core of this paper, which focuses on the ability of "soft law" to fill
the void left by "hard law". It is nevertheless important to realize,
following Shaffer and Pollack, that "hard law" and soft law are not in a
binary either/or relationship. Rather, their interaction is rather one
where specific conditions are conducive to making the actors employ
them as alternatives, complements or antagonists. 6 This paper strives
to contribute to the discourse by exploring the notion of softness and
how that characteristic may reflect in the choice of the instrument in
each individual case. The analysis leads to observations about how on
occasion, neither a hard nor soft type of an instrument is able to fill a
policy void, and that a focus on "soft law" may in fact only be leading
the attempts astray.

IV. FROM THE DEFICIENT NOTION OF "SOFT LAW''
TOWARDS AN ACCURATE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
SOFTNESS
In order to understand whether "soft law" instruments may succeed
in alleviating the policy void in governing TNCs, and if so, how, it is
next pertinent to define in more detail what "soft law" actually means.
As the analysis below will reveal, the term "soft law" is rather
problematic: there seem to be more suitable terms than "soft law" to

58. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at 709, 728.
59. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law?
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT. L. 553 (2002); Roderick A. MacDonald, Metaphors
of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes, and Legal Pluralism, 69 ARIZ. J. INT. & COMP. L. 75
(1998).
60. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at 709.
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describe instruments that are not part of "hard law" in the classic sense
of the term. The terminological analysis will lead to a conceptualization
of instruments, which is believed to be more instructive for
understanding their key characteristics in terms of "softness." With the
tool, the suitability of a number of leading human rights and
environmental instruments that govern TNCs may then be analyzed in
the ensuing Section 5.
A. Definitional Deficiencies of "Soft Law"
1. An Incorrect Concept
The instruments looked at in this paper have often been grouped
together under a single concept: 'soft law.' 'Soft law' is widely used as
a concept to denote all normative instruments that do not amount to
classic "hard law". As Jan Klabbers, a staunch critic of the concept, has
submitted
"[ w]e tend to use the term soft law in order to describe things which
are difficult to describe as "hard law". Thus, guidelines, codes of
conduct, resolutions, recommendations and action programs,
indeterminate provisions of treaties, unratified conventions, perhaps
even the opinions of advocates general or dissenting opinions of
individual judges of the ICJ or the various human rights courts, they
may all perhaps be qualified as 'soft law.' Clearly they are not "hard
law"; clearly they are not totally irrelevant either, so voila: soft law it
must be."61

Klabbers and some other international legal scholars denounce the
idea that law can be "soft." "As soon as soft law is to be applied to any
specific set of circumstances, it collapses into either "hard law", or no
law at all." 62 In a binary world of law and non-law, soft law as an inbetween is incorrect: there either are or are not normative obligations
that are created when the law is applied ex post. The 'soft' part of the
concept creates confusion from another perspective. It glosses over the
fact that many 'soft instruments' have direct effects on the behavior of
states, TNCs and other actors, and they have indirect legal effects by
transforming subsequently into formal international law. Mechanisms
often employed by "soft law", such as economic incentives and
reputational costs, can be much more compulsory than the term soft
would indicate. They may be more effective than "hard law" itself, as
some of the authors noted in Section 3 have suggested.
61. Klabbers, supra note 53, at 385.
62. Id. at 382.
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As for the 'law' part of the concept, it seems rather odd to use it
where states or international organizations have usually quite
purposefully chosen "an instrument that lies outside the realm of law,"
and have thus indicated their specific intention "not to legally commit
themselves."63 Using the term "law" for something that is adopted
explicitly as something other than law threatens to blur the "normativity
threshold." This is so in particular if and when there is a point of
transition between law and non-law, between what does and does not
constitute a legal norm. 64

2. Too Generic a Concept
While soft law may be inaccurate as a concept, it also seems much
too generic to properly guide our understanding regarding the very
different nature, properties and normativity of the various instruments
relating to TNCs and their behavior. As long as there are the soft and
hard ends to the spectrum of instruments, it seems inevitable that there
are also shades of softness and hardness in between. At the very least,
there must be such spectrums from softer to harder within the two
binary categories of law and other instruments. A sharp binary
categorization seems unlikely to be helpful in explaining all the legal as
well as non-legal instruments, each with their different characteristics.
This is so especially for legal instruments with soft dimensions and for
non-legal instruments with hard dimensions. There is no denying the
growing disaggregation of power into myriad spheres of authority,
which may not (fully) be public authorities and that deliver formal and
informal rules and norms of various kinds. 65 There is considerable
66
This is
variance, whichever way one may wish to create categories.
certainly so with respect to instruments addressing the behavior of
TNCs.
Although it is thus not possible to describe all such variance with a
single term "soft law," it would seem equally unadvisable to limit the
use of the term to only a clear but narrow sub-group among the
variance. In this latter case, there is likely to exist a more accurate
63. Jean d' Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New
Legal Materials 19 EUR. J. INT. L. 1075, 1081-82 (2008) (emphasis added).
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2000); WEIL, supra note 51, at 415.
65. Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Techniques
and Politics, 70 Moo. L. Rev. 1 (2007); James Rosenau, Governing the Ungovernable: The
Challenge of Global Disaggregation of Authority, 1 REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 88, 88
(2007).
66. S. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & A. Vihma, Comparing the Legitimacy and
Effectiveness of Global Hard and Soft Power: An Analytical Framework, 3 REGULATION
AND GOVERNANCE 400, 401 (2009).
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descriptive term than "soft law" to explain the instruments in question.
Therefore, a simple dichotomy between "hard law" and soft law
(and also between law and "non-law") alone seems too stiff and
inaccurate to be useful for fully understanding the instruments, which
the terms intend to cover. 67 It remains important to maintain that binary
distinction, because in some contexts-such as domestic or international
adjudication-the legal status of an instrument continues to be relevant
for its softness or hardness. Yet it also seems vital to understand norms
to be on a continuum with a lot of diversity along numerous other
variables. 68
One may thus agree with for example d' Aspremont that a binary
approach to law is not in conflict with the growing complexity of
regulatory tools in contemporary international relations. 69 A binary
division may be maintained, but while distinguishing e.g. the different
regulatory choices and the gradations of normativity in the language
that are available for both legal and non-legal norms. The nuance and
the binary approach are not mutually exclusive. 70
B. The Lay of the Land in the Theory of "Soft Law"
Numerous attempts have been made to make sense of "soft law."
Problematic in these approaches has been the disregard for the idea of
maintaining the binary distinction in parallel with the more fluid
characterizations. The empirical basis of the attempts has also often
been wanting. 71 This Section highlights the views of authors that appear
the most insightful, and which therefore have served as the basis in this
paper for developing the methodology for assessing "soft law."

67. Laszlo Blutman, In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soft Law, 59
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 605, 611 (2010); Matthias Goldmann, Inside Relative Normativity:
From Sources to Standard Instruments for the Exercise of International Public Authority, 9
GERMAN L. J. 1865, 1869 (2008) (Goldmann remarked that the term "soft law" is not much
more than a slightly more elegant way of saying "underconceptualized law." Accordingly,
he continues, we should use formal criteria to divide it into subspecies, each with its own
characteristics).
68. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66, at 402. See also Daniel Bodansky,
The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University Press 2010),
100-0 I, I 06-07 (emphasizing the importance of both legal status, as well as various other
characteristics).
69. d'Aspremont, supra note 63, at 1075.
70. Cf Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 167, 180
( 1996) ("law itself, for all its binariness, is capable of reflecting a whole spectre of subtleties
and nuances; ... law itself can accommodate various shades of grey without losing its
binary character").
71. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66, at 401.
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1. The Three Dimensions of Softness
Amongst the most quoted authors in describing "soft law" are
Abbott et al., who have proposed a continuum of legalization, 72 where
the softness or hardness of legalization may be measured in terms of the
"obligation, precision and delegation" of the measure. Obligation
means the (legally or otherwise) binding nature of the rule, precision
reflects the ability of the rule to unambiguously define conduct and
delegation refers to the extent to which an implementing and
interpretive authority has been defined. 73 Taking these three dimensions
seriously, most international instruments, including those on the 'law'
side of the binary distinction, seem soft in many respects. 74 This is
certainly true of global environmental and human rights treaties with
their many indeterminate provisions and limited delegation to third
parties.
To be more specific, the dimension of "obligation" is dependent
on the mandatory, normative-Abbott et al. use "binding"-nature of
the rule. Obligation seems to be a concept with multiple meanings. It
may indicate especially the mandatory quality of the language of the
instrument. The authority of the actors that adopted the instrument, or a
more general sentiment of obligation caused by the legitimacy of the
instrument is also central. Obligation thus can be linked to the concept
author, which Neil Komesar finds important from an institutional
perspective. 75 As he has suggested, the implications of a policy may
differ greatly according to the author.
"Precision", the second dimension proposed by Abbott et al.,
measures the extent that "that rules unambiguously define the conduct
The third dimension,
they require, authorize, or proscribe."76
"delegation", reminds us that not only the authority of the adopting
entities matters. The instrument's implementation, enforcement and
interpretation are quite relevant. 77 It needs to be determined who, if
72. These authors define legalization as "global regulation through diverse types of
norms."
73. Kenneth W. Abbott et al. , The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 401
(2000).
74. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT'LORG. 421, 422 (2000).
75. N. KOMESAR, 1MPERFECT ALTERNATIVES ' : CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS TN LAW,
ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 4-5 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1997).
76. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 402.
77. The relevance of delegation to the normativity of international norms was already
stressed in Lauterpacht's critical analysis of the auto-interpretive character of international
law, or what he called "self-judging obligations." See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE
FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (Oxford Univ. Press
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anyone, is in charge, and how much authority is being delegated.
The approach of Abbott and Snidal to instrument choice, which
builds on these three dimensions of legalization, emphasizes the role of
different types of legalization in the instrumentalist hands of powerful
states. 78 For example, Chinkin's categories of "soft law" reflect these
three dimensions. 79 Weakening one or more of the dimensions turns
legal arrangements conveniently into "soft law" or vice versa. This is
essential from the perspective of governance, because TNCs may be
able to exert pressure towards the governing authorities on the types of
instruments that will be created.
2. Softness v. Effectiveness
It may be noted that Abbott et al. deliberately avoid assessing the
instruments' effects, as that would conflate delegation with effective
action. 80 Also in the analysis of this paper effectiveness is understood as
conceptually distinct from softness; the two must be evaluated
separately. While softness refers to low levels of obligation, precision
and delegation seems to correlate negatively with effectiveness, the
interrelationship between the two appears rather complex and casespecific. 81 There are many intervening external factors, such as the
degree of stakeholder agreement on the issue, reputational risks and
potential fringe benefits of compliance. Softness is not a conditio sine
qua non of ineffectiveness, nor is hardness a prerequisite of
effectiveness, even if the former usually increases the latter. 2 Indeed,
soft measures can be effective, otherwise the prospect of them acting as
alternatives to "hard law" would not materialize. Similarly, there would
be no need to complement or replace "hard law", if it could not be
1933).
78. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 74, at 421.
79. Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in
International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 850 (1989). The degree of legalization (as
defined by Abbot et al. 's obligation, precision and delegation) is the independent variable,
effectiveness and legitimacy the dependent variables in determining softness. Abbott et al.,
supra note 73.
80. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 402.
81. See Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66, at 414. See, e.g., Jean-Marie
Kamatali, The New Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights' Contribution in
Ending the Divisive Debate over Human Rights Responsibilities of Companies: Is it Time
for an !CJ Advisory Opinion?, 20 CARDOZO J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 437, 449-50 (2012);
Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship,
106 AM. J. lNT'L L. 1, 43-45 (2012); Deborah E. Rupp & Cynthia A. Williams, The Efficacy
of Regulation as a Function of Psychological Fit: Reexamining the /Soft Law Continuum, 12
THEO. lNQ. L. 581, 594-95 (2011).
82. See Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66, at 414.
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ineffective. Thus, by not conflating softness and effectiveness, the
analysis of the instruments of governance remains more detailed and
transparent on the surface. The focus of this paper is precisely on this
softness aspect.
Karlsson-Vinkhyuzen and Vihma take a similar view in their
comparison of international norms: softness is the independent variable,
while effectiveness, together with legitimacy, emerge as the central,
overarching dependent variables. 83

3. lnstrumentum and Negotium
d' Aspremont proposes on the basis of the theory of legal acts that
in contemporary international law, it is either the instrumentum ("the
container") or the negotium (the "content") that can be softened. 84 The
softness of the instrumentum thus pertains to the choice of an instrument
outside the realm of law, defined as formal treaties or binding unilateral
declarations. 85 A soft instrumentum can also produce legal effects, such
as interpretative guidelines of other legal acts, or even customary law in
the long run. However, being such legal fact, capable of creating legal
effects, is according to d' Aspremont not sufficient to qualify it as a legal
act. The latter creates effects only at the explicit will of its authors,
hence the distinction to "hard law". 6
As for the negotium (the content) of a legal act, it can also be softer
or harder. Soft, non-normative content does not produce rules that
would commit the subjects. The negotium of a legal act can be softened
without invalidating it or transforming it to a legal fact. 87 The softness
of the negotium will not affect the status of the instrument as law. It
will, however, reduce law's ability to oblige the parties, reflecting on
the obligation and precision dimensions of Abbot et al.
83. Id. at 401. Their approach thus is wide as it relies on both rationalist and
constructivist theories to cover, respectively, the utilitarian political economy aspects and
the culturo-anthropological aspects of the issue. Effectiveness is for these authors
interdependent with legitimacy, and they both consist of numerous components.
Effectiveness can be understood as the degree to which the set policy objective is achieved
as a consequence of the measure. Note the difference between effectiveness and
compliance. K. Raustiala & D. Victor, Conclusions, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE
659-708 (K. Raustiala, D. Victor & E. Skolnikoff eds., 1998). Note also the difference
between behavioural effectiveness and problem-solving effectiveness. Ariel Underdal, One
Question, Two Answers, in ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS 3-45, at 6-7(E. L.
Miles et al. eds., 2001).
84. d' Aspremont, supra note 63, at 1084.
85. Id. at 1084-85.
86. Id. at 1084-87.
87. Id. at 1084.
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Blutman takes a similar approach using the notions of legal
(formal) source and the substance of the norm. 88 He further notes that
current studies group "soft law" into three: (1) non-binding decisions of
international organisations (2) non-obligatory agreements of states and
(3) recommendations of non-state parties (NGOs). 89 In the first two
groups, the softness emanates from what d' Aspremont called the
negotium - the lack of obligation of the non-binding content of the
norm. In the third group, softness is caused by the instrumentum and
the legislating party. Blutman does not consider the authority of the
author, and indeed probably not the delegation or the instrumentum
either. Moreover, neither precision, effectiveness nor legitimacy, are
directly relevant in this type of categorization. The strength of
categorizations such as Blutman's, lies in their simplicity and ease of
application, as well as the direct link to existing types of instruments.
C. Making Use of the "Soft Law Theories"
It would seem that the above selection of approaches to "soft law"
have varying degrees of explanatory power. Many of them consist of
dimensions that from the perspective of softness constitute continuums
rather than either or type binary choices. A careful combination of the
dimensions, whether continuums or not, appears a useful way to better
conceptualize "soft law" and to understand specific cases of
instruments' softness in international governance.
It seems possible to combine the assessments of softness along
many such dimensions onto a single, summarizing scale. A summary
value of softness may be useful in providing an overview of the
characteristics of the instrument that one is dealing with. It might even
be possible to define a point, a dividing line between soft and hard,
similar to that which we recognize between law and "non-law". One
may wonder, however, to what extent such a point is actually relevant.
First of all, all instruments, be they soft or hard in the end, are in any
event analyzed along the same dimensions of softness, just as water
may be measured for its coldness/hotness. But like water, is there a
metaphysical "melting point" where the definition of an instrument
changes from hard to soft in a way that would represent a drastic change
in its qualities, like (solid, hard) ice changes into (liquid, soft) water?
Most of the instruments are likely to have some degree of
softness/hardness anyway; only at the extremes are instruments entirely
hard or soft.
88. Blutman, supra note 67, at 606.
89. Id. at 607-08.
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Second, it seems important to perceive that any such dichotomy
between soft and hard is indeed only a summary of many aspects. It
appears more relevant to understand what the constitutive dimensions of
each summary value of softness in a particular case may be, in
particular on those dimensions that are close to the extreme ends of the
scales. This is so especially as regards the "instrumentum". On the one
hand, there are legal instruments, which in the context of international
governance consist of the formal sources of international law;
conventions, customary law and binding decisions of international
organizations. On the other hand, there are non-legal instruments, which
are all the other international or transnational public or private
instruments that are not formal sources of international law. 90 A hard
instrumentum thus refers to formal "law", while a soft instrumentum
means that one is not dealing with law. This in turn implies that to
qualify as soft an instrument that in terms of its instrumentum
dimension is "hard (law)", it would need to rank quite low (soft) on
many if not all other dimensions. Conversely, to consider as hard91 a
non-legal (and thus prima facie soft) instrument, it would need to rank
high across many, if not all, dimensions beyond the instrumentum. A
precise obligation by an authoritative NGO with strong oversight on the
implementation could perhaps achieve such hardness in a soft
instrumentum.
Third, an understanding of softness as relative and measured
against the same criteria for all kinds of instruments, whether formal
law or something else, is important. As could be seen in the discussion
in Section 2 on the voids left by (international) "hard law" in governing
TNCs, various types of instruments may have important roles to play.
Perhaps an instrument is not just a second best solution in a particular
case - or for particular ends within that case - but indeed the best, or
even the only means of achieving a policy outcome? 92 The situation for
which the instrument is intended needs to be analyzed along the same
dimensions to know what type of an instrument is required.
Finally, there is still an important aspect from the viewpoint of the
instruments' functioning that could be called systemic coherence. It
relates closely to the above points noted by Shaffer and Pollack: all
legal and non-legal instruments, whether hard or soft, also affect one
90. According to Guzman a categorical difference between harder and softer types of
governance is created here. Guzman, supra note 54, at 580.
91. Blutman describes that it is a common misconception that non-binding "soft law"
would influence less the actions of a state than a binding norm. Blutman, supra note 67, at
612.
92. For further explanation look to the arguments made in Section 3.
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another. Indeed, as was described above, soft instruments are often
seen as an alternative or complement to international "hard law".
Treaties can generate secondary (delegated) rules that may be non-legal.
Treaties can harden existing non-legal instruments, and non-legal
instruments may not only be an alternative or complement to legal
instruments, but also soften them. Non-legal instruments may even
become antagonists that work directly against treaties, as Shaffer and
Pollack have pointed out. 93
The types of conceptualizations portrayed in this Section can be
useful when the hardness/softness of multiple instruments, both legal
and non-legal, is assessed comparatively against one another. As
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma point out, 94 the development of a legal
or non-legal instrument, and subsequently its qualities as a "harder" or
"softer" instrument in global governance, is only one variable in the
evolution that determines the long-term policy outcome. Moreover, the
choice as explained often involves a highly complex set of interrelated,
time- and place-specific variables and impacts. This touches the very
core of modern politics that struggles to address the dynamics of
globalism.
D. Towards a More Accurate Conceptualization of Softness in
Instruments

Linguistic conventions such as "soft law" are difficult to fight
against. 95 Political scientists make the observation that "[a] few
international institutions and issue-areas approach the theoretical ideal
of hard legalization, but most international law is soft in distinct

93. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at 788-96. This would seem to imply that the
effectiveness of an instrument can even be negative from the perspective of the policy
objective: it decreases rather than increases the ability to reach the set policy goal. This is
an important aspect explaining the reasons behind the existence of a legal void in TNC
governance. As was explained earlier, the void on TNCs is in part created by their ability to
influence law-making at various levels of governance. An important way to do so is to
swap from the role of a subject of international norms to that of an author of international
(private) norms by creating alternative (non-legal) norms that are antagonistic to the
objectives of prevailing legal instruments, or to other public instruments such as decisions of
international organizations or joint declarations of states. In other words, if we were to
measure the effectiveness of antagonistic instruments, a scale would need to continue from
"weekly positive" and "none" onto a "negative," when the point of reference are the
prevailing policy objectives rather than the alternative or direct objective of the law or other
instrument in question. Because this paper focuses on ways to fill in the voids left by "hard
law", the antagonistic aspects of non-legal instruments are however, not discussed further.
Id.

94. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66, at 400, 401.
95. Blutman, supra note 67, at 605.
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ways. " 96 The proposal here is to take the above-noted dimensions of
softness, fine-tune them, and use them to describe the instruments more
accurately. The assumption is that such a systemization/categorization
may be helpful to the understanding of policy instruments,
distinguishing for example between their softness and effectiveness. 97
It is further proposed here that each of these dimensions of softness
of Abbott et al. (obligation, precision and delegation) be specified a step
further into a few more accurate, particularly significant subdimensions. The proposed sub-dimensions improve the tool, because
their values seem especially instructive for the processes being studied
in this paper: the behavior of TNCs. 98
The 'obligation' dimension is perhaps the most ambiguous. As
indicated above, it seems that Abbott et al. 99 equate 'obligation' with
'legal obligation'. Such a definition of obligation would, however, not
clearly distinguish the dimension from (i.e. would limit it to) the
concept of instrumentum. The hard v. soft instrumentum distinction in
this paper makes a difference between two types of public instruments:
those that are and those that are not (formal) law. Only formal sources
of law oblige in the hardest sense of legally binding the parties and
being capable of enforcement through judicial means. These qualities
could be qualified as sub-dimensions of obligation, but because of the
importance of the either-or type binary distinction between what is or is
not a legally binding formal source of law, it seems appropriate to tum
them into a dimension of their own. lnstrumentum must therefore be
lifted out of the obligation dimension.
The obligatory nature of the instrument however also appears to
depend on the authority of the 'author' of the instrument and on its
mandatory quality. These should be the focus of the obligation
dimension. First, the authority sub-dimension of obligation reflects the
authority of the author over the addressees of the instrument. Some
institutions that adopt instruments on TNC behavior have more
authority over TNC behavior than others. There are various factors on
which such authority may be based. Authority will depend upon
whether there has been some grant of authority from the addressees of
the instrument to the author. It also turns on the involvement of experts
during the drafting, the perceived quality of the instrument, and whether
96. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 421.
97. Obviously, there is likely to be overlap between the dimensions. A similar
pragmatic approach is taken by Shaffer and Pollack. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at
714.
98. See Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 403.
99. Id. at 401.
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the process leading to the text has allowed for consultations with the
addressees. In other words, the relationship between the authors and the
constituency of the instrument matters. This also explains why a single
institution ("author") may have authority in one specific case, but less
so in another. A higher level of authority will make the instrument
more obliging, and hence harder, regardless of its public or private
character.
Instruments created by the addressees themselves are usually
referred to as self-regulation, distinguishing them from other private
rule making by third parties. It is difficult to generalize whether a rule
to which specific private parties (such as TNCs) have committed
themselves is more obligatory or less obligatory than that created by
some other private parties without the involvement and/or assent of the
former (i.e. TNCs). Some NGOs are more highly regarded by TNCs
than others in terms of their expertise or trustworthiness, whereas others
may be more feared because of their effective publicity campaigns. All
such factors influence whether TNCs regard instruments to be
authoritative. It would also seem important to extend the obligation
dimension to the negotium, the contents of the instrument. A legal
instrumentum can contain a negotium devoid of any obligatory
language, such as 'shall'. At the same time, a non-legal instrumentum
can contain a negotium that is worded in unmistakably mandatory
terms. 100 The provisions of both legal and non-legal instruments can
attempt to guide the behavior of their addressees "in a stronger or
weaker fashion." 101 The obligation dimension hence would seem to
consist of two sub-dimensions: authority and the mandatory nature of
the instrument.
Also the precision dimension would, at least with regard to the
particular subject-matter of TNCs, seem to be improved if divided into
two sub-dimensions. Abbott et al.' s concept of precision related to the
object of the rule ratione materiae: "that rules unambiriously define
the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe." 10 This is the
accuracy of the instrument. But precision would also seem to include
the specificity of an instrument towards certain actors or issues. Softness
or hardness of an instrument in terms of a certain group of actors such
as TNCs, also depends on whether the rules specifically address that

100. See A. Aust, Alternatives to Treaty-Making: MOUs as Political Commitments, in
THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 46-72 (D. B. Hollis ed., Oxford University Press 2012).
101. D. BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
103 (Harvard Univ. Press 2010).
102. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 401.
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group. The softness in other words is influenced also by the scope of
the instrument ratione personae. A narrow, specific scope increases
hardness especially in the international context, where the absence of an
institutional framework moves the ex post interpretation and application
of general rules to the hands of the actors to be governed-the TNCs, in
this case, and also states within whose jurisdiction the TNCs act. 103 The
precision dimension therefore is enhanced by including the subdimension of "specificity" in addition to what could be redefined as its
"accuracy".
Delegation, 104 finally, concerns primarily the question of how
much authority to implement and enforce the instrument is delegated to
others, how much is retained by the author of the instrument, and how
much simply remains undetermined. Delegation to third parties
increases hardness, and is vital where precision in terms of specificity is
low. 105 Delegation of interpretive authority is a variety of delegation
that links back directly to accuracy, i.e. precision ratione materiae.
Furthermore, the softness of the delegation also appears to depend
on to whom exactly the authority is delegated, i.e. the authorship of the
delegated acts. Close ties, even a shared identity amongst those
authorized to implement the instrument and those addressed by it soften
the delegation dimension. Delegation is harder when an auditor or
NGOs enforce the instrument, than where the TNCs, as the subjects of
the instrument, enforce their own rules. It is also important to
distinguish between delegation in rule-making and dispute settlement
(i.e. judicial) functions. 106
To sum up, the tool proposed here incorporates the following
dimensions of softness:
•

the instrumentum (formal source of law v. other instruments);

•

obligation (authority and mandatory nature of the language);

•

precision (accuracy and specificity); and

•

delegation (extent and authority of delegation).

These softness-related dimensions measure only specific qualities
of the instrument. They may be combined and may interact with
numerous other qualities of the instruments, such as how quickly they

103.
104.
interpret,
at 401.
105.
106.

Id. at 414.
"Delegation means that third parties have been granted authority to implement,
and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules." Id.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 408.
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can be enacted, how representative they are, etc. A discussion on the
qualities of the instrument itself also easily merges into a discussion on
the impacts that the instruments have. International lawyers and legal
scholars often concentrate on compliance, while political scientists
assess e.g. the effectiveness, dynamic and static efficiency, legitimacy
and administrative burden of the instrument, with a clear emphasis on
effectiveness. 107 Mitchell convincingly argues that compliance is only a
subset of effectiveness, and indeed from the perspective of this paper it
is the final policy outcome-a change in the environmental and human
rights behavior of TNCs-that is relevant. 108 As this paper specifically
addresses the question of the aptness of "soft law" instruments to
govern TNCs, the effectiveness of instruments thus is a relevant, yet
limited part of the analysis. It is worth repeating that softness and
effectiveness are separate but interrelated issues, and that only softnessrelated qualities are analyzed in this article; the other qualities of the
instruments are not assessed. 109
The following tool emerges:

107. R.B. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 146-80 (Sage
2010).
108. Id.; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66.
109. Qualities such as static and dynamic efficiency, and administrative burden, are
typically assessed.
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The aspect of systemic coherence-the complementing, replacing,
precursory or antagonistic impacts that the instruments have against
each-seems worth bringing forth in some examples in view of the
earlier discussion. The coherence may be depicted as follows:

Figure 2. Systemic coherence of soft law instruments.

E. Applying the Tool on Public Legal Instruments, Public Nonlegal Instruments and Private Instruments
In order to structure the application of the tool to particular
environmental and human rights instruments in Section V, it is useful to
categorize the instruments in a preliminary fashion. First, as was
indicated in Section IV.A., it is possible to distinguish between the
formal sources of international law (legal instrumentum) and the nonlegal or "soft" instrumentum. It is not implied that non-legal instruments
cannot bind actors politically, nor that they cannot be successful in
addressing a policy problem. The distinction simply reflects that such
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instruments cannot legally bind states and can in most cases not be
enforced through judicial means. Therefore, there are some good
reasons why non-legal instruments cannot operate in the same way as
legal instruments.
Second, the broad non-legal category can be further sharpened 110 by
separating public instruments from private instruments. 111 Three broad
categories of instruments can thus be identified: 112
• Public Legal Instruments are the formal sources of
international law - i.e. the legal instrumentum within the
context of the international legal order - consist primarily of
conventions, customary law and binding decisions of
international organizations. These instruments are in the left
column of Table 1, while non-legal instruments form the
right column.
• Public Non-Legal Instruments include the output of
international organizations, two or more states collectively,
or even more loose gatherings of public officials (such as
collaborative networks), that are however not laid down as
formal international law. 113
'Public' thus denotes the
centrality of public actors: state representatives,
intergovernmental organizations, other public officials.
• Private Instruments 114 in contrast include the output of
private or primarily private transnational initiatives, such as
guidelines or standards. A few instruments, such as the UN
Global Compact and other public-private partnerships,
partly fit under either category, public or private. The
distinction public/private may be particularly relevant in the
area of TNCs, where the private authorship of an instrument
110. Cf. Id.
111. Compare the IN-LAW project which leaves private formal instruments outside of
its ambit.
JOOST PAUWELYN, RAMSES WESSEL & JAN WOUTERS (eds.), INFORMAL
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING (Oxford University Press 2012).
112. These three groups are different from those distinguished by Blutman: the output
of international organizations; non-binding output of states directly other than what is part
of the formal sources of international law; and the output of civil society which is per
definition non-binding. Blutman, supra note 67, at 607.
113. Blutman distinguishes more categorically between state instruments and
instruments adopted by international organizations. However, because the adoption of
instruments within international organizations is heavily influenced by states a further
distinction would not seem useful or justifiable.
114. The type of private instruments that this article analyses are never legal
instruments, so that the addition 'non-legal' is superfluous. Private actors are of course
perfectly capable of adopting legal instruments in the form of private law contracts, but
those are outside the scope of this research.
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usually points to the involvement of either the regulated
TNCs themselves or their staunchest critics, NGOs. The
difference between the Public Non-Legal and Private (NonLegal) Instruments (as well as the overlap between them) is
highlighted with background shadings in the right-hand
column of Table 1 below.
The most noteworthy environmental and human rights instruments
can be grouped into these three categories of Public Legal Instruments,
Public Non-Legal Instruments and Private Instruments as shown in
Figure 3 below.

LEGAL
INSTRUMENTUM
(Formal Sources of
International Law)

PUBLIC
(States and IOs)

V .A. Public Legal
Instruments

•

ICCPR, ICESCR,
other human
rights treaties;

•

Multilateral
Environmental
AgreementsSecurity Council
Decisions

NON-LEGAL
INSTRUMENTUM
(Other than formal
sources of
international law)
V.B. Public NonLegal Instruments

•

UN Guiding
Principles on
Business and
Human Rights

•

OECD
Principles on
Multinational
Enterprises

•

UNEP
Guidelines 115

115. E.g., Charles Thomas, Tessa Tennant & Jon Rolls, The GHG Indicator: UNEP
Guidelines for Calculating Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Businesses and Non Commercial
Organizations
(2000),
available
at
http://www. unepfi .org/fileadmin/documents/ghg_indicator_2000 .pdf (last visited Mar. 25,
2014).
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PUBLICPRIVATE
(Mix of States/
IOs and TNCs/
NGOs)

-

PRIVATE
(TNCs)

-

PRIVATE
(NGOs)

-

• UN Global
Compact
• UN Business
Partnerships
• Equator
Principles
• Voluntary
Principles on
Security and
Human Rights
V.C. Private
Instruments
• Corporate
Codes of
Conduct
• Extractive
Industries
Transparency
Initiative
• Forest
Stewardship
Council's
Forest
Principles
• !SEAL
Alliance-labels
• Social
Accountability
International
Standards

Figure 3. Categories of environmental and human rights instruments.
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It seems that instruments belonging to different categories are
likely to denote certain recurring combinations of dimensions of
softness. These dimensions are marked in Figure 4 below, although
there may also of course be other soft characteristics as the analysis
further below will clearly show.
Public Non-legal
instruments

PrivateNon-legal

instruments

Figure 4. Hypothetical Illustration of the "softness" of instruments.

The possibility of such different dynamics of softness, as well as
different underlying explanations, justify a separate analysis of
instruments from each of the three categories. The categories of Public
Legal Instruments, Public Non-Legal Instruments and Private
Instruments thus constitute Sections V.A., V.B. and V.C. in the
discussion that follows below.

V. APPLYING THE CONCEPTUAL TOOL ON SOFTNESS TO

PRACTICAL CASES
In this Section, the conceptual tool created in the preceding
Section is applied to practical case examples on human rights and
environmental instruments that deal with TNCs. The approach has two
objectives. First, the tool's scores along the dimensions of softness
enable a sharper differentiation of the numerous instruments that apply
to TNCs. Second, the application of the tool will allow for observations
of potential connections between the instrument's softness (both along
individual dimensions and overall) and how it operates. Ultimately, this
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enables preliminary reflections on the relationship between (categories
of) instruments' softness and their effectiveness. It might even enable
the grouping of measures into some type of sub-categories on the basis
of their softness, as measured along the dimensions.
The instruments that are to be analyzed have been selected for
their central place in the legal system for this area (Human Rights
Covenants), for their high profile (UN Guiding Principles, OECD
Guidelines) or their visibility towards the public (UN Global Compact,
Forest Stewardship Council). In the TNC context, instruments often
combine human rights with environmental protection.
As may be recalled from the previous Section, the preliminary
application of the tool grouped instruments into three general
categories, that are each discussed in the Sections that follow: Public
Legal Instruments (Section A), Public Non-Legal Instruments (Section
B) and Private Instruments (Section C). 116 The instruments have been
chosen so as to provide case examples that are representative of each of
those categories. 117 The selected instruments for each category will be
scrutinized along the (sub )dimensions of softness of the conceptual
tool-obligation (authority and mandatory nature of the language);
precision (accuracy and specificity); and delegation (extent and
authority of delegation)-to add further nuance to the analysis.
A. Public Legal Instruments
1. Preliminary Observations
Instruments that are formal sources of international law-treaties
and binding decisions of international organizations-possess a legal
instrumentum, and have thereby specific characteristics compared to
non-legal instruments: only formal sources of law are capable of
creating obligations that are hard in the sense of being legally binding
and capable of enforcement through judicial means.
Most international law, aside from a few obligations under
customary law, is nonetheless not applicable to TN Cs directly 118 as was
explained in Section II. Treaties and binding decisions of international
organizations also usually do not specifically address TNC behavior.
116. A few of the examples amount to such an important participation of both private
and public actors that they may also be considered to constitute a separate public-private
category.
117. The first group, Public Legal Instruments, were already discussed in Section 2 to
establish the existence of a legal void. The observations in the following section on them
will therefore build upon the previous analysis in Section 2.
118. NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 22, at 58-59.
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The hardness of the instrumentum of Public Legal Instruments is
therefore in the particular context of international governance not
equaled in the negotium part when measured along the dimensions of
creating obligations on TNCs and being specific in doing so.
Authority as a sub-dimension of "obligation" emanates in this
category of instruments from public authors, states and, to a much lesser
extent, international organizations. However, a state as a public
authority is not always authoritative as a rule maker, when it adopts
instruments to address its own behavior, the obliging authority of the
instrument is at the state's own discretion, and thus lower than when it
is set by a binding Security Council Chapter VII resolution. States also
do not have much authority over activities that take place outside their
jurisdictions, which is very relevant in the context of TNCs. This type
of exception therefore limits public authorities' power in terms of the
obligatory nature of the enacted instrument.
On the other (sub-)dimensions in the tool, the softness of Public
Legal Instruments may in principle vary like it varies in all other types
of instruments. In the absence of direct obligations and likely poor
specificity, the tool places special emphasis on the delegation dimension
of international public law instruments. Are the implementing tasks
comprehensively delegated, and do the delegatee bodies possess the
necessary authority to oversee the process? It should be kept in mind
that because the states in any event need to act in-between the
international requirements and TNCs, there already are two steps in
applying international public law instruments.
The delegation
dimension of the tool shows how there is one further step to be taken
into account.
The state's implementing authority and responsibility to apply the
international provisions is often delegated to a public body such as a
ministry or agency. Although an actor other than the TNCs
themselves, the authority of the delegation is limited by the fact that it
was these very states that adopted the instruments in question, and they
are addressed to these very same states. The implementing and
interpretive authorities are in this sense not delegated to a truly
independent actor. The state's independent authority in the delegation
will depend on many factors, but there is often little in the instruments
to guarantee it, and much to restrain it. For example, the interests of the
state may be too close to that of the TNCs for it to exercise
'independent' delegated authority over the corporations. This holds true
for host states, as the Chevron case vividly illustrated, but also for home
states, which may be unwilling to constrain the operations of 'their'
corporations abroad.
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Another problem is that international jurisdictional laws limit the
authority that is legally delegated to the home state. Home state organs
enforcing or adjudicating on 'their' corporations may rightly fear that
such extensive exercises of jurisdiction are for the most part prohibited
by international law. The Shell Nigeria case showed that even where a
home state judge declares itself competent, it may only be able to apply
the law of the host state, which in that case was far below the standards
prescribed by the home state. 119 Third, a state may be unlikely to
proactively enforce the rules, and will often only intervene if the victims
or their representatives bring a case against the state authorities. Local
inhabitants or vigilant NGOs may be required to force the state to
assume its role as the delegatee. An example is again the Chevron case,
where only a decades-long effort by interest groups was able to move
the case forward.
Truly relevant delegation would mean third party oversight over
the states' performance of their delegated tasks with regard to TNCs.
The following sections will show that such oversight is nevertheless
often deficient on all levels: national, regional as well as international.
In conclusion, also the delegation sub-dimension seems therefore rather
soft for many Public Legal Instruments on TNCs.
A tentative picture can thus already be envisaged .before applying
the tool to provisions of particular Public Legal Instruments in areas of
human rights covenants and multilateral environmental agreements.
Public Legal Instruments are formally binding upon states that are
parties to them, but not upon TNCs nor do they generally contain
mandatory and precise requirements specifically about their behavior, or
delegation of oversight regarding state actions vis-a-vis TNCs. Public
Legal Instruments thus appear soft along all dimensions in their
application to TNCs. The conclusion seems almost counter-intuitive.
'Hard law' could leave a void in terms of TNCs because it is in fact not
hard at all.

2. The Human Rights Covenants
The human rights covenants ICCPR (International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights) and ICESCR (International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) illustrate the softness that may
plague Public Legal Instruments in the field of human rights. The
Covenants amount only to what Knox calls a due diligence obligation,

119. See supra Section 2.5.3; Milieudefensie v. Dutch Royal Shell (LJN: BU3535)
(2013).
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"an obligation of conduct and effort, not of result," 120 regarding human
rights violations between private actors such as TNCs and individual
citizens. It is sufficient for the state governments to satisfy their
obligations to just take "reasonable steps" in trying to prevent
violations. Individual states and national legal orders retain rather large
discretion to determine appropriate measures.
Admittedly, the Human Rights Committee has commented that
states must protect individuals "also against acts committed by private
persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights
in so far as they are amenable to application between private parties or
entities.'' 121 But how exactly the rights apply to private actors, and
which actions are required of states in particular situations is left to the
states themselves to determine. Moreover, the General Comments of
the Covenant's bodies are not legally binding. Research conducted
under the UN Special Representative for business and human rights'
mandate shows that in practice, very few states actually have "special
policies, programs, or tools designed specifically to deal with corporate
human rights challenges." 122 The conclusion is that the "due diligence"
standard leads to a low level of obligation, and that the lack of accurate
guidance on which actions are a part of that due diligence standard
amounts to a low level of precision, both in terms of accuracy and
specificity.
As for the duties of home states to oversee that corporations based
within their jurisdiction respect human rights extra-territorially, the
Covenants are even more ambiguous: "The committees have not
expressly interpreted the treaties as requiring states to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over abuses committed abroad by
corporations domiciled in their territory. Nor however, do they seem to
regard the treaties as prohibiting such action, and in some situations
they have encouraged it." For example, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has suggested that state parties take steps to
"prevent their own citizens and companies" from violating rights in
other countries. 123 Thus, the dimensions of obligation and precision
appear to be for home states even softer than for host states.

120. Knox, supra note 21, at 22.
8, UN Doc.
121. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31,
CCPR/21/Rev.l/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
122. See Human Rights Council, Human Rights Policies and Management Practices:
Results from Questionnaire Surveys of Governments and the Fortune Global 500 Firms, UN
Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add. 3 (Feb. 28, 2007).
123. Ruggie, supra note 9, at 830.
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Is the softness of such low levels of obligation and precision
mitigated through oversight by third parties, delegation? The Human
Rights Committee (HRC) and the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (the Human Rights Bodies) may be considered as a kind
of 'secondary' delegatee: they monitor whether the states complete their
delegated task of providing horizontal protection. Such interventions by
the Human Rights Bodies will not be able to strengthen the delegation
much in practice, however, as it is widely acknowledged that these UN
bodies have only very limited powers. The so-called 'views' the HRC
adopt in specific cases are non-binding as are the General Comments of
both committees.
Regional courts such as the European Court of Human Rights
have declared themselves incompetent to assert jurisdiction outside the
territory of the member states of the European Convention on Human
Rights, except where a member state exercises effective control, but this
is only possible in cases of either full occupation 124 or military action on
the ground. 125 In the developing regions, where the consequences of the
void are felt most, oversight mechanisms are much weaker. They are
practically absent in Asia, 126 while the African Court of Human and
Peoples' Rights is slowly starting to make use of its competences. 127
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights seems in this respect most
promising in the short term. However, the primary focus of all these
courts often is, or at least should be, in scrutinizing government's own
inappropriate conduct. Scrutiny of governmental oversight of corporate
conduct would seem a second-tier priority.
The Shell-Nigeria case implies that home state courts will at most
oversee that the state applies to national corporations the domestic law
of the host state, but not that it applies the ECHR or the ICCPR. The
OECD National Contact Points are a very modest attempt to oversee
human rights violations outside ECHR territory. The Contact Points fall
in this paper under the next category of Public Non-Legal Instruments.
124. Cyprus v. Turkey, A. 25781/94, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 731, 1 76, (2001); Loizidou v.
Turkey, App. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 162, (1995).
125. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, A. 55721/07, 53 E.H.R.R. 18, (2011); Bankovic
& others v. Belgium, A. 52207/99, 12 December 2001, para. 82.
126. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) has as
of yet no real judicial powers. See James Munro, The Relationship Between the Origins and
Regime Design of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR),
15 lNT'L J. HUM. RTS., (2011).
127. A first decision was issued on 15 December 2009, in the matter of Michelot
Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal. See Chacha Bhoke Murungu, Judgment in the
First Case Before the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: A Missed Opportunity
or a Mockery of International Law in Africa?, 3 J. AFRICAN & INT' LL. 187 (2010).
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These examples are well aligned with the conclusions of the UN
Special Rapporteur. States seem to escape effective oversight by other
delegated bodies, irrespective of the level of governance.
3. Environmental Agreements

The previous discussion on Public Legal Instruments in the field
of human rights indicated that these tools often lack in terms of their
obligation, precision and delegation.
International environmental
agreements may however be used to illustrate that such deficiencies are
not an unavoidable characteristic of Public Legal Instruments, but rather
a consequence of more or less deliberate choices in constructing the
instruments. In other words, hardness is possible to achieve, also in
international law. The International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage (the CLC Convention) 1992, 128 provides an
instructive example. The CLC Convention is an international maritime
treaty that was adopted to ensure that adequate compensation is
available for oil pollution damage caused by accidents of oil tankers. 129
Article IX of the Convention states that "[ eJach Contracting State shall
ensure that its Courts possess the necessary jurisdiction to entertain such
actions for compensation."
The convention is extremely precise and framed in mandatory
terms. It reads almost like an insurance contract. 130 Paradoxically, as the
128. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Civil
Liability Convention, (CLC)), International Maritime Organization (Nov. 29, 1969),
available
at
http://www. imo .org/About/Conventions/ListOft:onventions/Pages/InternationalConvention-on-Civi l-Liability-for-Oil-Po llution-Damage-( CLC).aspx (last visited Mar. 27,
2014).
129. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov.
29,
1969,
973
U.N.T.S.
14097,
available
at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTSNolume%20973/volume-973-I-14097English.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
130. For example, paragraphs 1-3 of Article V state:
The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention in
respect of any one incident to an aggregate amount calculated as follows:
4,510,000 units ofaccount for a ship not exceeding 5,000 units of tonnage;
for a ship with a tonnage in excess thereof, for each additional unit of tonnage, 631
units of account in addition to the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (a);
provided, however, that this aggregate amount shall not in any event exceed
89,770,000 units of account
The owner shall not be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention if it is
proved that the pollution damage resulted from his personal act or omission,
committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge
that such damage would probably result.
For the purpose of availing himself of the benefit of limitation provided for in
paragraph 1 of this Article the owner shall constitute a fund for the total sum
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text of for example the Preamble and Articles III and V of the
Convention show, a central aim of the Convention is in fact to limit the
liability of the ship owners. A number of scholars indeed criticize the
way in which a regime, which was meant to establish a balance between
the needs of the victims of oil spills (compensation for the harm) and
the needs of the economic actors (continuation of activities), favors the
latter. 131 The victims of a recent oil spill, caused by the tanker Erika,
have for that reason sought to escape the limitations of the international
civil liability regime. They try to rely on the more protective provisions
of national criminal law or EU waste legislation, 132 instead. 133 All other
public law instruments such as the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("HR
Convention") also seem incapable of alleviating the victims' concerns.
The precision and delegation of the HR Convention is low and much
inferior to that of the CLC Convention.
The example demonstrates how a Public Legal Instrument can be
very hard in terms of its obligations, precision and delegation, and that
representing the limit of his liability with the Court or other competent authority of
any one of the Contracting States in which action is brought under Article IX or, if
no action is brought, with any Court or other competent authority in any one of the
Contracting States in which an action can be brought under Article IX. The fund can
be constituted either by depositing the sum or by producing a bank guarantee or
other guarantee, acceptable under the legislation of the Contracting State where the
fund is constituted, and considered to be adequate by the Court or other competent
authority. Id.
131. Cf A.E. Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National
and International Law, 17 OXFORD J. ENV. L. 3 (2005); EDWARD H.P. BRANS, LIABILITY
FOR DAMAGES TO PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES: STANDING, DAMAGE, AND DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT (200 I); LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT (Colin M. De la
Rue ed., 1993); Gotthard M. Gauci, Protection of the Marine Environment Through the
International Ship-Source Oil Pollution Compensation Regimes, 8 Rev. EUR. COMP. & INT'L
ENVT. L. 29 (1999); Magnus Goransson, Liability for Damage To The Marine Environment,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND
FUTURE CHALLENGES 345, 345-58 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone eds., 1999); David
Wilkinson, Moving The Boundaries of Compensable Environmental Damage Caused by
Marine Oil Spills: The Effect of two New International Protocols, 5 OXFORD J. ENVTL. L. 71
(1993). For more critical approaches, see Anne Daniel, Civil Liability Regimes as a
Complement to Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Sound International Policy or
False Comfort?, 12 Rev. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVT. L. 225 (2003); Michael Faure & Wang
Hui, The International Regimes for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: Are They
Effective?, 12 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVT. L. 242 (2003); Armelle Gouritin, The
International Regime for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage. A Good Candidate to
Have a Human Rights Approach?, 20 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVT. L.194 (2011); and
Drame lbrahima, Recovering Damage to the Environment per se Following an Oil Spill:
The Shadows and Lights of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions of 1992, 14 Rev. EUR.
COMP. & INT'L ENVT. L. 63 (2005).
132. See Case C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer v. Total Fr. SA, 2008 E.C.R. 1-4501.
133. See Gouritin, supra note 132, at 194-207.
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it may then tend to be working to shield rather than to govern the
specific powerful group of TNCs, in the quoted example the shipping
compames.

4. Concluding Perspectives on Public Legal Instruments
The application of the softness tool on Public Legal Instruments
reveals that they tend to score low on the mandatory language, precision
and specificity in terms of managing TNCs and other private actors.
The level of obligation for states in fulfilling their tasks as delegatees
also remains ambiguous. Especially the extra-territorial enforcement of
home state laws against national corporations is rare. In many respects,
the 'hard law' turns out not to be hard at all, even if there clearly is
potential for it be so.

Hard

Soft

Figure 5. Softness of TNC related Public Legal Instruments in human rights
and environmental protection.

B.

Public Non-Legal Instruments

1. Preliminary Observations
The second group, Public Non-Legal Instruments contains
agreements between state parties, state-centric institutions or even
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looser gatherings of public officials. The proliferation of international
organizations has increased the importance of public yet non-legal
instruments, 134 and this is also true for the governance of TNCs. Such
instruments are therefore not a new phenomenon in international
governance, and their longstanding role has been described by scholars
such as Schachter, Lipson and Aust. 135
The obvious observation on the softness of the entire category of
Public Non-Legal Instruments is what distinguishes them from formal
law: that governments and international organizations (I Os) have opted
for a non-legal instrumentum, that is not formal law. The non-legal
nature of the instrumentum is often reflected in the denominations of the
instruments, such as 'recommendations' or 'guidelines'. Sometimes a
closer analysis of the IO's constitutive instrument, or of the content of
the agreement, is necessary to establish that one is indeed dealing with a
non-legal instrumentum.
Many Public Non-Legal Instruments that relate to TNC behaviour
are adopted through, or by, IOs such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation in Europe (OECD), the United Nations (UN) and the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Their authority
tends to vary on a case-by-case basis: the UN as an eminent
organization can assert great moral authority on state and TNC
activities, while the OECD is regarded highly by TNCs for its
competence and expertise on economic issues. The obligations created
by the authority of other IOs, for instance UNEP, towards TNCs are in
many cases softer. What is relatively new in Public Non-Legal
Instruments is that increasingly they contain a mixture of provisions that
are intended to directly cover the behaviour of non-state actors, even
though the non-state actors have no official part in the adoption of such
instruments. This increases the obligatory nature of the instruments
towards TNCs. On the other hand, the member states of international

134. JOSE E. Alvarez, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS (2005). See,
e.g.' CHRISTIAN BRUTSCH & DIRK LEHMKUHL, Complex Legalization and the Many Moves to
Law, in LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 9, 9-27 (Christian Brutsch
& Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007) (discussing the increase in international law making and
legalization of transnational relations); Kai Raustiala, Institutional Proliferation and the
International Legal Order, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 293, 293-316 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff &
Mark A. Pollack eds., 2012) (referring to institutional proliferation and the rise of
institutional density).
135. See Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International
Instruments, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 787 (1986); Charles Lipson, Why are Some
International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495 (1991); Oscar Schachter, The
Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977).
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organizations voting in favor of such instruments tend to equate them
with political agreements. The language of the instruments is not
mandatory, and hence does not create obligations: not on the TNCs, the
states, nor on the IOs adopting them. The member states rather tend to
share the idea that the TNCs' behaviour needs to change in certain
ways, and wish to point each other's actions into that direction. The
instruments that are directly addressed to TNCs only encourage them to
act in a certain way.
The sub-dimensions of precision-the accuracy and specificity of
the instruments - appear to vary widely in Public Non-Legal
Instruments. Specificity perhaps tends to be the 'harder' sub-dimension
of the two, as the instruments occasionally address specific kinds of
businesses and specific types of TNC behavior, but are less often very
accurate about what exactly the states and TNCs are in practice
expected to do.
Finally, the delegation dimension tends to be low across Public
Non-Legal Instruments, as the implementation and interpretation of the
instruments is mostly left to the enacting states and IOs themselves.

2. The OECD Guidelines and National Contact Points
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) adopted the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in
1976, and revised them in 2000 and 2011. The OECD Guidelines are
"recommendations addressed by governments to multinational
enterprises operating in or from" OECD Member States adhering to the
Guidelines. 136 They "provide non-binding principles and standards for
responsible business conduct in a global context," 137 thus apparently
aiming to fill the void left by the Human Rights Covenants with their
The Guidelines encourage
unclear stance on extra-territoriality.
companies to "[r]espect the internationally recognised human rights of
those affected by their activities," 138 "wherever they operate." 139
In terms of precision, the OECD Guidelines are thus specifically
addressed at multinational enterprises and are quite accurate as to what
is expected from them. For example, the Guidelines state that

136. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., OECD Guidelines on Multinational
Enterprises 3 (2011 ), available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323 .pdf (last
visited Feb. 11, 2014) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
137. Id.
138. Id. at 19.
139. Id. at 17.
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[a] State's failure either to enforce relevant domestic laws, or to
implement international human rights obligations or the fact that it may
act contrary to such laws or international obligations does not diminish
the expectation that enterprises respect human rights. 140
However, much of the language is not phrased as obligations. In
most provisions, 'should', 'seek ways to' or 'does not diminish the
expectation' in the provisions just quoted above prevail over 'shall', 141
It remains unclear where in the Guidelines an obligation for the TN Cs 142
to actually act in accordance with them is really created. Perhaps it
flows from the 'procedural' obligations that are phrased in more
mandatory terms. 143 For instance, TNCs-if acting in accordance with
the Guidelines-must have an internal policy on human rights, carry out
human rights due diligence and "provide for or co-operate through
legitimate processes in the remediation of adverse human rights
impacts." 144 Yet the Guidelines do not mention any sanctions on
transnational corporations that do not carry out such tasks. It should be
recalled that for the TNCs, the Guidelines indeed only establish nonbinding principles. The ability of the procedural provisions of the
Guidelines to set obligations that amount to a high level of hardness in
the sense of the tool will hence depend on the authority of the
instrument, and the OECD more generally. As was noted above, the
corporate community would seem to regard the organization rather
highly. 145
A further dimension along which to measure the hardness of the
Guidelines is the delegation of their implementation and enforcement.
The Guidelines do set legally binding obligations on the OECD member
states in this respect. The states must, amongst other things, establish
"National Contact Points" ("NCPs") to assist companies and their
stakeholders in complying with the Guidelines. 146 This obligation finds
a legal backrest in Article 5(a) of the OECD Convention, which
specifically mandates state parties to follow the OECD Guidelines'
procedural and institutional rules regarding the setting up of NCPs and

140. Id. at 38.
141. See e.g., OECD Guidelines, supra note 137, art. IV.1-IV.3.
142. The OECD Guidelines uses the terminology "MNEs." Id.
143. Id. art. IV.4-IV.6.
144. Id.
145. For an example of a critical approach to the authority of the OECD Guidelines,
see Oldenziel & Wilde-Ramsing, OECD Guidelines lack teeth, influence, OECD WATCH
(Sept. 25 , 2009), available at http://oecdwatch.org/news-en/oecd-guidelines-lack-teethinfluence (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
146. OECD Guidelines, supra note 137, Part II.I.
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the proceedings that they are to follow. 147 However, 1t 1s doubtful
whether the NCPs may be considered independent from the executive
branch of the states that establish them. As noted, this triggers
problems on the role of the state as a delegatee. 148 This problem is
slightly less serious in OECD Guidelines than in many Public Legal
Instruments, because the state is implementing standards that apply
directly to the TNCs instead of relying on their indirect application
through the duty to protect. It has been argued that the NGOs also play
the role of a delegatee, next to the NCPs themselves, because the
procedure allows NGOs to bring cases to the attention of the NCPs. 149
In practice, this is the way in which a case usually reaches an NCP.
A more serious problem is the limited extent of delegation. The
ultimate power of the NCPs resides in their ability to make public
statements. While the power of negative publicity in inducing changes
in TNC behavior ( or at least in the image it wishes to promote) should
not be underestimated, it usually still falls short of the obligatory force
of for instance monetary fines or the judicial prosecution of individuals.
There are nevertheless good reasons to doubt the extent to which the
NCPs are, or can be expected to be, performing their tasks as effective
implementers and interpret of the Guidelines. In fact, there is no sign
that TNCs would actually have been publically reproached in more
cases than the odd one out. For example, in the eleven cases over a
period of ten years-a low figure in itself-on which the NCP of the
Netherlands so far has reached a Final Report, not once did it find a
reason to publicize the violations of substantive rights. 150 In but a few
cases did it find that transparency, communication and other such more
14 7. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
art.
5(a),
OECD
(Dec.
14,
1960),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/general/conventionontheorganisation foreconomiccooperationanddevelopment.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) [hereinafter COECD].
148. The Netherlands tried to mitigate this problem by making its NCP a more
independent body, but the OECD Guidelines require at least some measure of government
involvement, so that independence could only partially be achieved. For instance, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs can still make a statement before a report is made public. See
Dutch National Contact Point: Aspirations and Expectations Met? Report of the NCP Peer
(2010),
available
at
Review
Team
http://www.oesorichtlijnen.nl/sites/www.oesorichtlijnen.nl/files/final_peer_ review_report_d
utch_ ncp_with_annexes_ 17_march_2010. pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
149. COECD, supra note 148, at 1774. According to Schuler, another possible role of
delegatee is reserved for the OECD Investment Committee, but its role is limited to posting
clarifications of a general nature and it cannot overrule statements by NCPs in specific
cases.
150. OECD Guidelines for Responsible Business Conduct, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, available at http://www.oecdguidelines.nl/ncp/closedcomplaints/ (last visited Mar.
25, 2014).
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secondary issues were below the OECD standard. 151 It urged the
companies in question to improve those particular points, or only
congratulated them for having already done so. In the remainder of the
cases, the NCP concluded that no 'investment context' or 'nexus'
existed, so that the situation fell outside the scope of the OECD
Guidelines, 152 or that bilateral talks between the NGO complainant and
the company had already brought the issue to a close. 153 The figures on
the Dutch NCP reflect those on other OECD member states. 154

Delega on
(Extent

author y)

"Softness
in average"

Soft

Hard

Figure 6. "Softness" of OECD Guidelines.
151. See e.g., Neth. Nat'l Contact Point, Final Statement of the Dutch NCP on the
"Complaint (May 15, 2006) on the Violations of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
(PSPC), Pursuant to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises" (July 14, 2009),
available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/43663730.pdf. (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
152. See Neth. Nat'l Contact Point, Final Statement of the Dutch NCP on the Specific
Instance Raised by Shehri-CBE Concerning Makro-Habib Pakistan Limited, Raised on 9
October 2008 (Feb. 2010), available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/46085466.pdf
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
153. See Neth. Nat'l Contact Point, Final Report of the National Contact Point for the
OECD Guidelines in the Netherlands on the Specific Instance Notified by CEDHA,
INCASUR Foundation, SOMO and Oxfam Novib Concerning Nidera Holding B.V. (Feb. 3
2012),
available
at:
http://www.oesorichtlijnen.nl/sites/www.oesorichtlijnen.nl/files/final_statement_nidera.pdf
(last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
154. See J. OLDENZIEL, J.WILDE-RAMSING AND P. FEENEY, OECD WATCH 10 YEARS
ON
ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTfNATIONAL
ENTERPRISES TO RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT 10-11 (OECD Pub. 2010).
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3. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights ("UN Guiding Principles")
The UN Guiding Principles are the result of a UN Human Rights
Council mandate to the Special Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral, John Ruggie. On the basis of the mandate, Ruggie was to
develop such principles within the framework proposed in his Report to
"Protect, Respect and Remedy". 155 The Principles rest accordingly on
the Report's three pillars of protection, respect and remedy:
The first is the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third
parties, including business enterprises, through appropriate policies,
regulation, and adjudication. The second is the corporate responsibility
to respect human rights, which means that business enterprises should
act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to
address adverse impacts with which they are involved. The third is the
need for greater access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and
non-judicial. 156
The text of the UN Guiding Principles was consulted extensively
with a wide variety of relevant actors ranging from governments to
businesses and NGOs. 157 The substantive principles of the UN Guiding
Principles are quite similar to the OECD Guidelines, which in their
2011 version were aligned with the former. 158 Yet, the UN Guiding
Principles have a broader scope ratione personae, because they include
TNCs from all UN member states, rather than from the industrialized
OECD countries only. Ratione materiae, the UN Guiding principles are
not limited to investment settings, as are the OECD Guidelines. In
other words, the UN Principles apply to a larger number of states and
TN Cs, and to a wider array of situations.
The UN Guiding Principles were adopted by the geographically
representative UN Human Rights Council. The Principles' hardness
along the obligation dimension of the tool is likely to benefit from the
rather strong systemic coherence with the human rights Covenants. As
explained previously, systemic coherence denotes the influence that one
instrument may have on the performance of another along the
155. Ruggie, supra note 9.
156. UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding Principles on
6 A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), available at
Business and Human Rights, Intro.,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN. pdf (last
visited Mar. 30, 2014).
157. Id. 12.
158. This is understandable since the most recent version of the OECD Guidelines
(2011) explicitly states that they are in line with the UN Guiding Principles. OECD
Guidelines, supra note 137, at 3.
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dimensions of the tool. The interaction between a similarly aligned
Public Legal Instrument, such as a human rights Covenant, and a Public
Non-Legal Instrument, such as the UN Guiding Principles, could
mutually increase the hardness of both instruments. In this case both
instruments are even a part of the UN human rights system. The
Principles could lead judiciaries to interpret more specifically the
obligations of states as delegatees vis-a-vis TNC conduct under the
Covenants. 159 Since all parties to the human rights Covenants are also
parties to the UN, the UN Guiding Principles could be argued to
constitute a subsequent agreement or practice that contributes to the
interpretation of the pre-existing international human rights obligations
of states. 160 Alternatively, the UN Guiding Principles could be
considered a part of the opinio juris in the formation of new customary
rules. 161 Most relevant in this respect is that Part I of the UN Guiding
Principles deals with what the state "duty to protect" amounts to for
companies. The notion of systemic coherence thus provides insights in
how one instrument may have a high level of obligation but lack in
precision, while for another one the situation is the other way around.
Taken together, the instruments may alleviate each other's softness.
The obligations created by the UN Guiding Principles could therefore
be harder than the principled, non-legal nature of their form would lead
to assume, if they are 'hardened' by their close links to existing "hard
law" instruments. Conversely, the UN Guiding Principles could oblige
states, and consequently TNCs, by further 'hardening' the obligations
that the states have earlier agreed to as delegatees under human rights
Covenants.
This line of reasoning nevertheless holds in practice only where
the Public Non-Legal Instrument in question is actually hard
comprehensively, i.e. is also precise and uses mandatory language. It is
questionable whether this is the case for the UN Guiding Principles.
First, the duties of states in the Principles are not phrased in a
mandatory or particularly accurate fashion. The duty of the states
towards 'abuses by private actors' is in the Principles defined by using
wordings such as 'appropriate steps', 'discretion' and 'should
159. Arguably, there is no reason why this would not be true as well to some extent for
the OECD Guidelines, just as for all other Public Non-Legal Instruments, which may
influence the development of the law through interpretation or the development of
customary international law.
160. UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, supra note 157; see also
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31 (2)(b) ( 1969).
161. This is what happened to some of the principles established in the famous Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development (1992).
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consider'. 162 Compared with how state duties have developed in the
jurisprudence of the international human rights bodies, the UN Guiding
Principles may therefore be a step backwards in terms of accuracy. The
vagueness about what the duty to protect amounts to leaves the states a
wider margin of discretion on what is acceptable TNC behavior. 163 A
closer analysis of the Principles thus reveals evidence of systemic
incoherence, or antagonism, in contrast to what initially seemed like a
case of coherence.
Moreover, the express emphasis in the Principles that no
international obligations are set on the corporations directly, only on the
states, obviously dilutes the obligatory character of the Principles on
TNCs. In the period before the drafting of the Principles, the idea of
setting legal obligations for companies was still taken seriously. 164 The
'Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights' 165 were however
dismissed, after which the appointment of the Special Representative
followed. The part that directly applies to companies speaks only of
responsibilities to respect, but not of obligations in the same more
The concept of
explicit sense as the duties laid on states.
'responsibility' is not defined any further than that a certain standard of
conduct is "expected" of the businesses. 166 Moreover, the UN Guiding
Principles do not state on what basis this responsibility arises. Clearly,
it is not on the basis of a legal instrumentum. Since TNCs are not
legally bound by the Principles, the Principles represent to the TNCs, a
mere reiteration of pre-existing legal obligations, and a consensually
agreed moral obligation to reach beyond such legal obligations. The
hardness of such a moral obligation would depend on the authority of
the instrument. 167
162. UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, supra note 157,
Commentary on Foundational Principle 1, 3-4 (emphasis added).
163. Nicola Jagers, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making
Headway Towards Real Accountability?, 29 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 159, 161 (2011).
164. Id. at 160 ("From the very beginning professor Ruggie has steered determinedly
away from the concept of human rights obligations for corporations and instead placed
exclusive emphasis on the State as the sole duty-bearer."). See also De Feyter supra note
15, at 78.
165. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
166. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, supra note 157,
Commentary to Principle 11.
167. Special Representative Ruggie notes quite positively the numerous consultations
he had with companies in establishing the Principles. See UN Guiding Principles,
Introduction, 7, 12. It is difficult to assess whether the consultations have truly supported
the authority of the Principles, or were merely something that TNCs participated in to
maintain a constructive image and to influence any obligations they could be subjected to.
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In terms of precision, the UN Guiding Principles represent the
high end in this paper's examples of instruments. They are slightly less
specific than the OECD Guidelines, because the drafters broadened
their scope of application to all businesses rather than to TNCs alone.
Also accuracy is reasonably high, with elaborate commentaries to each
of the 'Operational Principles' . The part that sets out the desired scope
and content of the companies' human rights due diligence processes
seems to some extent comparable to an environmental impact
assessment. 168 The focus of the Principles is on prevention, which the
TNCs have direct influence on, and which is often more effective than
remediation.
However, although precise, much is laid out in descriptive and
explanatory concepts that do not amount to new mandatory
requirements from the perspective of the dimension of obligation. So
while accurate, the Principles and their Commentaries at most reiterate
existing legal requirements. They, for example, note that in many
jurisdictions, complicity in committing a crime can lead to criminal
liability, even on TNCs, but they do not in any way expand the scope of
such liability. 169
Even precise obligations on companies need to be interpreted
when they are implemented into practice. The implementation is
optimally delegated to separate authorities. Yet on delegation, the UN
Guiding Principles are considerably softer than, for example, the OECD
An earlier version of the Principles envisaged an
Guidelines.
Ombudsperson, 170 but this role was apparently removed. The Principles
in the part on the state Duty to Protect probably confused rather than
clarified the role of states as delegatees in the implementation and
enforcement of international human rights law on TNCs. 171 The part on
Access to Remedy calls for various kinds of national and companybased non-judicial grievance mechanisms to complement the statebased judiciaries. In other words, the Principles neither strengthen the
role of home states nor do they create a centralized authority to
coordinate the implementation. They only advocate a very soft form of
delegation that excludes the power to take decisions. Moreover, such
mechanisms are only encouraged, rather than made mandatory. The
contrast to the National Contact Points (NCPs), mandated by the OECD
Guidelines, is clear.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at Principles 17-21.
Id. at Principle 17.
Ruggie, supra note 9, 103.
Jagers, supra note 164.
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language)

(Accura cy, specificity)

Delegation
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authority)

"Softness
in average"

Soft

Hard

Figure 7. Softness of UN Guiding Principles

4. Concluding Perspectives on Public Non-Legal Instruments
Public Non-Legal Instruments score around the average on several
dimensions of softness in the tool. While scoring rather high on the
dimension of precision, the Public Non-Legal Instruments in this paper
score low on the scale of delegation. They are low on the scale of
obligation as well, because the two sub-dimensions of obligationauthority and the mandatory nature of the language-give contradictory
results. The language used is often overtly non-mandatory, and this fact
cannot be fully compensated by the respectability of the IOs involved,
which is likely to reinforce the authority of the instruments. Public
Non-Legal Instruments, such as the OECD Guidelines and the UN
Guiding Principles, by definition lack the legally binding character of
their counterparts in formal treaties. Unless they are considered
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interpretive agreements, they cannot be invoked before a judge as
directly applicable to a dispute. Systemic coherence therefore could
influence the softness or hardness of a non-legal instrument. However,
unless that dynamic clearly increases the level of obligation and
delegation, the softness along these two dimensions only appears to
permit average levels of hardness in this category of instruments.

lnstrumentum
(formal source of IL or not)

Hard

Soft

Figure 8. Effects of systemic coherence - hardening Public Non-Legal
Instruments through hard law.

C. Private Instruments

1. Preliminary Observations

There are a great number of instruments that belong to the third
group: private instruments with direct relevance to TNC behavior.
Despite the variance among the instruments in this category, it is
possible to make some general assumptions on how they score on the
dimensions of the tool.
Private instruments, as explained above in Section IV, derive their
denomination from the fact that their dominant authors are neither states
nor state-centric international organizations.
These types of
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organizations do not have the capacity to adopt instruments that qualify
as formal sources of international law, i.e. as Public Legal Instruments.
None of these instruments in other words has a legal instrumentum. At
the same time, however, such authors do have the capacity to agree
among themselves on instruments that are of private kind.
Private instruments vary significantly by the (combinations of)
authors adopting them. These authors are principally businesses or their
associations, as well as national and international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). In many fields TNCs and NGOs have even
entered into a veritable contest to set the applicable standards.
Sometimes a single instrument is ultimately agreed upon by TNCs and
NGOs together, such as the much discussed Forest Stewardship
Principles and Criteria. Some private instruments are adopted together
with or without the support of states or international organizations that
result in some cases in so-called public-private partnerships (PPPs). 172 It
is for that reason not always easy to distinguish between private and
public instruments, although in most cases either the public or the
private actors will be in a dominant role. The Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) and the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) are, respectively, examples of a venture
purely among TNCs and a venture between TNCs and a few states. In
some cases, such as the UN Global Compact, NGOs have heavily
criticized PPPs for being dominated from the outset by business
interests under the umbrella of what was formally a state or IO
initiative. 173
It is difficult to make generalizations along the tool's dimension
of authority with so many different author-addressee combinations.
Public authors are generally, but not always, more authoritative than
private parties, and the views on the authority of self-regulation vary
greatly. Low authority indicates low obligation, and hence softness.
Mandatory nature of the language differs widely as well: the Forest
Stewardship Council confronts a TNC with mandatory language, while
the UN Global Compact does not. It is voluntary to sign up for either
instrument.
Generally, the dimension of delegation is very soft across the
board, in particular where private instruments are a form of self172. Peter Utting & Ann Zammitt, United Nations-Business Partnerships: Good
Intentions and Contradictory Agendas, 90 J. Bus. ETHICS 39 (2009).
173. Payne, supra note 13, at 13-14. See also J. Martens, Precarious Partnerships: Six
problems of the Global Compact between Business and the UN, GLOBAL PoL'Y FORUM,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/225/32252.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2014).
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regulation. The role of the state as delegatee is absent in the context of
private instruments. In the NGO-led schemes, there may be some
delegation to the NGOs, and the TNC schemes sometimes rely on
external firms that perform corporate social accountability audits. Yet
neither of them wields the investigative and prosecutorial power of the
state.
Specificity is often high, not only ratione personae, but also
ratione materiae, as companies are the only addressees. The used
language may range from the very accurate and mandatory expressions
of, technical standards to the very open and loosely formulated texts
that are predominant in the human rights and environmental context,
such as the Corporate Social Responsibility declarations of TNCs.
Finally, on precision there is again much variance. The NGO principles
usually score higher on this dimension than their TNC counterparts.

2. The United Nations Global Compact ("UN Global
Compact'') 174
The United Nations Global Compact is a cooperative initiative of
the UN and businesses, based on the multi-stakeholder ideology ofUNBusiness Partnerships that became prevalent in the UN in the 1990' s. 175
The Global Compact is based on the voluntary incorporation by TNCs
of a set of ten principles on human and labor rights, environmental
rights and fight against corruption into all their activities. The
companies also undertake to actively defend these values within their
'sphere of influence' .176 The Global Compact is completely voluntary,
both in regards to the initial registration as well as the subsequent
adherence to the rules. In earlier versions, the principles were quite
vague, but recently they refer to the UN Guiding Principles' chapter on
the responsibilities of businesses. The link subjects companies to the
more elaborate set of principles. They give more accurate, yet clearly
non-mandatory guidance about the steps that TNCs can take not to
violate existing legal rules. One may clearly notice the effects of
positive systemic coherence between the Compact and the Principles.
For example:
Principle 2: "Businesses should make sure they are not complicit in
human rights abuses," or
174. The content of this section is derived partly from Tim Staal, The Roles of Hard
Law and Soft Law in the Regulation of Global Business Conduct (2010) (unpublished
Master's Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussels).
175. Utting & Zammitt, supra note 173, at 39-40.
See
U.N
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
available
at
176.
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
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Principle 9: "Businesses should encourage the development and
diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies."

The Global Compact awards companies who report their efforts
on a regular basis the right to sport the Global Compact Logo. A
sanction exists in the form of 'de-listing' a company that does not report
on its efforts over three consecutive one-year periods. 177 But in order to
remain listed, a company need not do anything substantive. This TNCfavorable overall set-up attests to the private sector dominance in the
Compact, and speaks for analyzing this public-private arrangement
under the category of Private Instruments.
The Global Compact is based on the idea of forming a
"community among the participants in which each individual actor
strives to appear as appropriate in relation to other members of the
network and to their stakeholders at large, a stance that should drive
them to act according to the articulated principles." 178 Thus, the success
of the Global Compact seems to depend on the plausibility of this
relation between (superficial) peer accountability, the attractiveness of
the Logo, and a TNC improved human rights and environmental record.
This outcome seems quite case specific: what for a diligent TNC with
high brand recognition and many aggressive competitors may create a
hard instrument, may for a low profile free rider appear completely soft.
The difficulty in even measuring such attributes against the tool
illustrates well in fact the uncertainties and vagueness inherent in this
type of an instrument.
In terms of softness, the drafters of the Compact seem to expect
that the lack of mandatory and precise wording, as well as the emphasis
on the Compact's voluntary nature, are compensated through the
hardness of other dimensions. The primary means here is the delegation
of the supervision over self-implementation to 'other members of the
network and to their stakeholders at large'. These groups include other
TNCs and NGOs. This has, however, arguably remained an empty
promise. First of all, a single group of actors, the TNCs themselves,
"appear[ s] as rule setters, rule enforcers, rule followers and rule
monitors." 179 This is at odds with the very idea of delegation. Second,
the delegation of authority to 'stakeholders at large' points to two
177.
Integrity
Measures,
U.N.
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/IntegrityMeasures/index.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2014).
178. K. Sahlin-Andersson, Emergent Cross-sectional Soft Regulations: Dynamics at
play in the Global Compact Initiative, in SOFT LAW IN GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS 140 (U. Morth ed., Edward Elgar Pub 2004).
179. Id. at 141.
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groups of actors: the general public and NGOs. The former may be
expected to react at press stories about serious violations, but will not
actively compare company behavior to the principles. So in that sense
the general public has a limited, if any task at all, in the governance of
the Global Compact. The most visible part of the public, NGOs, have
from the beginning played an ambivalent role in the Compact. NGOs
can be members, just like TNCs, and can therefore present a matter of
alleged 'egregious abuse' to the Global Compact Board. However, the
ultimate sanction is the 'de-listing' of the TNC. Such an outcome
seems superficial at best, and thus makes for a very unsatisfactory route
for NGOs. Compared to the OECD Guidelines' National Contact Points
or to the human rights treaty bodies, one may conclude that barely any
delegation of authority takes place under the Global Compact.

lnstrumentum
(formal source of IL or not)

"Softness
in average1'

Soft

Hard

Figure 9. "Softness" of the UN Global Compact, with the impact of systemic
coherence highlighted.

3. The Forest Principles of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)
Forestry is an area where nation states have consistently failed to
reach a global legally binding agreement. Negotiations on a global
forest convention were called off already at the Rio Earth Summit of
1992. 180 The International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) is
180. B. Cashore et al., Can Non-state Governance
Ratchet Up
Global
Environmental Standards? Lessons from the Forest Sector, 16 RECIEL 158, 160 (2007).
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criticized for focusing on trade issues and leaving environmental
protection practically entirely at domestic discretion. What is left are a
number of initiatives that in the course of the 1990' s resulted in nonbinding instruments with weak substance. 181 Possibly for these very
reasons, forestry was one of the first fields where a new form of private
transnational regulation appeared: the NGO-based certification scheme
of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) aims directly at changing the
behavior of large forestry companies, 182 often TNCs.
The FSC stands both for a governance scheme, the Forest
Stewardship Council, and for a set of principles on forestry. 183 These
"Forest Principles and Criteria" are further "elaborated through more
specific global standards, which are adapted to local conditions by
national or regional chapters." 184 FSC-certified forests must have a
continuously updated management plan, the implementation of which is
to be monitored and periodically verified by an accredited third-party
auditor. 185 Participating companies may actually be obliged to change
their policies, even in ways that are not necessarily cost-effective. 186
The Principles are specific in that they refer to one particular sector with
its own demands, and they are also quite accurate. There are detailed

All substantive provisions of the ITT A 2006, which entered into force 7 December 2011, are
indeed formulated as 'objectives' (Article 1), that are to be implemented through 'policy
work and projects' (Article 24) and funding (Article 21) and the conduct of 'studies (Article
See International Tropical Timber Agreement, Jan.27, 2006, U.N. Doc.
27).
TD/TIMBER.3.12 (Jan. 27, 2006).
181. Intergovernmental Panel on Forests; Intergovernmental Forum on Forests; United
Nations Forum on Forests, which produced the "Plan of Action" and the "Programme of
Work", contained in E/CN.18/2001/3/Rev.1, which Dimitrov describes as "masterpieces of
Machiavellian diplomacy". R.S. Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms?: States, Institutions and
Global Forest Politics, 5 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 11 (2005).
182. The high intensity of research on the FSC shows that if any private regulatory
instrument is taken seriously and seen as a forerunner, it is the FSC. Interestingly, this
literature has also ventured into the complement-substitute-or-antagonist debate referred to
above. See E. Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the
Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 75-76 (2006); Cashore et al., supra note 181; J. Zeitlin,
Pragmatic Transnationalism: Governance Across Borders in the Global Economy, 9 Soc10ECON. Rev 196-97(2010); T. Bartley, Transnational Private Regulation in Practice: The
Limits of Forest and Labor Standards Certification in Indonesia, 12 Bus. & POL. 7-8 (2010);
T. Bartley, Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of Public and
Private Standards, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 517 (2011) [hereinafter Transnational
Governance].
183. Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship FSC-STD-01-001 (version 4-0),
FSC INTERNATIONAL (1996), available at http://ic.fsc.org/principles-and-criteria.34.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2014).
184. Zeitlin, supra note 183, at 196-97.
185. Id.
186. Cashore et al., supra note 181, at 161.
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provisions on tenure and use rights (Principle 2), indigenous peoples'
rights (Principle 3), community relations (Principles 4) and
environmental impacts (Principle 6). Moreover, all the mentioned
principles are phrased in clearly mandatory terms with every provision
using the verb "shall".
On the macro level, the hardness of the obligation will depend on
how many producers have been willing to join the scheme.
Participation is in principle voluntary, but the pressure to join is
nowadays rather high due to the strong developed country industry buyin and increasing consumer awareness. In 2012, it was estimated that
168.364 million hectares, 187 compared to over 4 billion hectares in total
forest coverage, 188 are FSC-certified. Overall, the high authority of the
scheme and its mandatory language render the scheme quite hard in
terms of the created obligation.
Delegation seems at first sight to be quite far reaching as well,
although ultimately it is the softest link in the FSC. The governance of
the FSC is in the hands of the tripartite Board of Directors, with
members representing Environmental, Social and Economic (i.e.
business) constituencies, and an equal participation from the global
North and South. 189 This multi-stakeholder set-up has arguably boosted
the authority of implementing the FSC. The interpretation of the Forest
Principles, discussed above, is in the hands of the FSC's organs, not in
that of the timber producing participants. The Board of Directors has
indeed from time-to-time issued interpretive decisions on TNC
activities. 190 Moreover, fulfillment by a timber producer of the FSC
Principles is validated by independent certification bodies, which have
in tum been accredited by the FSC. 191
However, there are at least two reasons why the FSC and the
certification bodies as delegatees do not reach a high level of
delegation. First, it is quite impossible for the certification bodies to
regularly check the companies' adherence with the principles. Its
executive capacities fall far short of those of public authorities, even in

187. Forest Stewardship Council, Facts & Figures, FSC INTERNATIONAL (2014),
available at https://ic.fsc.org/facts-figures.19 .htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
188. Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N., State of the World's Forests 2012, 15, FAO
(2012), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3010e/i3010e.pdf (last visited Feb. 10,
2014). In other words, about 4.2 % of total global forest coverage is certified by FSC.
189. Forest Stewardship Council, Governance, FSC INTERNATIONAL (2014), available
at http://ic.fsc.org/govemance.14.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
190. See id.
191. Forest Stewardship Council, Accreditation, FSC INTERNATIONAL (2014),
available at http://ic.fsc.org/accreditation.28.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
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developing countries. Its knowledge of 'local dynamics' is often
inadequate to really assess compliance with the FSC Principles'
criteria. 192 Second, and also connected to the lack of government
resources and the authority involved, the only sanction available is the
suspension of a forest's certification. As in most timber exporting
developing states, FSC certified forests still amount to only a fraction of
total production, this can hardly be called an effective sanction. To
summarize, a private, non-local authority without effective means of
enforcement makes for a 'softer' delegatee than a public, local
authority.
The weaknesses in delegation are further aggravated by the FSC' s
lack of legal instrumentum. FSC is a telling example of how the
softness of the dimensions of precision and obligation is quite limited,
yet the scheme still will have to yield in case of conflict with other,
formal rules such as domestic laws on forestry. As Bartley has
insightfully hypothesized and empirically researched with Indonesia as
case study, the design of private instruments such as the FSC and its
criteria disregard the domestic regulatory setting in which the rules are
expected to operate. For example, FSC Principle 2 requires that the
exploitation of certified local forests respects "the tenure and use rights
to the land and forest resources", and that such rights may only be given
up through the "free and informed consent" of the involved
However, in the large forestry industry country
communities.
Indonesia, the FSC requirements conflict with the domestic Forestry
Act. The Act has "affirmed state control over forest land", and although
the Forestry Act does protect local rights, "roughly ninety percent of the
twelve million hectares of state forest land in Indonesia has not been
properly defined". 193 The FSC certifications have added another layer
of rules, with requirements that are in part contradictory to domestic
laws. Yet in case of conflict, the local formal law obviously prevails, as
is even explicitly stated in FSC Principle 1.1. 194 This problem may lead
the FSC to "crumble under its own contradictions": a company must, to
192. Transnational Governance, supra note 183, at 533 (in the context of the
community land use rights demanded by Principle 2.2) ("One former auditor suggested that
assessment teams generally do not spend enough time on the ground to understand
community dynamics, explaining that you are 'lucky if there's an NGO there,' or it can be
difficult to learn the real situation.").
193. Id. at 532.
194. Revised FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship FSC-STD-01-001
(V5-0), FSC INTERNATIONAL 12 (Rev. 2012), available at https://ic.fsc.org/principles-andcriteria.34.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) ("Principle 1: Compliance with Laws: The
Organization shall comply with all applicable laws, regulations and nationally-ratified
international treaties, conventions and agreements.").
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be in conformity with the Forest Principles, both act in accordance with
local law, as well as in contravention of it. 195 Had the FSC's Principles
been laid down by states in a formal source of international law, it
would have been much less clear that domestic forestry law would have
prevailed in case of a conflict. The example shows well how the
instrumentum dimension is fundamentally important.

lnstrumentum
(formal source of IL or not)

Hard

Soft
Figure 10. "Softness" of FSC.

4. Concluding Perspectives on Private Instruments
There are many labeling initiatives such as the FSC, 196 and many
voluntary standards with an approach similar to the UN Global
Compact. Some of them are even aimed at more specific sectors,
problems or groups of TNCs, such as the Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) and the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI).
195. Transnational Governance, supra note 183, at 534. Compare the above stated
umbrella to Principle I with Principle 1.8: "The Organization shall demonstrate a long-term
commitment to adhere to the FSC Principles and Criteria in the Management Unit, and to
related FSC Policies and Standards. A statement of this commitment shall be contained in a
publicly available document made freely available." Id. at 13.
196. Many of these are assembled under the ISEAL alliance. See generally About Us,
ISEAL ALLIANCE, available at http://www.isealalliance.org/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
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Two main problems became apparent from the analysis of these
much-discussed private instruments. First, the great weakness in terms
of delegation is, in the words of Sahlin-Andersson, that "it is not so
clear who is governing whom." 197 Are NGOs governing TNCs? Or are
TNCs governing themselves-or even each other? What role remains
for governments? Second, it is unclear where obligation in these
instruments really comes from. They often refer to 'international
human rights standards', and stress that lower local standards, local
government abuses, or lack of government enforcement do not impede
what companies 'should' do. Yet it is not clear what exactly leads to
raise the requirements above the level of a mere moral obligation,
beyond a bare exclusion from a voluntary scheme. Is the marketplace
already sophisticated enough to create such an impact?
It was apparent that even an instrument that on the surface seems
to have a relatively high level of delegation, the FSC, in practice has
rather limited implementation resources. It moreover has to recede
where it conflicts with formal legal instruments that often maintain a
lower environmental or human rights standard.
Although the
implementing authority is clearly delegated, its reach remains limited.

VI.

CONCLUSIONS-THE MYRIAD EFFECTS OF
SOFTNESS

The tool developed in this paper has two aims. First, it aims to
contribute to the "soft law discourse" by promoting a move beyond the
inaccurate and overly generic term "soft law". 198 This term appears
problematic in the global governance of TNCs. It is proposed here, on
the one hand, because it is more accurate and useful in the legal and
political discourse to describe instruments on the basis of the three
general categories introduced in the previous Section: Public Legal
Instruments, Public Non-Legal Instruments and Private Instruments. 199
The categories build on the work of for example d' Aspremont 200and

197. Sahlin-Andersson, supra note 179, at 130.
198. See generally Abbott et al., supra note 73. With international law, they mean to
include explicitly formal sources of international law such as conventions/treaties. Id. at
402.
199. Compare these three groups with those distinguished by Blutman, who noted
output of international organizations; non-binding output of states directly other than what is
part of the formal sources of international law; and the output of civil society which is per
definition non-binding. Blutman, supra note 67, at 607.
200. d'Aspremont, supra note 63, at 1082-87.
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Blutman. 201
The basic distinction lies in the dimension of
instrumentum: the "container" of the instrument as opposed to its
negotium, the "contents."
On the other hand, it would add further, important nuance to the
understanding of the instruments to perceive them along four
dimensions of softness: the softness of the instrumentum, and of three
aspects of the negotium, namely obligation (authority and the
mandatory nature of the language); precision (accuracy and specificity);
and delegation (extent and authority of delegation). These dimensions
of softness, proposed originally by Abbott et al. 202 , and developed
further here, fine-tune the analysis by bringing forth key characteristics
of the instruments.
Second, through the tool the paper explores how such resystemization of instruments functions in the specific framework of the
TNCs, taking into account the challenge of finding solutions to the void
in their governance. The paper focuses in particular on how softness as
a characteristic manifests itself in different types of TNC related
instruments, and how this may link to the perceived void, and further to
the instruments' effectiveness. It may even be possible to contemplate
certain dimensions of softness, and combinations of thereof, that are
necessary in reaching effectiveness in different circumstances. Finally,
the utility and potential weaknesses of the conceptual tool itself may be
elaborated upon during its application to practical case examples on the
global governance of TNCs.

A. Effective Softness?
The application of the tool to various TNC related instruments,
including legal public instruments, illustrates well how an analysis of
softness is by no means limited to what is incorrectly called "soft law"
instruments. All kinds of hard and soft instruments can, and indeed
should, be scrutinized for their softness.
From the practical perspective of applying the instruments, the
essential question is whether, and to what extent, the observed softness
of an instrument correlates with its effectiveness. While the research in
this paper is not geared to answer this question with any definitiveness,
it is designed to prop exploratory insights onto what such a relationships
might be. The first observation along this trajectory is the usual claim
that "soft law" might be able to act as a supplement or a complement, or

201. Blutman, supra note 67, at 607.
202. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 401.
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even an alternative, to "hard law. " 203 The claim assumes that somehow
an instrument that is soft along one or more of the depicted dimensions
can be effective in reaching a policy outcome. It can even potentially be
more effective in doing so than a "hard law" instrument would be.
The effectiveness in other words may link to softness-but how
exactly? At least two options appear to arise. In the first option, the
softness of one (or more) dimension( s) directly contributes to the fact
that the policy outcome is reached. This would reflect the scenario of
"soft law" acting as an alternative to "hard law": it is because of its
hardness along all the dimensions that a "hard law" instrument would
not able to reach the desired outcome. Softness would under this
assumption correlate positively with effectiveness.
The second option is that softness along one (or more) of the
dimension(s) is unavoidable for an instrument to be legally, politically,
technically, and/or in some other manner possible. Softness is the
critical prerequisite for a policy instrument to be created, yet it is the
other, hard dimension(s) of the instrument that in fact directly
determines the instrument's effectiveness. Soft instruments are in this
scenario a complement to "hard law". Softness as a characteristic only
has an indirect role. Without the subtlety the instrument would not
exist, and hence its qualities could not have an impact. The unique
quality of 'soft' instruments as complements is their achievability. 204
They are, as explained in Section III, a necessity if "hard law" options
are not at all, or not initially, available. But softness in itself will rather
work against, than for, the effectiveness of the instrument. Softness is
in these instruments just limited enough not to impede reaching the
policy objective in a sufficient manner. The perceptions on what is
considered sufficient may be quite subjective and, as the examples of
using soft instruments to govern TNCs implied, not always
representative of the reality.
The first option, i.e. the direct role and relevance of softness in an
instrument's performance, can be tested through a number of
propositions. The most different case approach would lead one to ask
whether there are instruments that are soft on all the dimensions, yet
still perform effectively. A positive answer would point towards
effective instruments that are already quite removed from classic
command-and-control law. Although the limited scope of the research
does not exclude the possibility, the TNC case studies conducted in this
203. "Soft law" may also be seen in some cases as an antagonist to "hard law", but
these questions are beyond the focus of this piece.
204. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 401-03.
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paper did not offer support for this hypothesis. Rather, the observations
on the case studies seemed to point to the opposite direction: when
defined along the dimensions used in this paper, there seems to be a
negative correlation between softness and effectiveness. A negative
correlation would hence perceive soft instruments in a paradoxical way:
one should seek for the vital aspects of hardness in defining effective
soft instruments. If the hypothesis on a positive correlation held, the
ensuing question would then be whether an instrument's effectiveness
could be associated with a particular aspect of softness.

B. Effective Hardness?
Indeed, looking back at the three categories of instruments and the
empirical examples within them, the observations would appear to point
into the opposite direction: some measure of hardness may be required
on at least one, if not most, of the dimensions also for instruments to be
effective. Turning this around, even the absence of hardness on one or
two dimensions beyond the instrumentum-for instance lack of
precision and specificity in the human rights treaties, or the incomplete
delegation in the case of the FSC-may be fatal for its effectiveness.
The conclusion of the case studies was that none of the instruments in
any of the categories of Public Legal Instruments, Public Non-Legal
Instruments and Private Instruments seemed to satisfactorily achieve the
set human rights and environmental governance objectives regarding
TNCs. The disappointing observation could hence have an explanation:
each one of the TNC related instruments- even the "hard law"
instruments-lacked one or more crucial hard dimensions that would
have allowed them to be effective in that particular instance.

1. Over-Reaching
One may wonder, however, if the need to consider hard
dimensions in soft instruments is already a sign of "over-reaching":
have the soft instruments been set to achieve objectives that only
instruments that are hard on all dimensions can achieve? Are they
surpassing the limits of what soft instruments in directly filling a policy
void can reach, even theoretically? In cases of over-reaching, soft
instruments cannot act as complements nor as alternatives to "hard
law"-- exceptperhaps in some narrow respects.
As may be remembered from the development of the tool, the
instrumentum is a core dimension of classic "hard law" instruments.
Soft instruments lack this key characteristic; only in the first group,
which consists of the formal sources of international law, are the
instruments formally speaking law. Private instruments as defined in
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/1
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this paper are adopted by private actors, either amongst themselves or in
collaboration with public authorities. Because private actors completely
lack the capacity to legislate, they cannot create formal instruments of
international law. The instrumentum is not legal. A logical reaction
would be to seek to increase hardness on the other dimensions of
obligation, precision and delegation-potentially even all of them. The
OECD Guidelines from the group of Public Non-Legal Instruments and
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) from the group of Private
Instruments served as examples. As noted above, while perhaps
practically possible, such across-the-board hardness would mean that
the instrument measures hard in average, so much so as start to
conceptually changing its nature from soft to hard, and even from nonlaw to law, if hardened along the instrumentum to a legislative act. In
other words, the soft instrument has been "over-reaching", if the aim
had been in policy objectives that can in fact only be reached with
formal legal instruments that are hard on all accounts. It does not seem
justified, or even possible, to contemplate Public Non-Legal
Instruments or Private Instruments as effective alternatives or
complements to "hard law" in these types of situations. Their role
would remain partial, at best.
2.

Under-Reaching

The fact that an instrument's effectiveness is tied to more
hardness on a particular dimension does not have to imply that all
effective instruments be considered "hard law". In practice, the
relevance of such labels of hardness or softness is linked to the ability of
the tool to help in creating the impetus to amend (i.e. to harden) an
existing instrument in a tailored and adequate manner so as to reach the
set objective. The situation may be different to the above examples of
over-reaching. In cases of "under-reaching", the soft instrument is not
fulfilling its complete promise, which would still be within the
boundaries of what under the three categories and the four dimensions
still constitute soft instruments. Hardening a particular aspect of an
under-reaching instrument not would not always require pushing it
beyond the boundaries of what conceptually are soft instruments.
Understanding that the level of obligation and precision in the OECD
Guidelines is sufficient, but that it is mainly the delegation aspect of the
instrument that is lacking, could lead to amend the instrument in the
correct fashion. This would point towards amending the practice of
NCPs to become considerably more aggressive in publically
reproaching the companies for their violations of human rights law.
Published by SURFACE, 2014
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Figure 11. Instrument's achieved v. potential hardness in cases of underreaching and over-reaching instruments.

Indeed, delegation appears to be a dimension on which practically
all of the TNC-instruments that were used as case examples measured
on the soft end of the scale. This implies an almost structural deficiency
in delegating the implementation of the instruments. The observation
finds clear parallels in the discourse on the deficiencies of "hard law":
poor implementation and enforcement is also often cited as the weak
point of hard international environmental and human rights law. In this
important respect "soft law" therefore appears to offer very limited
remedies. To state this differently: non-legal instruments could most
fundamentally remedy the deficiencies of "hard law" if their unique
characteristics could innovatively improve enforcement. To reiterate
the above example: the impact of negative media coverage on TNCs
image can be drastic, and hence prompt sweeping changes in company
behavior. For example, heavy media attention led the company
Chiquita (formerly United Fruit) to completely overhaul in the early
1990s its dreadful corporate social responsibility policies on exotic fruit
business. Chiquita outsourced for example the corporate environmental
and social audits to an external NGO, the Rainforest Alliance. 205 Yet to
actually create such an impact, the application of this instrument needs
to be delegated to a party that is prepared and equipped to publicize it
205. DANIEL ESTY & ANDREW WINSTON, FROM GREEN TO Gow. How SMART
COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE AND BUILD
COMPETITIVE Aov ANT AGE 88, 183 (Yale University Press 2006).
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without hesitation and delay -not just in theory, but in practice. This is
a far cry from the current state of affairs, should the application of the
media provisions of the OECD Guidelines offer a representative
example in this respect.
It appears possible to give examples of under-reaching "soft law"
also in terms of all other dimensions of softness. The UN Guiding
Principles were an example of an instrument where the wording on what
is really expected is both ambiguous and drafted in non-mandatory
terms. More precise use of words that are clearly obligating would
harden this instrument in a way that would appear to be vital for
increasing its effectiveness in filling the policy void. Precision is a
dimension on which the non-legal instruments may score quite well,
because the tools can contain quite accurate provisions specifically
targeted at TNCs. It is in fact the legal instruments that may be underreaching on this aspect. The systemic coherence between soft and hard
instruments could in a useful way combine the precision of the soft
instruments with e.g. the hard instrumentum of for instance the Human
Rights treaties.
C. Softness - A Combination of Multiple Dimensions
It seems possible with the help of the developed conceptual tool to
synthesize the findings regarding the over-reaching and under-reaching
soft instruments a few steps further, still. The values of all the
dimensions of an instrument may be combined into a single value of
"average softness," as was explained in Section IV.D. above. The
softness/hardness of an instrument is only a single variable amongst
many other time- and space-specific, inter-related variables that affect
the overall policy outcomes in a globalized environment. 206 Yet a
summary value may be useful in having an overview on the
characteristics of the instrument that one is dealing with, even if the line
between soft and hard is a subjective continuum, not a "metaphysical
border" where the overall characteristics of an instrument would
suddenly drastically change like the qualities of water change in the
melting and boiling points. This may be exactly the point of using the
model proposed here: the fact that any instrument consists of four
dimensions with their "sub-dimensions" should quickly lead to a
realization that the denomination of an instrument as "hard law" or "soft
law" actually reveals very little of its characteristics. It is the
constitutive dimensions of the instrument that matter. Instrumentum is

206. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 66.
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central, and admittedly the distinction of the formal sources of
international law implies a binary dimension.
But its binary nature and importance are tempered by the other,
continuum-type dimensions. They too can be crucial, depending on
such factors as the instrument's objectives and addressees. The case
studies on Public Legal Instruments showed how "hard law" may be
quite soft. Case studies across the groups of instruments seemed to
suggest that weak delegation of implementing tasks in some cases
'softens' the instrument more than a low measure of precision or
obligation. The continuums are therefore useful; they make an analysis
of the instruments more flexible and accurate, and facilitate detailed
comparisons between them. As Abbot et al. noted207 while developing
these three dimensions, they can also serve to trace an instrument's
evolution over time. The dimensions were used here as a means to
understand, explain and to propose nuanced improvements to various
kinds of TNC related instruments.
One might also speculate whether there are specific combinations
of these dimensions of softness that are particularly well or poorly
adapted for certain kinds of policy objectives and/or circumstances.
Such "pairing" could support the policy making process. The case
studies gave anecdotal evidence of such interconnections. For example,
in the case of FSC, the hardness of the instrument along the dimensions
of precision and delegation considerably alleviated the need to have
fully hard obligations. Market pressures on TNCs also contributed to a
lesser emphasis on delegation in this particular example.
States and IOs often seem to enforce international law upon TNCs
in a rather lenient fashion: the delegation dimension was soft on
virtually all the analysed instruments. Only very limited delegation to
more independent, international bodies seems likely in the near future as
well.
Hardness along the other dimensions may alleviate that
shortcoming only in some cases, such as the example of FSCs above.
More precise and specific provisions will make it harder for states to
argue that they are not under an obligation to act in a given situation.

D. Systemic coherence
Many authors have highlighted the importance of the systemic
coherence between different instruments.
Soft instruments may,
according to these views, act either as complements, alternatives or
antagonists to "hard law". This paper does not have as its objective to

207. Abbott, et al., supra note 73, at 405.
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delve into the systemic coherence of instruments. It does shed some
light on some of the interrelationships that were noticeable between the
UN Global Compact, UN Guiding Principles, the OECD Guidelines, the
Forest Stewardship Council, the human rights Covenants and domestic
law. In particular, the systemic inconsistencies and antagonistic
relations deserve further research particularly in order to better
understand the prospects of governing TNCs. The discussion merges
here with themes such as the fragmentation and integration of
international law208 and the management of institutional complexity in
global governance. 209

E. Prospects of Governing TNCs with "Soft Law"
1.

"Soft Law" as a Misnomer - But Softness as an Asset

The analysis above has elaborated on whether "soft law" may help
in filling the policy void left by "hard law" in governing transnational
corporations in the areas of environmental protection and human rights.
Softness may indeed be a quality that explains the characteristics of
policy instruments in a manner that is useful. However, this benefit has
often gone undetected or has
been overshadowed by
misunderstandings. 210 The softness of an instrument tends to correlate
negatively with its effectiveness-if any straightforward relationship
between the two is even verifiable. Softness as an overarching
conceptual construct might end up not only correlating with
ineffectiveness, but being defined by it. The notion of soft instruments,
let alone "soft law", as an optimal gap filler for legal voids appears in
this sense fundamentally flawed. Soft instruments may remedy policy
problems, but in most cases exactly despite of their softness.
Gearing the policy strategy towards "soft law" without properly
defining it could hence essentially threaten to misguide the entire effort.
Perhaps the clearest example is the UN Global Compact, which relies

208. See Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 59, at 553; see also Study Group of the
International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682
(Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi).
209. For institutional interaction, see generally Thomas Gehring & Sebastian
Oberthur, The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between International Institutions, 15
EUR. J. INT'L REL. 125 (2009).
210. See d' Aspremont, supra note 63, at 1083; See also d' Aspremont' s recent
introduction in the Leiden Journal of International Law where he apologizes for devoting a
whole issue of the journal to such an oft-debated theme. Jean d' Aspremont & Tanja
Aalberts, Which Future for the Scholarly Concept of Soft International Law? Editors'
Introductory Remarks, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 309 (2012).
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on softness quite explicitly. 211 "Soft law" is therefore not only a vague
and overly generic concept-it may be a precarious misnomer. The
case studies on the governance of TNCs gave insights into how "soft
law" approaches may create false assumptions, and might lead to
skewed policy pathways and meager outcomes. 212
The
conceptualisation of the instruments and of the issue at stake, as well as
the definition of the desired policy objectives, need to take place in
much more accurate and authentic terms.
2. Soft Instruments as Complements and Alternatives to "Hard
Law"

While "soft law" may be a misnomer, softness as a characteristic
that is first properly defined may prove to be quite useful. It helps in
explaining the characteristics of individual instruments. The notion of
softness may also be useful in more correctly understanding the general
characteristics that are commonly associated with soft instruments as we
noted them in Section III: their necessity, uniqueness and
unavoidability; 213 and their role as complements or alternatives 214 to
"hard law". The uniqueness of soft instruments can mean a number of
things. It can refer either to the instrument as a whole or to some of its
particular characteristics. This observation prompts us to rethink the
categories of Shaffer and Pollack, soft instruments as complements or
alternatives to "hard law". A unique instrument would seem to mean
that it combines softness and hardness in a different way along the
dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation. Unique soft
instruments are soft enough to be achievable-unlike a fully hard and
legal instrument-yet hard enough to be effective. Thus, they are able
to complement "hard law" in the narrow sense of addressing policy
questions that "hard law" simply could not address at this moment. This
is different from the occasional misconception that soft instruments are
unique and effective for their softness only. The notion of a soft
211. "The initiative seeks to combine the best properties of the UN, such as moral
authority and convening power, with the private sector's solution-finding strengths and the
expertise and capacities of a range of key stakeholders. The Global Compact is global and
local; private and public; voluntary yet accountable." Overview of the UN Global Compact,
UNITED
NATIONS
GLOBAL
COMPACT
(Apr.
22,
2013),
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
212. See Utting & Zammitt, supra note 173, at 44, 47 (showing the wide belief within
the UN in the late l 990's that soft approaches are preferable, because of lack of UN
implementation powers).
213. See Section 3, supra.
214. The role of soft instruments as antagonists to hard law were excluded from the
scope of this paper.
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instrument constituting in these cases an "alternative"215 also seems
misleading: it hints at the existence of a choice-yet if the soft
instrument is unique in this narrow sense, there is none.
If the uniqueness of the entire instrument refers to its
distinctiveness from a "hard law" instrument, yet does not entail the
filling of policy gaps beyond what "hard law" can do, it seems to offer
an alternative to reaching a policy objective. Because certain softness on
some dimensions is "permissible" in terms of reaching adequate
effectiveness, a soft instrument can be the preferred alternative for other
reasons, such as for being less costly to negotiate, lighter to administer
or quicker to adapt to the evolving circumstances.
The uniqueness of certain (combinations of) characteristics,
instead of the entire soft instrument, leads to a different kind of
complementarity-the type Shaffer and Pollack described. 216 The
differences in the softness of a soft and a hard instrument lead them to
interact in a way that, together, creates a complementary result. The
complementary characteristics may make up for certain soft dimensions
in legal instruments-on which the complementing instrument is in fact
harder-and result in even harder combinations. Some non-legal
instrument may in this way prove harder on important dimensions than
many existing legal instruments, particularly on precision, even though
they are soft on others.
As for the unavoidability of soft instruments as a consequence of
globalization, the nuance that can be identified in the softness of
instruments calls for a similarly delicate attention in managing such
instruments. To the extent that globalization implies the predominance
of instruments without a hard instrumentum, it may imply doubtful
effectiveness. Yet this is not at all self-evident, and can only be
determined on a context-specific instrument-by-instrument analysis.
The complication would offer one explanation to why it is so difficult to
create clear-cut theories and approaches about the global governance of
TNCs, or governance through regime complexes more generally
speaking.
F. Epilogue: Revisiting the Chevron Case

While the Chevron case dragged on in the Ecuadorian judiciary
and now continues in the arbitration bodies, Chevron has aligned itself
with the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR)
and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Will these
215. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 46, at 717-21.
216. Id. at 721-22.
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soft instruments offer a remedy to address the considerable
environmental degradation? Could they prevent similar cases from
taking place in the future? The EITI aims at transparent financial flows
between the extractive industry and their host governments. VPSHR
aims to prevent human rights abuses that would be a consequence of
companies' private security operations. Already in terms of the subject
matter, these instruments do not present comprehensive solutions to
address issues of environmental protection or human rights protection.
Regrettably, when assessed through the tool developed in this paper,
they appear moreover to be of the softest type. Both are predominantly
private, non-legal instruments, with some involvement of governments
in the VPSHR. The rather vague and non-mandatory principles are
quite soft in terms of precision and obligation, and auditing as the only
measure of delegation leaves this dimension soft as well. In fact, the
principal aim of both instruments may rather be to shield companies
from further liability rather than addressing fundamental aspects of
human rights or environmental protection related conduct. In other
words, a closer analysis of softness reveals there to be little hope for
these particular soft instruments preventing, let alone remedying, the
situation in cases such as Chevron.
More promising, at least for future cases, could be the National
Contact Points under the revised 2000 OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Especially insofar as the damage can be
qualified as (environmental) human rights or labor rights violations, a
'specific procedure' can be commenced before the United States
NCP. 217 As was discussed above in section V.C., such procedures may
lead to public statements by the NCP, or to a settlement of the dispute
between the parties. However, due to the very limited delegation
dimension, an NCP cannot order damages; it can primarily be useful in
ceasing the TNC conduct.

217. See US. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE,
available
at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/oecd/usncp/index.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2014).
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INTRODUCTION
Against a background where trade is growing and becoming
more complicated in modem society, private parties are appealing for
more flexibility and freedom in making decisions rather than strictly
abiding by the documents they have signed. Correspondingly, the
traditional study of contract law has embraced more theoretical
resources rather than insist on the traditional conception that breach of
the contract is wrong. The school of law and economics, with its
efficient breach theory, provided a new approach to explaining contracts
and breaches, and challenged the traditional notion of pacta sunt
servanda 1 and the moralistic nature of obligation. 2 In 1897, Justice
Holmes wrote in his well-known book The Path of the Law, "[t]he duty
to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it, and nothing else." 3 Afterwards, this
conception of contract became a dynamic support for the theory of
efficient breach, which is assumed to have first appeared in Birmingham
(1970)4 and received its name from Goetz & Scott (1977). 5
At the early stage, after the theory was born, it worked on one
hand, on a superficial layer as a descriptive concept for a situation
where breach of a contract would be profitable for the party who
breached after placing the non-breaching party in as good a position as
he would have occupied had the contract been performed. 6 In this
situation, breach of contract, compared to performance, would make the
promisor better off without making the promisee worse off. Hence,
performing the original contract is assumed to be economically
undesirable for the society. On the other hand, grounded in the theory
of efficient breach, early scholars focused on the justification of EB and
the doctrine's contributions to the structure of contract law and contract
1. "Pacta sunt servanda" is Latin for "agreement must be kept".
2. Frank Menetrez, Consequentialism, Promissory Obligation, and the Theory of
Efficient Breach, 47 UCLA L. REV. 859, 860 (2000); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS
PROMISE, ATHEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 1- 6 (Harvard Uni. Press 1981 ).
3. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. Rev. 457, 462 (1897).
4. Robert R. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damages Measurex and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 284 (1970).
5. Charles J. Goetz et al., Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 5
COLUM. L. REV. 554, 555 (1977).
6. Some scholars call the theory a simple efficient breach model, which makes a
comparison between the cost of performance and the expected benefit. See, e.g., Ian R.
Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 94 7, 949 ( 1982).
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remedies. They asked whether or not breach is immoral and what the
rules of contract law should be so as to provide incentives to parties to
breach efficiently. It was proposed that the contract remedy rules
should encourage breach when breach is efficient, but discourage it
otherwise. 7
The EB doctrine, in its simplest form, stops here and has been in
debate since it first appeared in academic work. For instance, it is stated
that the theory of efficient breach is cultivated in a simple and shortterm mind without the consideration of long-term interests from
cooperation. On the other hand, people argue that the moral and ethic
factors contained in contract obligations have been ignored. 8
Furthermore, the significant disconnect between the theoretical
hypothesis and legal realities put those early findings into plight. 9 After
almost forty years of controversy, the topic of efficient breach has
essentially lost its attraction in the normative construction of contract
rules. 10 Since 2000, many scholars have raised radical attacks against
this doctrine and suggested it be ended. 11 The plight of efficient breach
theory also indicates the problems embedded in the law and economic
analysis. As Posner indicated, the law and economic analysis of the last
decades, has almost stayed at establishing economic models without
explaining the existing law or examining the practical matters. As a
result, the analysis has failed to produce a real economic theory of
contract law and cannot provide a solid basis for criticizing and
reforming contract law. 12 Starting from this point, this paper will not
keep on building ideal efficient breach models, but it will set the
efficient breach theory against the background of real law and analyze

7. Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory
of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 343 (1984).
8. See, e.g. Dawinder S. Sidhu, A Crisis of Confidence and Legal Theory: Why the
Economic Downturn Should Help Signal the End of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach, 24
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 357, 397 (2011).
9. Id. at 393.
10. Gregory Klass, Efficient Breach, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONTRACT LAW 2-29 (Gregory Klass, G. Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228072 (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
11. Sidhu, supra note 8, at 360.
12. "In the last ten years, theory has become divergent, and impasses have emerged.
The simple models that dominated discussion prior to the 1990s do not predict observed
contract doctrine. The more complex models that emerged in the 1980s and dominated
discussion in the 1990s failed to predict doctrine or relied on variables that could not, as a
practical matter, be measured. As a result, the predictions of these models are indeterminate,
and the normative recommendations derived from them are implausible. " See Eric A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112
YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003).
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whether this doctrine can be promoted in the existing rules.
Another premise set in the beginning of this paper concerns a
trend toward forming the Common European Contract Law. This
development, also referred to as the Europeanization of contract law,
was created by a number of factors including the increasing crossborder trade across the common European market, efforts from scholars,
the European Union and the common law. Although some critical
voices also arise, questioning the necessity and possibility of this
undertaking of unification, 13 the topic of Europeanization is still being
developed in both academic work and real practice for the purpose of
achieving greater coherence and a more general common European civil
law. In the present stage, the harmonization of European private law
has gained great achievement, focusing on contract law, especially on
sales contracts and consumer law. A recent achievement was presented
as the publication of the European Proposal on Common European
Sales Law 14 by the European Commission on October 11th 2011, which
was largely based on the Draft Common Frame of Reference 15 and the
previous Principles of European Contract Law 16 ("PECL" 1994). As is
indicated in the beginning of the CESL, the purpose is to improve the
conditions for the establishment and the functioning of the internal
market by making available a uniform set of contract law rules. 17 Based
13. For example, the Tiebout argument in favor of legislative competition provides a
strong argument for decentralization of European law. As is pointed out, legal diversity
contributes to the competition among different legal systems and in that sense increases the
quality of law. Moreover, the "transaction costs" argument that has been pointed out by the
traditional literature in favor of Europeanization has also been challenged. On the one hand,
the cost of Europeanization is assumed to surpass the benefit brought out by this
undertaking and on the other hand, the cost of transactions incurred by cultural, social or
economic factors is thought to be larger than that is incurred by legal diversity. For more
information about the debate on Europeanization and decentralization, see Michael. G.
Faure, How Law and Economics May Contribute to the Harmonization of Tort Law in
Europe, in GRUNDSTRUKTUREN DES EUROPAISCHEN DELIKTSRECHTS 31 (Reinhard
Zimmermann ed., 2003).
14. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final (Oct. 11, 2011). The
CESL is comprised of three main parts: a Regulation (hereinafter Reg. CESL), Annex I to
the Regulation consisting of the contract law rules (hereinafter CESL), and Annex II
containing a Standard Information Notice.
15. PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRlVATE LAW: DRAFT
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE, OUTLINE EDITION (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009)
[hereinafter DCFR].
16. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PART I (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds.,
vol. I, 1995); PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LA w: PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando & Hugh
Beale eds., 2000); PRINCWLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PART 3 (Ole Lando et al. eds.,
2003) [hereinafter PECL].
17. Reg. CESL, supra note 14, art. I.
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on this goal, the CESL provides a set of standard terms for cross-border
sales covering contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or
transferred and contracts for the supply of digital contents, as well as the
service contracts related to the sales contracts. 18 Moreover, emphasis is
placed specially on offering a specific, largely protective sales regime
for consumers and small medium sized entrepreneurs ("SME"), 1 for
whom negotiations about the applicable law are less possible.
Putting those two contexts together, the concern of this paper will
be merely placed on the substantive content of those contract rules,
which have been drafted in the CESL. The paper will answer to what
extent efficient breach doctrine can be promoted within the content of
the CSEL. Moreover, efficient breach in the past, to a large extent, is
only considered as a seller's breach and has been analyzed within the
context of general sales contracts. The scope of this paper, however,
will be narrowed down to the consumer contract in which one of the
parties is a natural person and acting for purposes which are outside his
trade, business, craft or profession. Following this logic, the structure of
the contracts ("contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or
transferred") includes a business seller (or a producer), a consumer
buyer, a duty to convey a property (or to produce a good) and a price. 20
As is inferred from the doctrine of efficient breach, the primary
issue driving the introduction of efficient breach theory is the situation
where strictly performing the original contract is economically
inefficient. To deal with this situation, the seller can choose to break
the contract, or negotiate with the buyer or make a possible substitutive
performance. Breach and compensation of the non-breaching party is
just one option that a seller may choose and discussion about this issue
can fit into a broader framework of law and economic analysis of
contract law in which the basic hypothesis is that contract actors are
rational and welfare max1m1zers. By the same token, the theory of
18. See id. arts. 4-5.
19. CESL has made a clear differentiation between a trader and a consumer. As is
given in Article 2 of the CESL Regulations, a "'trader' means any natural or legal person
who is acting for purposes relating to that person's trade, business, craft, or profession." Id.
art. 2(e). A "'consumer' means any natural person who is acting for purposes[,] which are
outside that person's trade, business, craft, or profession." Id. art. 2(t). In addition, Article
7 of the CESL Regulations defines a small medium sized enterprise as "a trader which (a)
employs fewer than 250 persons; and (b) has an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50
million or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million, or, for an SME which
has its habitual residence in a Member State whose currency is not the euro or in a third
country, the equivalent amounts in the currency of that Member State or third country." Id.
art. 7, § 2.
20. In this section, the words "seller" and "buyer" will also be used in the same
meaning as the words of"promisor" or "debtor" and "promisee" or "creditor."
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efficient breach may be applied to consumer contracts based on the
assumption that both consumers and traders engage in contracting
behavior to enhance their welfare which is measured by either wealth or
happiness. Each party to the contract expects to receive more than he or
she relinquishes. 1 Starting from this cognition, the discussion about
efficient breach in this paper will focus on the CESL rules in relation to
the situation where strictly performing the original contract is
economically inefficient but neither party to the contract prefer welfaredecrease. In this sense, the doctrine of efficient breach provides a
viewing point to make the economic analysis of the substantial rules of
the CESL. To make this evaluation, Section 2 of this paper will first
summarize what has been achieved in law and economic literature and
establish the basic benchmarks for evaluating remedy rules.
Afterwards, the general remedy system in EU sales contract law will be
discussed in Section 3. In addition, the doctrine of efficient breach will
be discussed. Although it has been discussed widely, in prior literature
it was limited to the simplest model of non-performance. To overcome
this problem, Section 4 will analyze the applicability of efficient breach
under the context of specific types of breach.
I. EFFICIENT BREACH IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

The terminology of efficient breach, which appeared in the
literature, was used on the basis of general contracts. This section will
give a brief introduction to the doctrine of efficient breach and assess
what it can contribute to the structure of contract law, especially for the
contract remedy rules.

A. A Seller's Efficient Breach
The classical statement of efficient breach was indicated in
Birmingham 1970 "repudiation of obligations should be encouraged
where the promisor is able to profit from his default after placing his
promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had
performance been rendered. " 22 Around the same time, another paper by
Scott and Goetz first used the concept of efficient breach. 23 Afterwards,
this concept was largely cited as the basis for the common law remedy

21. See Jan M. Smits, Party Choice and the Common European Sales Law, or: How to
Prevent the CESL from Becoming a Lemon on the Law Market 8-9 (Maastricht European
Private Law Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2012/13, 2012), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=2060017 (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
22. Birmingham, supra note 4, at 284.
23. Goetz et al., supra note 5, at 557-59.
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of expectation damages. 24 Under this concept it is required that the
breacher pay damages in an amount that would make the victim of
breach as well off as she would have been had the breach not
occurred. 25 The reason is given as "if the promisor is willing to breach
and pay damages equal to the promisee' s lost surplus, he must be
earning a surplus from breach that is greater than the surplus yielded
from performing the contract. 26
A party to a contract, therefore, is induced to breach as long as
he is able to retain the remaining part of the profits yielded by his
breach after compensating the expected loss of the other party. By this
way, if a contract turns out to be disadvantageous or wasteful after its
formation, the promisor to this contract can be released from it by
paying damages rather than by seeking a successful renegotiation;
similarly, if and only if a contract stays valuable, the promisor will
complete it as agreed. 27 Moreover, in the case that one party breaks a
contract, the non-breaching party is entitled to expectation damages so
that he will be in the same position as if there had been performance.
Therefore, the non-breaching party will be indifferent between having
the breacher breach and pay damages or having the breacher perform
the contract. 28 This situation is in accordance with the Potential Pareto
Improvement (or Kaldor-Hicks improvement). 29
Another inference derived from the early study of efficient
24. Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract. Remedies- Efficiency, Equity, and the
Second "Restatement", 81 COLUM. L. Rev. 111, 111 (1981).
25. Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1679, 1680 (2008).
26. David W. Barnes, Anatomy of Contract Damages and Efficient Breach Theory, 6
S. CAL. lNTERDISC. L.J. 397, 425 (1997-1998).
27. Id.
28. Richard Craswell defined the Indifference Principle as: "the stated goal of contract
damages is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been in had the
defendant kept his contract." Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the
Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. Rev. 629, 636 (1988).
29. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 47 (6th ed. 2011). The
potential Pareto efficiency is the modification of Pareto efficiency. The later one refers to a
movement that makes at least one person better off and nobody worse off. It requires the
gainer explicitly compensate the loser in any change. If there is no payment, the loser can
veto any change. So any change is only possible by unanimous consent. However,
according to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, if a movement creates a winner and a loser but the
winner can compensate the loser and still have some gain left, then the movement is
efficient. Breach of a contract can be Kaldor-Hicks Efficient, but not Pareto Efficient. The
breach may create a loser (promisee) although it can generate a higher surplus and enhance
the net welfare. Therefore, only if the breacher can still be better off after he fully
compensates the other party's loss, the breach will eventually create a Pareto Efficient state.
It is noted that the compensation by a contract-breacher should place the victim in the
position that he would have been in had the contract been performed. Id.
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breach doctrine was the critiques over penalty clauses (or punitive
damages) that are created deliberately over-compensatory by the parties
so as to deter breach or ensure performance. The penalty clauses, which
are mostly created through a damage agreement (liquidated damages
clauses) between the parties, are accused of causing a problem of
overcompensation and deterring efficient breach. 30 That is, a promisee
that is subject to penalty clauses will be motivated to take undue
precaution and to always perform the contract in fear of paying penalty
damages. 31 This idea has been incorporated into some courts' opinions
in the U.S. One such case, Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Justice & Childers,
states "contractual terms fixing damages in an amount clearly
disproportionate to actual loss seek to deter breach through compulsion
and have an in terrorem effect: fearing severe economic loss, the
promisor is compelled to continue performance, while the promisee
may reap a windfall in excess of his just compensation. 32
Two simple models have been established for explaining the
efficient breach theory. Suppose a contract, which is assumed to be
advantageous to the parties at the time of contract formation. 33 After
the contract is signed, a number of unspecified contingencies arise in
the ongoing contract relationship, which might change an advantageous
contract into a disadvantageous contract. When a contingency increases
the performance cost so that performing the oringinal contract will
decrease the profits earned by the contract parties, the promisor will
choose to breach the contract in order to avoid the cost of performance.
This is referred to as an unfortunate contingency. In addition, after the
formation of a contract, if an external buyer comes, willing to pay a
price which is much higher than that of the oringinal buyer, the seller
will be motivated to breach in order to earn more surplus. This is a
fortunate contingency. 34
The following are examples of a fortunate contingency and an
unfortunate contingency: Suppose Y agrees to produce a car and sell it
to X at a price of €10,000. Suppose at the time when X and Y enter the
contract, Y estimates the production cost of the car will be €5,000 but X
estimates he can resell the car for €15,000. Two situations might
30. Juan P. Moreno, The Efficient Breach Hypothesis: Its Impact and Effect on the
Penalty Clause as Defined under Colombian Law, 1 ILL. Bus. L.J. 4, 5 (2010).
31. See Goetz et al., supra note 5, at 556.
32.
Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 677 (2001).
33. At the time two parties enter a contract, both of the parties consider performance of
the contract as efficient, otherwise the parties would not sign the contract.
34. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 29, at 325-26.
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happen after the formation of the contract. First, it might be an
unfortunate contingency that increases the production cost (for
concreteness, I will use PC to describe it) to €16,000. 35 Or, second, it
might be a fortunate contingency that offers the seller Y another trading
opportunity. Assume that Z approaches Y and explains that he
desperately needs this car and he would pay €20,000. Suppose the car is
worth €25,000 for Zand the highest price he would bid is €25,000.
Tables 1 and 2 indicate each party's surplus in the case when the
performance cost increases and when a third party places a higher value
on the car provided that perfect expectation damages can be awarded. In
the first case, Y is supposed to be better off if he tries to seek a lease
from performance by paying €15,000 as compensation rather than
investing €16,000 in producing the car. Moreover, the buyer X may
keep a fixed surplus of €5,000 no matter whether or not the contract is
performed as long as a compensatory damage measure is available. In
this sense, it is possible to reach a Pareto Efficiency through Y's nonproduction and avoid the decrease in the total surplus. Similarly, when
the second scenario occurs, breaking the original contract and
transferring the car to the alternative buyer may bring out a higher
surplus of €20,000 than transferring the car to the original buyer does.
Breach is efficient.
T able 1. Surp l us ofE ac hP arty Iif PC.mcreases 36
y
Total
PC=16,000
Y's decision x
-€1,000
-€6,000
€5,000
Expectation Perform
damages
€5,000
-€5,000
Breach

35. These two examples are modified from the examples that have been used by
Cooter and Ulen. See id. at 326-31. Similar examination can be found in Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the
Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALL. REV. 975, 998-1015 (2005).
36. We use "N" to indicate the net profit, "p" to denote performance and "b" to denote
breach. If Y performs the contract, each party's profit is calculated as: Npx=€15 ,000€10,000=€5,000; Npy=€10,000-€16,000= -€6,000. If Y decides not to perform, then each
party's surplus is measured as: Nbx=€15,000-€10,000=€5,000; Nby=O-Nbx=0€5,000=€5,000.
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Table 2. Surplus of each party if a third
• 37
price
y
x
€15,000 €5,000
Value
Expectation Y sells the €5,000
€5,000
car to X
Damages
€10,000
Y sells the €5,000
car to Z

party bids a higher

344

z

Total

€25,000
0

€10,000

€5,000

20,000

B. Efficient Breach, Negotiation and Remedies
As is indicated in the previous examples, the primary issue that
motivates the scholars to talk about efficient breach theory is how to
deal with the situations where breach of the contract will be more
efficient than performing the contract. To deal with this situation, the
parties have multiple solutions, either ex-ante or ex-post.
Through ex-ante negotiation, the parties can specify each other's
rights and obligations in reaction to the possible uncertainties, such as
writing a price reduction clause in case of a sharp increase in
performance cost. Or they can decide how to react to those
contingencies by ex-post renegotiation after disputes arise and try to use
a more efficient contract to replace the previous one. 38 For example,
after a second bargainer comes to a party to a contract, all the parties
involved in this transaction may gather together and re-negotiate the
price. Through this approach, a bidding war may occur and thus prevent
the promisor from implementing the less efficient contract. Or, if a
seller fails to sell a product to the buyer who values it more, 39 this buyer
can transact with the buyer who received the product. In this way,
resources will also be allocated to the best user in the end. What's more,
since the parties are the best judge of their own benefits, the approach of
ex-ante or ex-post negotiation may always achieve an efficient result.
37. When Y performs and the car is sold to X, each person's profit can be calculated as
this: the Npx= €15,000-€10,000==€5,000; Npy==€10,000-€5,000==€5,000; Nz=O;
Npx+Npy+Nz==€5,000+€5,000+o==€10,000. If Y breaches and resells the car to Z, then the
net profits are calculated: Nbx= l5,000-10,000=5,000; Nby= (€20,000-€5,000)-( €15 ,000==€10,000;
Nz=€25,000-€20,000==€5,000;
€10,000)
Nbx+Nby+Nz==€5,000+€10,000+€5,000==€20,000.
38. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 29, at 326.
39. For example, a buyer who values a property less might have already recieved the
goods according to the property law. For instance, in many civil law countries, registration
is an important requirement for obtaining ownership over real property. Suppose there are
two people who want to buy a house. If the first buyer has done the registration in the
public authority, the second buyer cannot get the property, even if he is willing to pay a
higher price.
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However, ex-ante or ex-post negotiations might fail for several reasons.
The trading parties' limitation of foresight may prevent contract parties
from predicting all the possible events and writing a complete contract
ex-ante; or the costs of negotiation and the conflicts in the parties'
interests might sometimes discourage a successful renegotiation. In this
sense, there is some space for legal rules, especially remedy rules,
which may fill up the contract gaps and offer the conflicting parties a
legal basis for solving the problem.
Within the framework of legal rules, nevertheless, different options
are available for achieving an efficient consequence. Or in other words,
legitimating breach and issuing expectation damages is far from the
only way to avoid performance of an inefficient contract. In the simple
efficient breach doctrine, the assumption that the approach of breach is
economically efficient is based on two conditions: (1) the expectation
damages may motivate those behaviours which will increase the total
surplus created in the transaction (Nb =O or €20,000 > Np=-€1,000 or
€10,000); and (2) the non-breaching party is able to get full
compensation (L= €5,000). Nevertheless, a similar result may be
realized as long as the seller is not forced to strictly perform the original
contract when a fortunate contingency or an unfortunate contingency
occurs. For instance, even if the default remedy is specific performance,
avoidance of an inefficient contract is still available. On the one hand,
the parties may negotiate with each other in order to reach a desirable
solution. When an unfortunate contingency arises, the seller might be
willing to pay the buyer up to €5,999 for a release from the contract
rather than loss €6,000 in producing the car; or the buyer would accept a
price higher than €5,000 for the buyer's non-performance. 40 On the
other hand, the law may set some exceptions to specific performance in
reaction to the situation where performing the contract turns out to be
socially inefficient. This refers to the impractical doctrine dealing with
"the circumstances in which a party's performance is physically
possible but will cause severe hardship". 41 Moreover, the goal of full
compensation could be also, or even better, accomplished through the
remedy of specific performance. Especially, when the subject of a
contract is a unique good or subjective values have been attached to a
contract, it is difficult for a court (a third party) to use the baseline of
"market price difference" or "lost profits" to assess the amount of

40. Klass, supra note 10, at 13.
41. Donald J. Smythe, Impossibility and Impracticability, in CONTRACT
ECONOMICS 2011, at 207 (6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECON., 2nd ed., 2011).
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compensation. 42 In those cases, either determining the baseline for
evaluating the subject of the contract is complicated or finding a
substitution in the market is impossible. In addition to these two
concerns which may influence the efficiency of the result, if more than
one approach would lead to a similar result, then the difference in
efficiency of the rules is related to the transaction costs under different
rules. 43 Contractual parties are supposed to prefer the approach which is
less costly so that their net profits from transactions are maximized.
Therefore, if a contract dispute has been brought to a court, then the
problem that should also be recognized is the level of transaction costs
facing the plaintiff and the defendant under different remedy rules, 44
such as the cost of litigation, the cost of assessing damages or the cost
of execution.
Beyond the worries within the expectation damages, questions
arise as to the effect of punitive damages in relation to the possibility of
efficient breach. In contrast to the traditional concerns about penalties'
deterrence to efficient breach, my argument is that damages stipulated
by parties have advantages in inducing rational decisions, precluding
conflicts or costly litigation and allocating risks. Behavioural
experiments and economic assumptions about rational theory add much
more force to support this statement. For example, as is shown in either
Gneezy & Rustichini' s Day-care Centre Study ( 1998)45 or WilkinsonRyan' s observation of Sick-leave Case in the Boston Fire Department
42. A non-breaching party's expectation loss can be calculated as the market price
difference or the value difference. When a buyer breaches, the expectation loss of the seller
is normally calculated as the discrepancy between the market price at the time when the
breach occurs and the contract price. When a seller breaches, the expectation loss of the
buyer is normally calculated as the difference between the contract price and the value that
the buyer places on the contract-for goods. However, if the buyer has a substitutive offer
after the breach happens, then what he has lost is the discrepancy between the price set in
the substitutive contract and the price set in the original contract. For instance, suppose a
contract to produce a product. If the parties agree on a price of €10,000 at the time of
contract formation and the production cost is estimated to be €5,000, then the expected
surplus of the producer is €5,000. Assume that the parties also learn that the market price for
this product is assessed as €12,000. In this case, the expectation loss will be €2,000. COOTER
& ULEN, supra note 29, at 309-10; Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 991.
43. Macneil, supra note 6, at 957.
44. Ulen, supra note 7, at 369.
45. In 1998, Gneezy and Rustichini made the famous study of the "day care centre" in
Israel. They researched the relationship between a penalty and the possibility that parents
pick up their kids late. A result is found that the number of late-coming parents increased
significantly after a monetary fine is attached to the behavior of coming late. As is
explained, introduction of a fine may remove the non-market nature that actors place on
being late. Actors are willing to treat a fine as a price for being later and no guilt or shame
will be attached to the act of buying a commodity. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A
Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
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(2001 - 2002)46 , it is found that people's behaviour becomes more
strategic and self-interested when the punishment of uncooperative
behaviour (late coming, sick-leaving) has been clarified. 47 The reason,
given by those observers, is that actors are more likely to deny social
norms and moral concerns of complying promises and be more selfseeking when there is an explicit and real penalty for non-cooperation.
48
Therefore, efficient breach will be promoted rather than be deterred
when there is an explicit arrangement of contract damages. Moreover,
within the dimension of rational theory, it is inferred that the permission
of penalty clauses would encourage other rational behaviour beyond
efficient breach. An example is that offering contract parties more
freedom in drafting damages clauses would promote risk-allocation and
"a penalty clause may represent the best effort of the parties to allocate
risk" 49 because people would carefully stipulate the amount of
compensation in relation to each party's risk attitude rather than agree
on an amount which is unreasonably high. If the seller is risk-averse, the
seller would prefer a kind of damage payment that will guarantee him a
fixed profit and is unaffected by neither the performance cost nor any
outsider's offer. 50 The seller would not accept any damage measure that
is higher than the expected loss suffered by the buyer and penalty
clauses will not be drafted into the contract. In another case where a
seller is risk-preferring or risk-neutral and a buyer is risk-averse, the
parties might use a high amount of damages to shift the risk of nonperformance from the buyer to the seller. 51 However, it is hardly for the
46. "In December of 2001, the Boston Fire Department changed its sick-leave policy
to allow fifteen sick days per year. The previous system had allowed unlimited sick time,
and the new rule was part of an initiative to bring professional management tools to the
department. In 2001, firefighters took a total of 6,432 sick days. In 2002, the total number
of sick days rose to 13,431 - more than double the previous year." Tess Wilkinson-Ryan,
Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 633, 635 (2010).
47. Daniel Houser et. al., When Punishment Fails: Research on Sanctions, Intentions
and Non- Cooperation, 62 GAMES ECON. BEHAVIOR 509, 522-23 (2008).
48. DiMatteo, supra note 32, at 705; Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 46, at 664.
49. Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 46, at 644.
50. Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract
Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 706 (1986).
51. The risk-averse buyer is willing to pay a premium in advance so as to shift the risk
to the seller. So he would accept to pay a higher amount of contract price. See id. at 705-06.
As is stated:
If the seller is risk neutral and the buyer is risk averse, it is beneficial to both parties
for the seller to insure the buyer.... Damages in excess of full compensation would
not appeal to a risk-averse buyer because he would face an unwanted variation in his
income, depending on whether the product failed . He would not wish to pay a higher
price for the product. . . . If the buyer is risk preferring, a clause that specified
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parties to reach an extremely high amount of damage payment which is
only aimed for punishing breach provided the process of contracting is
based on equal condition. In one aspect, the party who bears a risk of
paying penalty damages would require a higher price to cover any
increase in the cost of performance. 52 The higher the amount of
damages, the higher the price the buyer has to pay. So the buyer has no
incentive to require unreasonably high damages. In another aspect, there
is rare example in the commercial context where a seller is in favour of
risk or gambling and would accept an unreasonable penalty clause.

C. Implications for the Structure of Contract Remedies Rules
Put all those questions together and the simple efficient breach
theory is not as convincing as what was assumed in the early stage. As
shown in the previous section, a single expectation damages rule may
not reach the ideal result which is consistent with the efficient breach
model. Moreover, social or economic factors other than the threat of
legal liability will also influence the possibility of efficient breach, such
as the fear of losing reputation or the long-term benefit in cooperation.
Today, few scholars are in favour of the simple efficient breach
doctrine. However, the doctrine of efficient breach is still valuable in
the sense that it opens a window for evaluating contractual behaviour
and assessing legal remedies in a wider perspective. In response to the
unspecified risks arising after the contract formation, the efficient
breach doctrine is an optional approach that would be taken by
legislators and contract parties. In this paper, three implications of
efficient breach theory on contract remedy rules are drawn.
One of the most important implications is that by differentiating
an efficient performance zone (or inefficient breach zone) and an
efficient breach zone (or inefficient performance zone), the doctrine
makes us re-think the behaviour that either falls into the efficient breach
zone or into the efficient performance zone. 53 Take the previous case set
in Section 2.1 as an example; the efficient breach point is where the
production cost increases to €15,000 or the external bidder values the
car for €15,000. If the production cost increases to higher than €15,000,
damages in excess oflosses would provide an opportunity to gamble.
Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 147, 152 (1984).
52. Kornhauser, supra note 50, at 720.
53. Gerrit De Geest, Specific Performance, Damages and Unforeseen Contingencies in
the Draft Common Frame of Reference, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE DCRF: THE WORK
OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT GROUP WITHIN CoPECL N ETWORK OF EXCELLENCE 123, 126-27
(Filomena Chirico & Pierre Larouche eds., Munich: Sellier 2010).
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the entire surplus produced by the original contract will be consumed by
the increasing production cost and the contract will tum into the
efficient breach zone. Within the efficient breach zone, breach would be
efficient because it produces higher surplus than performance does for
the society. In another sense, a slight increase in performance cost (for
example, PC=€1000) would not necessary denote an efficient breach.
Moreover, breaches in reality actually involve other types of costs such
as the litigation cost, cost of damage calculation and the loss of
reputation and future trading opportunities, other than the cost of legal
liability. 54 Thus, when, and only when the extent of the increase is clear
and well beyond the normal range, performance of the contract will
become inefficient. By the same token, only when a second buyer
comes with a price which is much higher than the value that the first
buyer would pay, does breach of the original contract fall into the
efficient breach zone. 55 In addition, another interesting topic arousing
quite a lot of discussions in law and economics refers to the concept of
opportunistic breach. A breach is deemed as opportunistic when "oneparty attempts to reap the benefit of the bargain without bearing the
agreed-upon cost". 56 For example, a seller may appropriate all the prepayment by the buyer and invest the money in other uses without
providing reciprocal performance. 57 We may want the law of contracts
to discourage this type of breach and consider depriving the actor of all
the benefits he could obtain from the opportunism.
Another lesson we can learn from the efficient breach theory is that
remedies for breach may have multiple influences over the whole
transaction. One important example is that the contract remedy has an
influence on a person's breach-or-perform decision. By realizing this,
we can better evaluate how contract remedies would affect people's
incentives to behave intentionally. 58 To promote efficient breach and
avoid wasteful performance, the contract law should create incentives to

54. See id.; HANS-BERND SCHAFER & CLAUS OTT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CIVIL
LAW 320-24 (Matthew Braham trans., Edward Elgar Puhl 'g 2004).
55. Or a second seller is willing to accept a price which is much lower than that the
lowest price the first seller would accept.
56. Klass, supra note 10, at 10.
57. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 118-19 (8th ed. 2011 ).
58. For instance, Barnes observes that the efficient breach theory is an example that
scholars study the relationship between damages rules and surplus-increasing breach. See
Barnes, supra note 26, at 398 ("The topic of greatest scholarly interest, judicial notice, and
casebook teaching is the effect of rules on incentives to break promises intentionally .. .
Economists conclude that contract damage rules tend to provide incentives to breach
contracts that align the self-interested preferences of a person contemplating breach with
society's interest in ensuring that its scarce resources are used wisely.").
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breach in the circumstances where breach may lead to a higher sum of
surpluses than that yielded by performance and vice versa. On the one
hand, the law should not force a promisor to strictly perform the original
contract in the situation when a contract falls into the efficient breach
zone. It does not necessarily require that expectation damages should be
set as the default remedy. On the other hand, the remedy rules should be
able to protect the expectation interest of the promisee, namely, to put
the promisee in the same position as she would have been had the
contract been performed.
The third point, that we can infer from the efficient breach doctrine
is related to the freedom in contracting and renegotiation. As is noted,
breach and compensation is the second-best tool for welfare
maximization in many occasions. A more desirable approach to
achieving an efficient result derives from private negotiation. After all,
contract parties are better than courts or legal scholars at assessing their
own preferences and working for their own welfare. They know more
about how to deal with risks in their transactions, which kind of
breaches are clearly efficient and should be priced rather than punished,
through which remedy they can avoid inefficient breach more cheaply
and so on. 59 We want the law to facilitate parties' ex-ante and ex-post
contracting. One important point is to diminish mandatory rules in
contract law and give parties more freedom in choosing their own
remedies. For example, courts should reduce inference with liquidated
damage clauses. Rather than scrutinize over the amount of damages
stipulated by contract parties, a more preferable way for courts is to
evaluate the formation process of those clauses.
Based on those three points, this paper will address some
specific questions in relation to the application of efficient breach
theory in the CSEL. With regard to the general case of breach and
remedy, it is necessary to figure out the line between the efficient
breach zone and the efficient performance zone drawn by the CESL and
the CESL' s approach to dealing with the situation where a contract falls
into each zone. In addition, the findings deriving from the study of the
general breach case will be put in the context of specific breach cases in
order to examine the possibility of different types of efficient breach.

59. Klass, supra note 10, at 24.
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II. APPLICATION OF THE EFFICIENT BREACH DOCTRINE IN
THE GENERAL RULES OF THE CESL
As shown in the previous section, one important topic driving
the discussion of efficient breach theory arises from the situations where
breach of the contract is more efficient than performance. Using the
economic surplus standard, a contract either falls into the efficient
breach zone or into the efficient performance zone. According to
economic theory, contract law should aim to optimize the contracting
parties' incentives to take efficient actions, or to facilitate their abilities
to maximize welfare from transactions. 60 It is assumed, based on this
insight, that contract law should be able to motivate contract parties to
avoid strict performance of a contract when it falls into the efficient
breach zone, but encourage performance otherwise.
The proposal for regulation defines the CESL' s scope to sales
contract, covering contracts for transferring ownership of goods and
contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced. As is
noticed, one important feature of the sales contracts shaped by the
CESL is the sharp distinction made between the business contracts
(hereinafter B2B contracts) and the consumer contracts (hereinafter
B2C contracts). However, the fundamental structures of these two types
of contractual relationships are quite similar. Both the consumer party
and the business party engage in transactions for their own profits, as a
result of which, contracts entered into voluntarily by the parties will
lead to welfare enhancement. 61 In the absence of a fully complete
contract, 62 potential risks or opportunistic behaviour may arise in the
contractual relationship and thus decrease or eliminate the utility of the
contract. There are several factors leading to the incompleteness of a
contract, such as the transaction costs 63 , or the limited foresight of the
60. Cf Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
law, 113. YALE L.J. 541 , 544 (2003).
61. Smits, supra note 21, at 6.
62. Assume a complete contract. Then the trading parties have to consider every risk,
consequence, possible opportunistic behaviour of the other one, etc. ("contingently
completeness"). Correspondingly, the contract should specify the exact actions that one
party should perform when every risk happens. For example, it should include the time,
place, way and quality of performance ("obligationally completeness"). See Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules,
101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992).
63. In order to draft a complete contract, the trading parties have to take all the
potential risks into account and deal in their contract with all of the risk in a specific way.
Drafting complete contracts incurs the cost of searching information, the cost of negotiation
and so on. Hence, a low possibility risk or insignificant risk may always be neglected by the
contracting parties. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
299-301 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004).
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parties. Moreover, the risk of opportunism increases in consumer
contracts caused by consumers' lack of information, the absence of a
truly competitive market or even the standard form contracts that are not
subject to negotiation. 64 As a result, the contract that was assumed to be
efficient at the time of conclusion may tum out to be wasteful because
the cost of implementing the original contract increases or businesses
may opportunistically try to cut down the investment in the performance
of a binding contract. Taking those concerns into account, there is space
for introducing legal interference into consumer contracts in order to
shape the parties' incentives to taking proper behaviour, for instance, to
motivate a business party to comply with what he has agreed. What is
debatable, however, is the desirable extent of legal interference. Applied
to consumer contracts, if the law imposes a high requirement for
performance on the business party, this would be converted into the
price of the product or shrink the supply of products and hence to a
decrease in social welfare. 65
This section will discuss the general attitude taken by the CESL
toward breach, remedies and efficient breach zone.

A. Seller's Breach and Buyer's Remedy in General
The central concept stressed in this paper refers to "breach".
However, instead of using the concept of "breach", the CESL uses the
term "non-performance" to include any failure to perform a contract
obligation, regardless of whether the failure is excused. 66 Part IV of the

64. In a normal case, the consumer contract is presented as a standard form contract in
which the consumer cannot negotiate individually but can only "take it or leave it". As is
argued by Slawson, infra, about 99% of consumer contracts are standard form contracts. In
economic theory, standard contracts are preferable for the concern of lowering transaction
cost. As to the consumer contract, which occurs at regular basis, it is costly for the business
to negotiate with consumers individually. However, in another sense, consumers are
compelled to adhere to the standard terms in the contract and the situation for the consumer
is worse off if the business tries to exploit economic benefits without bearing any cost. See
W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts . and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971); Cf Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer
Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. Rev. 583, 594-608
(1990).
65. Smits, supra note 21, at 9.
66. The term of "non-performance" instead of "breach" has also been used in PECL,
as well as subsequent European soft law texts. For example, Chapter 8 of PECL provides
rules on "Non-Performance and Remedies in General"; Chapter III of Book III of DCFR
offers the rules about "Remedies for Non-performance". In the CESL, Chapter 11 addresses
"the buyer's remedies" and chapter 13 addresses "the seller's remedies". PRINCIPLES,
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 15; PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LA w, supra note 16; Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, supra note 14.
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CESL sets out the framework of the contractual parties' obligations and
remedies. Cases of breach might be presented either as a business
seller's breach or a consumer buyer's breach. This section will focus on
the basic structure of a business seller's breach and a consumer buyer's
remedies as indicated in the CESL.
Article 87 of the CESL includes two major types of a seller's
non-performance, covering the situations where a seller fails to deliver
the goods ("non-delivery") or the goods delivered are not in conformity
with the contract ("non-conformity"). Breach of an obligation is the
condition for awarding a consumer remedies. Generally, a consumer
buyer is provided with a set of standard remedies in Article 106. 67 As is
indicated, in the case that a breach takes place, a consumer buyer may
require: (1) Performance (including specific performance, repair or
replacement); 68 (2) Withholding the buyer's own performance 69 (usually
payment of money); (3) Terminating the contract; 70 (4) Declaring a
price reduction71 ; or (5) Claiming damages. 72
Moreover, Article 106 contains important information for the
consumer party, namely that the consumer is provided with a free
choice of remedies and Article 108 adds mandatory nature to the
general application of remedies rules in B2C contracts 73 On the one
hand, it means that a consumer buyer may either choose among any of
the remedies listed in Article 106, or resort to more than one remedy in
67. CESL, supra note 14, art. 106, §§ 1, 3.
68. Id. art. 110, §1 (entitling the buyer to require performance of the seller's
obligations).
69. Id. art. 113, § 1 (stating that a buyer who performs at the same time as, or after, the
seller performs, has a right to withhold performance until the seller has tendered
performance or has performed).
70. Id. art. 114, §§ 1, 2 (stating that a buyer may terminate the contract within the
meaning of Article 8 if the seller's non-performance under the contract is fundamental
within the meaning of Article 87; in a consumer sales contract and a contract for the supply
of digital content between a trader and a consumer, where there is a non-performance
because the goods do not conform to the contract, the consumer may terminate the contract
unless the lack of conformity is insignificant).
71. Id. art. 120, §1 (stating that a buyer who accepts a performance not conforming to
the contract may reduce the price; the reduction is to be proportionate to the decrease in the
value of what was received in performance at the time performance was made compared to
the value of what would have been received by a conforming performance).
72. CESL, supra note 14, art. 159, §§1, 2 (stating that a creditor is entitled to damages
for loss caused by the non-performance of an obligation by the debtor, unless the nonperformance is excused; the loss for which damages are recoverable includes future loss
which the debtor could expect to occur).
73. Id. art. 108 (stating that in a contract between a trader and a consumer, the parties
may not, to the detriment of the consumer, exclude the application of this Chapter, or
derogate from or vary its effect before the lack of conformity is brought to the trader's
attention by the consumer).
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the same case as long as the remedies he chooses are not incompatible.
For instance, if a buyer chooses to terminate a contract, it means the
bond created by the contract will be brought to an end and he cannot ask
for repair or replacement. On the other hand, the consumer's free
choice is not subject to cure by the seller, which is stated in
Article106(3). 74 Article 109 follows by specifying that the "cure" by a
seller in the case of "non-conformity". As is shown, a seller whose
early tender was not in conformity with the contract may make a new
and conforming tender within the time allowed for performance or cure
the defect at its own expense even after the time allowed for
performance. 75 The buyer may terminate the contract if the nonconformity amounts to being fundamental. 76 This is the normal case in
commercial sales, where both the seller and the buyer are professional
businessmen, but not in the B2C contract. The message conveyed in
Article106(3) is that a consumer buyer has great freedom in choosing
remedies. He may require the seller to either repair the defects in the
goods he received or change the defective goods into conforming goods.
But more importantly, the consumer is able to tum down any offer by
the seller to cure so as to require price reduction, damages, or
termination of the contract immediately. 77 The application of the
remedy is at the consumer's choice. Furthermore, Article 114 adds that
consumers may terminate the contract even when the lack of conformity
is not fundamental, enhancing a consumer's free choice of remedies.
Meanwhile, the application of a consumer buyer's remedies is
mandatory so that the parties may not exclude it or derogate from or
vary its effect in advance. However, the consumer's free choice of
remedies is not absolute. The type of remedies that are available to a
consumer buyer depends on the specific type of breach. Following
Article 106, the CESL adds more provisions, coordinating the
74. Id. art. 106, §3 (stating that "if the buyer is a consumer: (a) the buyer's rights are
not subject to cure by the seller ... ").
75. Id. art. 109, § 1 (stating that "a seller who has tendered performance early and
who has been notified that the performance is not in conformity with the contract may make
a new and conforming tender if that can be done within the time allowed for performance").
76. Id. art. 114, § 1 (stating that "buyer may terminate the contract within the meaning
of Article 8 if the seller's non-performance under the contract is fundamental within the
meaning of Article 87 (2)").
77. See CESL, supra note 14, art. 114, §2; see also Gerhard Wagner, Buyers'
Remedies under the CESL: Rejection, Rescission, and the Seller's Right to Cure (Apr. 5,
2012), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Wagner%20paper.pdf (last
visited Mar. 26, 2014) (presentation at the University of Chicago to Host Conference on
European Contract Law); see also Regine Feltkamp & Frederic Vanbossele, The Optional
Common European Sales Law: Better Buyer's Remedies for Seller's Non-performance in
Sales of Goods?, 6 EUR. Rev. PRIV. L. 873, 894 (2011).
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application of different types of remedies in specific types of breach,
which will be discussed in Section 4.
B. Damage Rules

As to the damages rules, the CESL has a separate part (Part VI)
covering the issue of damage measurement, types of damages and
conditions for damages.
Following the CISG and the DCFR, 78 the CESL also sets the aim
of damages as compensatory; namely, it aims to make a non-breaching
party indifferent to breach and performance of the contract. 79 As Article
160 indicates, "the general measure of damages for loss caused by nonperformance of an obligation is such sum as will put the creditor into
the position in which the creditor would have been if the obligation had
been duly performed, or, where that is not possible, as nearly as possible
into that position." Article 160 also adds that the damages cover the
loss which the creditor has suffered and the gain of which the creditor
has been deprived, which includes a future loss caused by the breach of
contract. Inferring from Article 165 of the CESL, a creditor's loss from
non-performance is generally measured by the discrepancy between the
contract price and the market price. But Article 164 adds that if the
creditor has arranged an alternative transaction to replace the original
transaction reasonably, he could recover the shortfall between the value
of what would have been payable under the terminated contract and the
value of what is payable under the substitute transaction. 80 Suppose the
buyer has arranged an alternative sale in which he paid a price (P ')
higher than the contract price (P); what he can then recover on the basis
of Article 164 is the discrepancy between P' and P, namely P' -P. A
problem occurs in the situation where the buyer has arranged a cheaper
substitutive transaction (P'<P). In addressing the principle of "full
compensation", the commentary to the CESL states that "if the
creditor's loss is higher, he retains the right to recover the loss through a
claim for damages on the basis of Article 159."81 However, in the case
where a buyer could arrange a cheaper alternative purchase, the buyer
actually suffers no loss and cannot obtain any compensation. As is
shown, the CESL tries to entitle a creditor to his real loss rather than to
78. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
arts. 74-5, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter CISG]; see also DCFR, supra note
15, bk. III, sec. 3-702.
79. COMMON EUROPEAN SALES LAW (CESL) COMMENTARY, 639-40 (Reiner Schulze
ed., Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft et al., 2012) [hereinafter CESL COMMENTARY].
80. See CESL, supra note 14, arts. 164-65.
81. See CESL COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 652.
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motivate the creditor to make the best possible substitutive transaction.
The CESL, moreover, sets several limits and conditions on the
expectation measure as well. First, not all types of loss are recoverable.
Article 2 of the CESL specifies the losses that are recoverable by
limiting them to economic loss and non-economic loss in the form of
physical pain and suffering. Other forms of non-economic loss such as
impairment of the quality of life and loss of enjoyment are precluded
from recovery with emphasis. The second limit to expectation damages
derives from the famous Hadly rules 82 , namely, a debtor is only liable
for losses that he could foresee or could be expected to have foreseen
when the contract was concluded as a possible consequence of his
breach. 83 This is in accordance with one of the requirements needed for
an efficient breach to take place. As is assumed, the debtor to a contract
has to obtain sufficient information concerning the cost and the benefit
of breach in order to assess whether it is more profitable to breach, to
perform, or to negotiate with the other party. The Hadly rule builds a
bridge between the debtor's incentive to breach and the creditor's
incentive to disclose information in terms of his expected loss from the
non-performance of the contract. Since the damages are limited to the
loss that is foreseeable by the debtor at the time of contract conclusion,
the buyer has to disclose as much information as possible at the stage of
contract formation in order to fully recover his loss from the nonperformance. Another condition for awarding expectation damages is
the causal relationship between nonperformance and loss. However, the
CESL doesn't establish any standard for evaluating this causal
relationship. 84
In addition, the CESL exempts the debtor from
compensating the loss to the extent that the creditor contributed to the
non-performance or its effects, or the creditor omitted reasonable steps
82. The Hadley Rule derives from the famous English case of Hadley v. Baxendale,
(1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.); 9 Exch. 341. Two implication were drawn from this
case:
( 1)[T]hat it is not always wise to make the defaulting promisor pay for all the damage which
follows as a consequence of his breach, and (2) that specifically the proper test for
determining whether particular items of damage should be compensable is to inquire
whether they should have been foreseen by the promisor at the time of the contract.
As is suggested, the "foreseeability" test is subject to defining what a hypothetical
reasonable man would have foreseen at the time he signed the contract. See L. L. Fuller &
William R. Perdue, Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L. J. 52, 84-85
(1936).
83. CESL, supra note 14, art. 161.
84. The commentary under Book III, §3-701 of the DCFR provides a basic standard
for evaluating causation between non-performance and loss. As is required, the creditor can
only recover the losses that would not have occurred without the failure in performance.
DCFR, supra note 15, bk. III, sec. 3-701, comment B.
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to reduce the loss. 85
The CESL is silent in terms of the party-designed damages for
the seller's non-performance. In the previous example, both PECL and
DCFR take a similar approach toward party-designed damages as that
of the "Resolution on Penalty Clause" (RPC 1971 ). 86 The attitude is to
distinguish normal liquidated damages from pure penalty clauses.
Liquidated damages, which are higher than the damages payable for
breach, are generally allowed and enforceable. But in the situation
where the damage clause has specified an excessive amount of damages
disproportionate to the actual loss from non-performance, the court is
authorized to reduce the sum of damages. The CESL, in contrast,
doesn't incorporate this kind of rule. The CESL's concentration on
regulating "unfair contract terms" in B2C contracts or B2B (SMEs)
contracts to some extent is relevant to its silence in addressing the rule
on liquidated damages or penalty clauses. In the context of a consumer
contract, the contract usually takes the form of a standard contract
drafted only by the business party and the consumer may either "agree
or leave". Logically, the business party would not specify any damage
clause against his own interest. Rather, the problem in standard contract
terms arises from the business' advantageous position in drafting unfair
terms that are unfavorable to the consumer, such as penalty clauses for
consumers' non-performance. The business party has the incentive to
insert an unfair penalty clause as long as his marginal cost of doing so is
lower than the marginal value. 87 Then a desirable way of eliminating
unfair penalty terms is to invalidate them. Article 85 of the CESL
indicates that "a contact term is presumed to be unfair if its object or
effect is to. . .(e) require a consumer who fails to perform obligations
under the contract to pay a disproportionately high amount by way of
damages or a stipulated payment for non-performance . . . ." If the
damages clause is presumed unfair, it is not binding on the consumer
party unless the business can prove it is not unfair. 88 By default, it is
inferred that the CESL allows general liquidated damages but only
excludes penalty clauses against consumer parties that have failed the
85. CESL, supra note 14, arts. 162-63.
86. Resolution (78) 3 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,
Relating to Penal Clauses in Civil Law art. 7 (1978). "The sum stipulated may be reduced
by the court when it is manifestly excessive. In particular, reduction may be made when the
principal obligation has been performed in part. The sum may not be reduced below the
damages payable for failure to perform the obligation. Any stipulation contrary to the
provisions of this article shall be void." Id. Similar articles are §9:509 PECL, supra note 16,
and Book III, sec. 3-702 ofDCFR, supra note 15.
87. Meyerson, supra note 64, at 606-07.
88. CESL, supra note 14, arts. 79, 83, 85.
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"Unfair Contract Terms" test.
C. Rules in the Efficient Performance Zone
In economic theory, actors engage in contracting in order to
enhance their welfare, thus the law should motivate the parties to
comply with their agreement. Accordingly, breach of a mutually agreed
upon contract should be refrained from unless performance of the
contract would decrease the social welfare. Within a trade between a
business and a consumer, the seller is motivated to comply with the
contract consciously, by either the goal of earning money, his personal
values, or as a means to protect his professional reputation. 89 Moreover,
legal rules encourage performance in the efficient performance zone by,
for instance, imposing obligations on the contracting parties and
creating remedy rules for a non-breaching party that may increase the
cost of breach and alter a promisor's incentive to breach. The CESL
adopted this notion of encouraging the performance of those contracts
within the efficient performance zone.
A general issue stressed in relation to the efficient performance
zone concerns the remedies that are available to the buyer. According
to Article 106 of the CESL, a hierarchy does not exist among those
remedies. Within the five types of remedies provided by the CESL,
performance is regarded as an important remedy arising from nonperformance but not as the primary one. 90 Article 106( 1) and
Article 110( 1) set the general provisions entitling a buyer to
performance, including claiming specific performance, repair of the
goods, or replacement of the goods. Basically, if a seller fails to deliver
the goods or the goods delivered are not in conformity with the contract,
the buyer may ask for delivery, repair or replacement unless some
specific conditions set out in the CESL are satisfied. 91 Provided that the
performance claim is available to the buyer, the seller's principal
reaction to a contract will not be to breach, but rather to comply with the
contract or negotiate with the buyer in order to buy the nonperformance. Moreover, what motivates the seller to perform at an
optimal level is a whole system composed of both legal and non-legal
incentives. 92 Within the legal system, remedies beyond specific
89. Schafer & Ott, supra note 54, at 277.
90. Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 77, at 891-92.
91. Section 3.4, infra, will discuss the exceptions to the claim of specific performance.
92. In terms of non-legal incentives, reputation and economic surplus may induce
performance. For example, the seller is willing to perform in order to obtain reciprocal
performance by the buyer; or he has to keep his promise in order to sustain a good
reputation within the common playing field. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 60, at 557-
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performance and damages may also provide such deterrence to nonperformance. For example, by withholding the obligation to pay, the
buyer can, on the one hand shift away the risk of losing the value of his
monetary payment if the seller fails to perform93 and on the other hand,
induce the seller to accomplish due performance since the seller expects
economic surplus from the payment.
Within the efficient performance zone, Article 89(1) of the CESL
recognizes a situation where performance of a contract has become
more onerous, but the surplus from performance is still assumed to be
higher than that from non-performance under the heading of"Change of
Circumstances". Article 89 also provides two types of contingencies
which may cause onerosity in performance, namely, an increase in the
cost of performance, or a decrease in the value of what is to be received
by a seller. Nevertheless, to be mentioned, the seller's obligation to
perform the contract in general will not be affected if the extent that
performance becomes more onerous is not great. In this sense, if a
seller refuses to deliver the goods as required, or delivers defective
goods merely on the ground of a minor difficulty in performance, the
buyer may still make a claim for remedies including requiring
performance. 94
D. Rules in the Efficient Breach Zone

Following the theory of efficient breach, a contract falls into the
efficient breach zone when an unexpected contingency arises so that the
performance of the contract will create less profit than the breach does.
As is noted in Section 2, either a drastic increase in performance cost, or
an extremely high bid by a third party may bring a contract into the
efficient breach zone. In the efficient breach zone, performance of the
original contract should be refrained from so as to avoid economic
waste and to enhance the total welfare that the contract parties obtain.
Two questions will be stressed in this section: (1) When does a contract
fall into efficient breach zone?; and (2) How does the CESL deal with
the situations when the contract is in the efficient breach zone?
1. When Will Contracts Fall into the Efficient Breach Zone?

The CESL provides three examples where a seller's obligation to
perform will be influenced, by the doctrine of efficient breach: ( 1)
58.
93. CESL COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 514.
94. CESL, supra note 14, art. 89. More discussion about Article 89 will be presented
in Section 3.4.1, infra.
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"Excused Non-performance," (2) "Change of Circumstance" and (3)
"Impossibility or Impracticability."
First, Article 88 provides the doctrine of "Excuse,"95 referring to an
impediment which is beyond the non-performing party's control, and
where that party could not be expected to have taken the impediment
into account at the time when the contract was formed, or to have
avoided or overcome the impediment or its consequences. 96 However,
the CESL doesn't give further explanation of prerequisites for "excused
non-performance" or show any examples which may be recognized as
these kind of impediments. The situation described in Article 89 can
also be covered by the civil law principle of "Force Majeure," 97 which
is widely used in literature. 98 The requirements for recognizing force
majeure can be traced back to the previous documents that Article 88 of
CESL is based on. For example, the ICC Force Majeure Clause 2003
sets out that: ( 1) the impediment must be out of the debtor's control, or
not fall in the sphere of risk of the debtor; (2) it must have been
unforeseeable at the time of contract formation; and (3) it or its
consequences must have been unavoidable. It lists some typical events
that amount to impediments, such as war, natural disasters or acts of
terrorism. In addition, the commentary below Book III, Section 3: 104
of DCFR provides some examples to show when an obstacle should be
recognized as an insurmountable impediment that is outside of the
debtor's control and could not been taken into account by the debtor.
95. Article 79(1) of CISG, Article 8:808(1) of PECL 1999 and Book Ill, Section 3104( 1) of DCFR 2008 are practically similar to Article 88( 1) of CESL.
96. CESL, supra note 14, art. 88, § 1.
97. Ingeborg Schwenzer, The Proposed Common European Sales Law and the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 44 UCC L.J. 457, 469-71 (2012).
98. The principle of force majeure originated in the French Civil code of 1804. See
CODE CIVIL [C. C1v.] art. 1148 (Fr.) ("There is no occasion for any damages where a debtor
was prevented from transferring or from doing that to which he was bound, or did what was
forbidden to him, by reason of force majeure or of a fortuitous event."). International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of International Commercial
Contracts,
169
(1994),
available
at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles l 994/l 994fulltext-english.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2014) [hereinafter UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES]. There are also other terms to
describe similar supervening events that make contract performance impossible. For
instance, the English law principle of "frustration" or German law principle of
"impossibility". In many situations, those terms are used interchangeably, except for some
subtle difference. For instance, the English principle of frustration has a broader meaning,
including that "which renders the contract something radically different from that which was
in the contemplation of the parties." See Peter Mazzacano, Force Majeure, Impossibility,
Frustration & the Like: Excuses for Non-Performance; the Historical Origins and
Development of an Autonomous Commercial Norm in the CISG, 2 NORDIC J.C. L. 38, 3845 (2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l982895 (last visited Apr. 1, 2014); see also
HUGH BEALE ET AL., CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON CONTRACT LAW 1106 (2d. ed. 2010).
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As is shown, an unexpected strike in the nationalised company which
distributes natural gas can be recognized as out of the control of a
debtor who only heats its furnaces with gas. 99 An earthquake is also
considered as an impediment since it is insurmountable or irresistible
unless the debtor can build a virtual fortress. In those cases, "one
cannot expect the debtor to take precautions out of proportion to the
risk," 100 hence, the impediment or its consequence cannot be overcome
or avoided and strictly performing the contract is impossible.
The CESL also contains a separate provision on "change of
circumstance", namely Article 89 which derives immediately from the
DCFR and the PECL. 101 As noted in Section 3.3, whether or not a
debtor's obligation of performance is affected depends on what extent
that performance has become more onerous. Article 89 indicates a
situation under the name of "an exceptional change of circumstance."
An exceptional change of circumstance makes performance excessively
onerous, because the cost of performance has increased or the value of
what is to be received in return has diminished to a large extent.
However, Article 89 doesn't draw a clear line between the situation
where "performance becomes more onerous" and the situation where
"performance becomes excessively onerous." It merely indicates that
the excessive onerosity is caused by "an exceptional change of
circumstances," which is also an ambiguous terminology. The task of
distinguishing an exceptional change of circumstance from simple
changes in the surrounding conditions of a contract is left to judges in
individual cases. Another name which is more commonly used by
scholars to denote the situation depicted in Article 89 is "hardship." 102
Different from force majeure, performing the original contract is only
excessively onerous, but physically possible, when the principle of
"change of circumstance" or "hardship" applies. It might be a great
99. DCFR, supra note 15, at 809.
100. See De Geest, supra note 53, at 128; see also DCFR, supra note 15, at 810.
101. The identical article in DCFR is Book III, Section 1-110 and in PECL is Section
6: 111. Conversely, the CISG, upon which both the PECL and DCFR were drawn, includes
both the force majeure and "change of circumstance" in the same Article: 79. As is indicated
by some scholars, the approach taken by the CISG is preferable, because it is difficult to
draw a distinction between "force majeure" and "hardship". Many subsequent events, as is
argued, will just make performance more onerous, rather than render it impossible.
Meanwhile, the prerequisites for both cases are the same. Therefore, to some extent,
hardship is just one situation of force maj eure and should be regulated in the same provision
covering the later case. Schwenzer, supra note 97, at 470.
I 02. See id.; see also Hector L. MacQueen, Change of Circumstances: CJSG, CESL
and A Case From Scotland, 11 J. INT'L TRADE L. & PoL'Y 300, 300 (2012); Ulrich Magnus,
CJSG and CESL, in LIBER AMICORUM OLE LANDO, 225, 251 (Michael Joachim Bonell et al.
eds., 2012).
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fluctuation of price in the material market that raises the seller's costs of
production greatly, for instance, to 200%. 103 In such a situation,
producing the commodity as required by the contract is still possible,
but the increased costs will consume all the profits that may be created
by the contract and thus performance of the contract is economically
inefficient. Except for "being exceptional", a "hardship" is recognized
only when three prerequisites are satisfied. Article 89(3) requires that
the change of circumstance should occur: ( 1) at the time after
conclusion of the contract; (2) when its possibility or scale could not
have been taken into account by the debtor; and (3) when the risk of it
has not been assumed by the aggrieved party or cannot reasonably be
regarded as having been assumed. 104 Apply those conditions to a
consumer contract. Changes of circumstances in relation to matters
within the area of professional expertise may normally be precluded
from the scope of Article 89. As a professional, the business seller is
considered to have assumed or should have assumed risks arising out of
his profession. 105
In addition to Articles 88 and 89, which are included in the general
chapter of obligations and remedies, what should be mentioned as well
is Article 110(3), which puts forth two exceptions to the remedy of
specific performance. Two cases are recognized where a buyer cannot
require specific performance. The first case refers to a situation where
performance of the contract is impossible or has become unlawful.
Another one occurs if the burden or expense of performance would be
disproportionate to the benefit that the buyer would obtain. 106
Situations embodied in Article 110(3) are recognized in relation to the
of
"impossibility"
or
traditional
contract
law
theory
"impracticability." 107 With regard to assessing when performance of a
contract is impractical (or uneconomic), the standard adopted in Article
103. Ingeborg Schwenzer, Force Majeure and Hardship in International Sales
Contracts, 39 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 709, 715-17 (2008) [hereinafter
Schwenzer, Force Majeure].
104. CESL, supra note 14, art. 89, § 3.
105. This has been clearly stressed in the commentary ofDCFR.
106. CESL, supra note 14, art. 110, § 3 (stating that performance cannot be required
where: (a) performance would be impossible or has become unlawful; or (b) the burden or
expense of performance would be disproportionate to the benefit that the buyer would
obtain).
107. As to the "impossibility principle", it covers not only physical impossibility, but
also legal impossibility. However, more information about when and how performance
should be judged unlawful cannot be found in the CESL. It leaves us to wonder which law
should be applied to make this judgment. For instance, will performance of a contract be
rendered unlawful if it violates mandatory rules in the national laws and regulations? See
Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 77, at. 897.
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110(3), which is grounded on the comparison between the costs of
performance and the benefit that a buyer will obtain, is analogous to the
requirement for the situation where efficient breach arises because of an
unfortunate contingency. Performance of a contract is rendered
impractical if the cost of performance exceeds the benefit that the buyer
can obtain from it. In other words, an impractical contract may fall into
the efficient breach zone where performance of the contract is
inefficient. In contrast to Article 88 and Article 89, Article 110(3) has
not set any prerequisite for the cause of impossibility or
impracticability. Hence, even if a situation of impossibility or
impracticability is induced by some events that are expectable or
controllable to the seller, Article 89 may apply as long as the
performance becomes impossible or extremely costly; meanwhile, the
CESL is chosen by the contracting parties.
To summarize, situations where a sales contract may fall into the
efficient breach zone have been recognized by the CESL. With regard
to the type of contingency rendering a contract economically inefficient,
the CESL only includes unfortunate contingencies which have increased
a seller's cost of performance or decreased the benefit that the seller
may obtain in return. The general qualification for this type of
contingency is based on a "cost-benefit" rule of comparing the cost or
burden of performance and the cost incurred by non-performance. A
contract falls into the efficient breach zone only when its performance
becomes impossible or is excessively costly. As a result, the seller's
obligation of performance will be influenced. Nevertheless, the CESL
doesn't specially mention the circumstance where non-performance is
motivated by the higher surplus yielded from contracting with a third
party. Even if a third party bids a price that is much higher than the
highest price offered by the buyer, the seller's obligation of
performance will not be affected and he must perform his obligation as
required by the contract. 108
2. The CESL 's Reaction to Contracts with the Efficient Breach Zone

When a contract falls into the efficient breach zone, there are two
basic conditions for qualifying the sellers breach as an efficient breach.
First of all, the law should not force the seller's to perform the contract
so that the seller is able to make free choice of breach, performance or
offer to negotiate. Moreover, the buyer should not be worse off on
account of the seller's non-performance. This would be possible if the
buyer's expectation interest is protected through the award of
108. CESL, supra note 14, art. 89, § 1.
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expectation damages. 109 Then, questions arising in relation to the CESL
are whether the CESL allows non-performance or not, and if so,
whether it entitles the aggrieved buyer to the claim of expectation
damages or not.
Concerning the situation of force majeure, the CESL follows the
traditional doctrine by exempting the seller from liability for nonperformance. The general rule of excuse for non-performance is drafted
in Article 88. Moreover, Article 106(4) adds information on the effects
of excuse by extending excuse to damages claims and performance
claims. 110 Other remedies remain available to the buyer. 111 Therefore,
in the case of force majeure, a buyer may still withhold his payment,
claim price reduction, or termination of the contract except for requiring
specific performance and damages. Paragraph (3) of Article 88 further
specifies an obligation of notification by the party who is unable to
perform. After the seller is aware or could be expected to have been
aware of an impediment, he has to give notice to the buyer of this
impediment and its effect without any undue delay. The text of the
CESL also clearly indicates the sanction for violation of the duty to
notice by holding the party liable for any damages incurred from his
failure to give notice. 11
Rather than directly allowing non-performance, the CESL
imposes a duty to renegotiate on the contract parties in the case of
hardship. As is set in Article 89(1 ), when performance becomes
excessively onerous, the parties have to enter into negotiations in order
to adapt or terminate the contract. Following the previous DCFR, 113
Section (2) of Article 89 carries the idea of encouraging re-negotiation
further. 114 If the parties fail to reach an adaptation or termination of the
109. Qi Zhou, Is a Seller 's Efficient Breach of Contract Possible in English Law,
SELECTEDWORKS (2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/qi_zhou/l (last visited Feb.
19, 2014).
110. Magnus, supra note l 02, at 251.
111. CESL, supra note 14, art. 106, §4 (stating that if the seller's non-performance is
excused, the buyer may resort to any of the remedies referred to in paragraph 1 except
requiring performance and damages).
112. Id. art. 88, §3. The party who is unable to perform has a duty to ensure that
notice of the impediment and of its effect on the ability to perform reaches the other party
without undue delay after the first party becomes, or could be expected to have become,
aware of these circumstances. The other party is entitled to damages for any loss resulting
from the breach of this duty. Id.
113 . DCFR, supra note 15, bk. III,§ l-110(3)(d).
114. CESL, supra note 14, art.8912. If the parties fail to reach an agreement within a
reasonable time, then, upon request by either party a court may: (a) adapt the contract in
order to bring it into accordance with what the parties would reasonably have agreed at the
time of contracting if they had taken the change of circumstances into account; or (b)
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contract within a reasonable time, a court or arbitral tribunal can do so
upon the request of either the seller or the buyer. 115 Two general
restrictions are set in relation to the adjustment of the contract by a court
or arbitral tribunal in Article 89(2). First of all, the court or arbitral
tribunal cannot decide to adjust the contract without any request of
either party. Only if the parties cannot negotiate successfully within a
reasonable time and one of the parties makes a request to the court or
arbitral tribunal for a solution, may the court adapt or terminate the
contract. 116 Secondly, the CESL requires that the adaption should be
made from the perspective of the contracting parties, namely, it should
be "in accordance with what the parties would reasonably have agreed
at the time of contracting if they took the change of circumstances into
account." In brief, although Article 89 doesn't expressively allow nonperformance, its clarification of the parties' duty to renegotiate as well
as a possible adjustment of the contract to hardship implicitly interferes
with any direct claim for specific performance of the contract by the
buyer.
In addition to invoking Article 89 to defend against a buyer's
performance claim, the seller may also resort to Article 110(3) to avoid
performing the contract if performance has become excessively
burdensome or costly. As Article 110(3) provides, performance cannot
be required if it is objectively impossible or legally impossible, or it
incurs excessively high costs or burdens. 117 Implicitly, application of
exceptions to performance, which is based on the balance between costs
and benefits, should be applied to two other forms of performance,
namely, repair and replacement. If cure is impossible or the cost or
burden of cure exceeds what a buyer can benefit from it, the seller may
decline the buyer's request of cure. Nevertheless, the CESL has not
exempted a debtor from damages when performance is impossible or
impracticable. Article 159 entitles a creditor to any damages for loss
caused by non-performance of an obligation by the debtor, with the only
exception in the situation where the rule of force majeure applies and
terminate the contract within the meaning of Article 8 at a date and on terms to be
determined by the court. Id.
115. See Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 77, at 891 ; see also Schwenzer, supra
note 97, at 4 71.
116. See MacQueen, supra note 102, at 301.
117. See DCFR, supra note 15 (goes a step further by specifying the consequence if a
creditor insists on specific performance; DCFR III. 3:302 (5) indicates that a creditor cannot
recover damages for loss or a stipulated payment for non-performance to the extent that she
has increased the loss or the amount of payment by insisting unreasonably on specific
performance in circumstances where the creditor could have made a reasonable substitute
transaction without significant effort or expense).
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the debtor's non-performance is excused. 118
From the above statements, three primary conclusions can be
drawn. First, specific performance is generally not allowed if contracts
fall into the efficient breach zone where performance is impossible or
impracticable. Second, with regard to the issue of damages, whether or
not the buyer is able to obtain damages depends on the cause of nonperformance. In principle, a buyer is still entitled to damages when he
is not able to claim for specific performance of the contract. However,
where the non-performance is caused by an impediment that the seller
did not expect and did not assume the risk; the procedure of
renegotiation should be intrigued.
Furthermore, if this kind of
unexpected impediment is uncontrollable and unavoidable or could not
be overcome by the debtor, the creditor cannot ask for damages because
non-performance is excused. In other words, the idea implied in the
damages rule is to correlate the possibility of damages to the allocation
of risk. The CESL makes the debtor who assumed the risk of
impediment take the risk and pay damages to the other party. If the
seller is risk neutral, he is indifferent to risk and should assume the risk
of non-performance after the conclusion of the contract. By awarding
expectation damages, the CESL removes the risk of non-performance
from the buyer and shifts it to the seller.
Nevertheless, nonperformance will be excused in the circumstance where the seller has
not assumed the risk. Third, cooperation and renegotiation is generally
encouraged within the efficient breach zone. Some special obligations
or rules have been established by the CESL in order to promote the
communication and cooperation between contract parties. On the one
hand, the debtor who has been influenced by a force majeure event is
imposed of an obligation to inform, upon which the other party may
understand the situation and take appropriate measures without any
delay. For instance, the creditor may negotiate with the debtor to either
adapt or terminate the contract or to arrange a substitute sale to reduce
the loss incurred by non-performance. On the other hand, Article 89(2)
directly puts forth the parties' duty to negotiate within a reasonable time
and the possibility of a court or an arbitral tribunal's adjustment of the
contract in light of a hardship. However, imposing an obligation to
renegotiate and permitting a court to adjust the contract also gets some
critiques from scholars. For instance, as is pointed out, "allowing the
court to directly interfere in the content of a contract is a serious
challenge to the principle of party autonomy and the pacta sunt servanda

118. CESL, supra note 14, art. 159.
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rule." 119 Moreover, creation of a duty to negotiation and a mandatory
renegotiation period is accused of being unnecessary. The reason, as is
given, is that the parties already have a strong incentive to renegotiate
and settle disputes because settling is cheaper than going to a court. 120
Nevertheless, the rule on renegotiation will just intervene with the
parties' freedom in choosing between renegotiation or going to trial
directly. 121
III. EFFICIENT BREACH IN SPECIFIC CASES OF CONSUMER
CONTRACTS
It was shown in Section 3 that the CESL partially absorbs what
has been derived from the law and economic analysis of efficient
breach. Although the CESL doesn't directly use the terminology of
efficient breach, the idea of differentiating the efficient breach zone and
the efficient performance zone, based on the balance between costs and
benefits of performance is present in it. What may lead a contract to fall
into the efficient breach zone is only an unlucky impediment that
increases a seller's performance cost or decreases the value of what he
is assumed to receive in return. In those situations, a claim of specific
performance is not allowed even though it is possible for a buyer to
require damages unless the seller's non-performance is excused. The
amount of damages that a buyer obtains should be equal to the amount
that will put the buyer into the position he would have been in if the
contract had been duly performed. Theoretically, efficient breach is
possible within the framework of the CESL.
Those findings can also applied to specific cases of consumer
contracts. In consumer sales, if the seller's breach can generate more
profit than performance does and bring no loss to the buyer, the breach
is economically efficient and should not be condemned. This is the
ideal model. In specific cases, a seller breaks the contract in different
ways. The seller might refuse to deliver the goods, or the delivery
might be finished after the time required for performance, or the goods

119. F eltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 77, at 891.
120. See De Geest, supra note 53, at 132-33.
121. Id. De Geest states: "(T)he likely effects of a duty-to-renegotiate are usually (a)
that court decisions are delayed, because when a party comes to the conclusion that
settlement is not possible (for instance, because parties have different expectations as to
what the court will decide, so that there is no 'settlement range'), she still has to wait until
the mandatory renegotiation period is over before going to court; and (b) that parties are
obliged to play a you-quit-first game in which they have to try to make the other party leave
the negotiation table first, so that the other one is held responsible for the failure of the
negotiations."
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offered might be in conformity with the contract. Under the general
provisions covering breach and remedies, the CESL recognizes two
major forms of non-performance and provides corresponding remedy
rules.
A. Hypothesis ofEfficient Non-Delivery or Delayed Delivery

The first case of non-performance that is present in the CESL is
non-delivery or delayed delivery of the goods. Suppose a case of nondelivery. If we apply the findings in Section 3 to the specific case,
efficiency is realized if the seller is not forced to deliver the goods and
the buyer's position will not be worse off when the contract has fallen
into the efficient breach zone.
An important condition for making efficient non-delivery is that
the contract has fallen into the efficient breach zone recognized by the
CESL. That is, the delivery of the goods is either impossible,
impracticable because the cost or burden of delivery increases
dramatically, or the value of the payment decreases to a great extent.
For example, the earthquake destroyed all the products so that the seller
is unable to provide the products as required or it would be extremely
expensive for the seller to find alternative products. Nevertheless, a
more profitable opportunity from a third party's offer will not affect a
seller's obligation to deliver the goods. The seller still has to deliver the
good to the original buyer as is required by the contract even if selling
the goods to a third party may create higher surplus. To be noted,
efficient non-delivery would only happen to the contracts that involve
future performance. 122 Within the passage of time between the
exchange of promise and the delivery, unexpected contingencies may
arise and increase the cost of delivery or render delivery impossible. To
the contrary, discussion of efficient non-delivery doesn't make sense in
the case of simultaneous exchanges where delivery of the goods
happens at the same time the contract is concluded. Suppose the
contracts happening on a regular basis, such as the purchase in grocery
shops or eating at restaurants. Products are delivered as long as a
consumer finishes a series of behaviour, such as picking up items and
making payment at the cash desk. In those cases, the contract is
performed at the same time as the contract is concluded.
122. As is indicated by Cooter & Ulen, there are three models of promise: ( 1) "one
party pays now for the other party's promise to deliver goods later ('payment for a
promise'); (2) one party delivers goods now for the other's promise to pay later ('goods for
a promise'); and (3) one party promises to deliver goods later and the other party promises
to pay when the goods are delivered ('promise for a promise')." COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 29, at 283.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/1

122

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

2014] Efficient Breach in the Common European Sales Law

369

According to the CESL, a seller is generally not forced to make
delivery if the contract has fallen into the efficient breach zone
recognized by it. In this case, the seller is free to choose the welfare
maximizing breach.
As to the remedies available to the consumer
buyer, what he may claim depends on whether or not the seller's nondelivery is excused. If the intervening event amounts to force majeure
covered by Article 88, the seller is exempted from non-delivery and the
buyer cannot claim for damages, but can withhold payment of the price,
terminate the contract, or reduce the price. 123 But since delivery of the
goods as required is impossible because of the force majeure, the
consumer in theory may not resort to price reduction. He is able not
only to refuse to pay for the goods, but also to terminate the contractual
relationship and claim his money back if he has already made the
payment. As a result of termination, the contractual relationship of the
parties will end and any benefit that a party had received from the other
party returned. 124 In other cases which fall outside the scope of Article
88, the seller is not excused from non-delivery and the consumer is
entitled to expectation damages in addition to the rights to withhold his
payment and to terminate the contract. 125 The amount of damages that a
consumer may obtain is equal to the benefit that he would get had the
product been delivered, 126 namely, the value that was placed on the
product at the time the contract was formed. In this sense, the consumer
may balance the remedies available and choose either to terminate the
contract or to make a claim for damages. Thus, non-delivery will only
happen if it is impossible or it is more profitable than delivery after the
seller compensates the consumer's expectation losses.
B. Hypothesis ofEfficient Non-Conformity (Defective Performance)

Suppose another circumstance of non-performance which happens
frequently in real life, namely, a seller has delivered the goods, but the
goods delivered are not in conformity with the contract. This situation
is also referred to as defective performance. It is assumed that the
contract falls into the efficient breach zone when the cost of providing
conforming products is disproportionate to the benefit of it in the hands
of the buyer.
123. CESL, supra note 14, arts. 88, 106.
124. See id. art. 172. Where a contract is avoided or terminated by either party, each
party is obliged to return what that party ("the recipient") has received from the other party.
The obligation to return what was received includes any natural and legal fruits derived
from what was received.
125. Id. arts. 110 3, 159.
126. Id. art. 160.

Published by SURFACE, 2014

123

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2014], Art. 1

370

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41 :2

Basically, the goods provided by a seller should be of the quantity,
quality, and description required by the contract; they should be
contained, packaged, and supplied along with any accessories or
instruction in the manner as required by the contract according to
Article 99 of the CESL. Article 100 further states seven criteria for
assessing non-conformity. Generally, the goods should comply with any
particular purpose made known to the seller at the time of the
conclusion of the contract and the usual or ordinary purpose for the
goods. 127 Moreover, Article 102 further requires that the goods be free
from any right or not obviously unfounded claim of a third party,
including rights or claims based on intellectual property. 128
According to the CESL, if the goods provided by a seller are not in
conformity with the contract, the consumer buyer may freely choose
remedies among a variety of options which include, requiring specific
performance, withholding the payment of the price, terminating
contract, reducing the price, and claiming damages. To be noted,
specific performance in the case of defective performance is present
either to repair the defects or to replace the defective goods with
conforming goods. Moreover, as is indicated in Article 111 (1 ), the
choice between repair and replacement is at the consumers will, 129
which carries the consumers free choice of remedies one step further. A
consumer buyer, thus, is able to make the choice of remedies based on
the relative benefit and cost of different remedies. 130 He may decide
whether or not to give the seller a chance to cure the defects and in
which way the seller should cure the defects according to his own
preference. Repair or replacement might be preferable if a consumer
thinks the value of the cured goods is great, for example because the
goods are unique or the market prices of the goods have gone up. 131
But once the consumer has validly required remedying the lack of
127. According to Article 100, the product must be in conformity with what has been
agreed to by the contractual parties. See id. art. 100. It should be fit for any particular
purpose made known to the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract, possess the
qualities of the product held out to the buyer as a sample or model and possess the qualities
indicated in any pre-contractual statement which forms part of the contract terms.
Moreover, Article 100 requires that the product provided by the seller comply with what has
been considered usual or reasonable. It should be fit for the purposes of ordinary use; be
contained or packaged in the manner usual or adequate for such goods or; be supplied along
with such accessories or instructions as the buyer may reasonably expect to receive; and
possess such qualities and performance capabilities as the buyer may expect. CESL, supra
note 14, art. 100.
128. Id. art. 102; see Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 77, at 888.
129. CESL, supra note 14, art. 111 §1; Wagner, supra note 77, at 5.
130. Wagner, supra note 77, at 18.
131. Id.
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conformity by repair or replacement, he can not resort to other remedies
except for withholding payment within a reasonable time, not exceeding
thirty days.
Consider the CESL' s attitude toward the remedy of cure in the
situation when the contract falls into the efficient zone so that defective
performance has more economic efficient than offering conforming
goods. Except for setting general limits by Articles 88, 89 and 110, the
CESL adds more to the restriction of the buyer's choice of remedies
through Article 111. As is stated, a consumer's choice between repair
and replacement is hindered if the option chosen would be unlawful or
impossible, or would impose high costs on the seller compared to the
other option available. Article 111 provides three indicators to evaluate
whether the cost of cure is high or not, including: ( 1) the value of the
goods without a lack of conformity; (2) the significance of the lack of
conformity; and (3) whether the alternative remedy could be completed
without significant inconvenience to the consumer. According to the
doctrine of efficient breach, non-conforming performance is considered
efficient if the cost of providing conforming goods is so high that it
consumes all the benefit from it. The benefit yielded by offering
conforming goods, to some extent, can be measured in relation to the
criterion established in Article 111(1). For example, suppose consumer
X receives a product which was expected to be worth €800 and this
product was the last one offered in the shop owned by seller Y. If the
product contains defects and repairing it may cost the seller € 1,000;
then the net profit yield from cure would be -€200. In this situation,
cure is inefficient compared to other approaches available to the
consumer.
Although a consumer's claim for cure will not be supported by the
CESL if the contract falls into the efficient breach zone, the consumer
may still resort to other remedies. The application of remedies for the
consumer buyer is similar to that in the model of efficient non-delivery.
A consumer may choose to withhold his payment of price, terminate the
contract, reduce the price, or claim for expectation damages unless the
inconformity is excused. What needs to be specially mentioned in the
situation of lack of conformity is the remedy of price reduction. A
precondition for this remedy is that the consumer decides to accept the
non-conforming goods rather than terminating or rejecting it. In this
situation, the value of what has been received by the consumer is
disproportionate to the price set in the contract. Correspondingly, the
CELS entitles the consumer to reduce the price or recover the excess, in
proportion to "the decrease in the value of what was received in
performance at the time performance was made compared to the value
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of what would have been received by a conforming performance." 132
To be mentioned, price reduction works as an alternative to damages for
the decreased value of what has been received. 133 Hence, once a buyer
reduces the price, he cannot also claim for damages for the loss thereby
recovered, but he is only entitled to damages for any further loss
suffered. 134 To a certain extent, the amount of price reduction is
calculated by the similar measurement as what is applied in damage
calculation. According to Article 160 of the CESL, the amount of
damages should be equal to the discrepancy between the hypothetical
status that he would have enjoyed by receiving conforming products
( Ve =Value of the conforming product) and the actual status of him
when he receives the non-conforming products ( Vd =Value of the
defective product). The formula shows the relationship between the
price after reduction (P') and the price of the original contract (P). As is
shown, regardless of whether the expectation damages or price
reduction is awarded, the goal is to put the consumer in the position as if
he had received goods in conformity with the contract.

Vd/Vc = P'/P
C. Limits of the Application of Efficient Breach in Consumer Contracts
Efficient breach is possible in a legal framework where a seller will
not be forced to perform the contract specifically and the buyer will not
become worse off because of the non-performance if the contract falls
into the efficient breach zone. This framework of efficient breach
within the CESL is composed by the rules of "force majeure,"
"hardship," "impossibility and implacability," and remedies. Within
this framework, efficient non-performance from which the surplus is
greater than that from strict performance is possible, either in the form
of efficient non-delivery or efficient non-conformity. Nevertheless,
situations in real-world consumer sales are much more complicated.
Except for the legal rules, several other factors may have an influence
on the possibility of efficient breach in consumer contracts.
First, consider the possibility that specific performance is
impossible or costly. Take the model of efficient non-conformity as an
132. CESL, supra note 14, art. 120 1, 2.
133. As is indicated, the justification for price reduction is to prevent unjust
enrichment for partial failure of consideration and compensates the creditor for simply not
getting the full performance. It works partially as the simplified right to damages and as the
simplified right to partially terminate the contract. See CESL commentary, supra note 79, at
526-27.
134. CESL, supra note 14, art. 12013.
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example in which providing conforming goods is impossible or
extremely costly. As is indicated in Section 4.2, specific performance
in the case of lack of conformity is present as either repair or
replacement. Only when both types of specific performance are
impossible or extremely costly, namely when it is costly to either repair
the defect or make a replacement, is efficient breach assumed to be
possible. The cost of replacement depends on several factors, for
example, whether the object of the contract is a general product or a
unique product and the price of the product. In the premise of consumer
contract, especially in retailing contracts, firms in markets may optimize
over availability of different products according to the demand of
consumers. 135 Normally, with regard to general goods, such as the
brand of a laptop, a firm may have more than one item in stock.
Moreover, empirical studies show that "consumers are often willing to
buy substitute items in the same shop when faced with stock-out in
frequently purchased consumer market." 136 Therefore, even if there is a
sold-out problem, it might not be expensive for a seller to arrange an
alternative when it comes to general products. In contrast, in the case of
unique goods, such as works of art or antiques, it is impossible to find
close substitutes. 137
Second, the way of dispute resolution may also matter. As to the
way of avoiding specific performance, a seller may choose to not break
the contract unilaterally but to reach a settlement. For instance, he may
offer to make a new tender, reduce the price, or return the money paid
by the consumer back. From the standpoint of a consumer, he is willing
to choose the dispute resolution that is less costly, easier, or less timeconsuming. If we put the background to the cross-border purchasing,
the cost involved in suing a foreign trader is huge. Therefore, what
might be preferable to the consumer is also to reach a settlement with
the seller, by either price reduction or termination of the contract and
getting the money back rather than going to the court and suing for
monetary damages if the cost of litigation is taken into account.
Another issue involved in assessing the possibility of efficient
breach concerns the question of whether the remedies available to a
consumer buyer are adequate to make him indifferent between
135. Christopher Conlon & Julie Holland Mortimer, Effects of Product Availability:
Experimental Evidence (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16506, Oct.
2010).
136. Ravi Anupindi, Maqbool Dada & Sachin Gupta, Estimation of Consumer
Demand with Stock- out Based Substitution: An Application to Vending Machine Products,
17 MKTG. Sci. 406, 407 (1998).
137. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 29, at 320.
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performance and breach. To guarantee that the consumer's position will
not worsen within the efficient breach zone, the CESL offers him free
choice among a series of remedies including withholding performance,
terminating the contract, price reduction, and expectation damages. But
a crucial dimension to evaluate the adequacy of remedies is what the
buyer expects from the contract, namely the consumer's purpose of
buying. In consumer sales, the consumer's purpose of purchasing is
outside of his trade, business, craft, or profession. 138 Most of the time
this refers to individual use. In other words, consumers engage in
transactions not only for obtaining promises or compensation, but for
accomplishing instrumental goals, such as obtaining ownership, using
properties, and receiving services. "The fact that an act leads to good
consequences is irrelevant if it is wrong." 139 So whether a consumer's
expectation can be satisfied is closely correlated to whether a consumer
can obtain the concrete products. With regard to general goods, it is
easy for a consumer to find a substitute in the market. In theory, as long
as the buyer can make a substitutive transaction and what he can receive
from the breaching party covers the additional amount necessary to
purchase the substitute plus the cost of making a second transaction, the
buyer will be fully compensated. 140 However, since finding a close
substitute is not possible when the object of a contract is unique, what a
consumer expected from performing the contract cannot be fully
recovered if the contract is broken. In addition, consider the type of
losses defined by the CESL that are compensable. As is shown in
Section 3.2, the CESL only recognizes the non-economic loss in the
form of pain and suffering, but excludes other forms of impairment of
life and loss of enjoyment. Think of the "wedding dress" case, where
the loss that is actually suffered by the buyer is neither purely economic
loss nor any physical pain, but the enjoyment of wearing the exactly
same wedding dress that was bought. 141 No matter whether the "current
price" rule or "substitutive price" rule applies, what the buyer can
recover according to the CESL is merely the price difference not the
happiness that she would enjoy from wearing the expected dress in the
wedding. As long as the buyer is worse off due to the breach, it is
impossible for Pareto efficiency to take place and efficient breach can
hardly be created.
138. Reg. CESL, supra note 14, art. 2.
139. Avery W. Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. Rev. 777,
787 (2012).
140. Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 275
(1979).
141. CESL COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 644-45.
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Fourth, some special legal devices used for consumer protection
will also have an impact on the possibility of efficient breach by
influencing how contractual parties react to their on-going relationship
in the case where the contract falls into the efficient breach zone. One
example is warranty clauses written in the contract. In practice, many
firms attach a warranty to their products as their marketinf strategy 142 in
addition to the mandatory warranty required by the law. 1 3 A warranty
guarantees the consumer buyer can make claims against the producer,
supplier, retailer, or seller if the products delivered are not in conformity
with the contract within a specified period. For instance, it guarantees
repair, replacement, or money return under special situation. Suppliers,
moreover, use warranty clauses as one type of implicit insurance policy
since the non-conformity is uncertain and adverse. When drafting
warranty clauses, suppliers have to consider the probability and
expected cost of product defects as well as the corresponding
settlements ex-ante. 1 4 In this sense, warranty clauses make the contract
more complete and provide consumers with explicit information about
what he should do in the case where non-conformity is costly. As a
result, ex-post settlements are promoted.
Put all those considerations above together in relation to the
remedy rules offered by the CESL, efficient breach would take place in
a very limited frame. With regard to non-delivery, only in those
contracts involving future performance, is there space for efficient
breach to take place. Furthermore, the nature of the product has an
impact on the probability that the contract falls into the efficient breach
zone. It is more difficult to find replacement in the sales of unique
goods than in the sales of general goods. So the probability that a
contract falls into the efficient breach zone is higher when it comes to
unique goods. But the paradox is that consumers can hardly get full
compensation if the seller breaks a contract involving unique goods.
What is more, compared to a damage claim, private settlement is
assumed to be preferable to both consumers and sellers in solving

142. A warranty might be imposed by law or created by contract. See Stefan Haupt, An
Economic Analysis of Consumer Protection in Contract Law, 4. GER. L.J. 1137, 1155
(2003).
143. For instance, the European Union imposed a mandatory warranty for consumer
sales through the directive 1999/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and
associated guarantees. See Council & Parliament Directive 1999/44/EC, art. 5, 1999 O.J. (L
171) 12.
144. In exchange of warranties, suppliers will also increase the price of the products
proportionally "because the promised measures are costly for the seller". See Haupt, supra
note 142, at 1155-56.
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conflicts, if the under-compensation problem and transaction cost are
taken into account.
Put the other way around, situation will be different if efficient
breach is assumed to be committed by the consumer buyer. First, the
criterion for termination of the contract is lenient for the consumer. As
provided by Article 114(2) of the CESL, if there is a defect in the
product delivered by the seller, a consumer may terminate the contract
unless the defect is insignificant. 145 In this case, a consumer has more
freedom in choosing to get rid of the contract when he thinks the value
from performing it decreases. Second, Article 132(2) provides buyers
an exception to the obligation to make the payment. As is stated,
"where the buyer has not yet taken over the goods and it is clear that the
buyer will be unwilling to receive performance, the seller may
nonetheless require the buyer to take delivery, and may recover the
price, unless the seller could have made a reasonable substitute
transaction without significant effort or expense." 146 In many consumer
transactions, products provided by a seller are standardized and it would
not be difficult for the seller to arrange an alternative transaction by
selling the products to others. The seller, in those occasions, cannot
require the other party to take over the delivery and make the payment.
What is more, the CESL entitles consumers the right to withdraw the
contract without giving any reason and at no cost within a certain period
after the conclusion of the contract (fourteen days). 147 Accordingly,
after a contract is formed, its binding power is comparatively weaker.
The consumer can easily get out of a contract if he gets a much more
lucrative opportunity or thinks it is wasteful to buy the product from the
original seller.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A starting point taken in this paper is that contract parties should
not be forced to perform the contract when non-performance leads to
wealth-maximisation. Rather than to defend expectation damages or to
encourage breach, the function of the efficient breach theory, as is
suggested in this paper, is to assess the approaches to motivating
contract parties to perform the contract unless strictly performing it is
not as profitable as what was expected at the time of contract formation.
The CESL takes the position that encouraging performance of
the contract and cooperation between consumers and sellers through a
145. CESL, supra note 14, art. 114 2.
146. Id. art. 132 2.
147. Id. art. 41-43.
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variety of rules including a performance rule, an information rule, and a
damage rule. For example, motivating information exchange and
establishing the criteria for damage measurement may facilitate the
seller to assess the price for non-performance. But the CESL also opens
a window for efficient breach with the aim of avoiding economically
wasteful performance. When drawing the border of the efficient breach
zone, the CESL compares the cost of performance with the surplus that
the parties are expected to obtain from the contract. According to the
CESL, specific performance is not allowed within the efficient breach
zone, but other options of remedy including withholding performance,
terminating the contract, price reduction and expectation damages are
available to consumers. In addition, the CESL takes the concern of risk
allocation into account as well, by making the seller who is assumed to
bear the risk of non-performance pay damages. Among other remedies,
the CESL offers the consumer a free choice of remedy, especially
presenting in the consumers right to terminate the contract in the case of
non-performance. Most importantly, under the premise of consumer
sales, the emphasis is placed on how to guarantee that a consumer's
position will not worsen because of the non-performance, rather than on
how to avoid wasteful performance. This could be understood if the
issue of consumer protection is taken into consideration. More research
is needed in relation to balancing on the one hand how to shape the
seller's incentive to take an optimal level of performance and on the
other hand how to protect a consumer's expectation from the
transaction.
The CESL, nevertheless, also has its shortages in relation to the
issue of optimal incentives to breach, negotiate or perform. In terms of
damage rules, the CESL excludes non-economic losses in the form of
impairment of life and loss of enjoyment, which commonly arises in the
case of consumer contract. Provided that there is no current market
price to evaluate the buyer's loss, it is difficult to make an accurate
calculation of contract damages. Moreover, within the efficient breach
zone, the CESL' s imposition of the obligation to negotiate is opaque
and unnecessary. On the one hand, the CESL mentions that to
renegotiate is the parties' duty, but it does not indicate clearly the
consequences of a violation of this duty. On the other hand, by making
the failure to reach negotiations within a certain period as the
prerequisite for the court's interference the CESL imposes an
unnecessary burden on the contracting parties. In the circumstance
where reaching an agreement via negotiations is costly, the parties
should be able to go to court directly. Moreover, what has been
neglected by the CESL is the possibility of breach with the aim of
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pursuing a higher economic surplus. The CESL doesn't show
expressively whether it allows or prohibits these types of breaches.
What we can infer from the provisions in the CESL is that the seller is
generally obliged to perform and the seller is entitled to specific
performance even if there is a more lucrative opportunity offered by a
third party. Paradoxically, in any circumstance where the outside bidder
has obtained the right to the good according to property law, the
damages that the buyer may claim is the expectation damages. In this
sense, the seller has the incentive to breach the contract as long as he
can still obtain an economic surplus after paying expectation damages.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly 47 years of its existence and development, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made much
progress on its way to building a cooperative framework for Southeast
Asian countries. 1 It has, in fact, made significant contributions to the
maintenance and promotion of peace, stability and cooperation for
t Hao Duy Phan (S.J.D.) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for International Law,
National University of Singapore. The views expressed here are of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of his affiliations.
1. ASEAN was established in 1967 and currently consists of Brunei, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
See Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Feb. 24, 1976, 1331 UNTS 243
[hereinafter ASEAN Charter].
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development not only in Southeast Asia, but also in the Asia-Pacific
region at large. 2 Until 2007, however, ASEAN operated without a
strong legal basis. The founding instrument of the Association, the
1967 Bangkok Declaration, was more of a political declaration than a
constitutional treaty. 3 Although the number of regional instruments has
proliferated, many have not been fully observed. Whereas the 1967
Bangkok Declaration sets out principles and purposes of cooperation
and establishes annual meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a
Standing Committee, an ad-hoc Committee, and a National Secretariat
in each country, it does not stipulate the Association's legal personality,
principles, functions, authorities, decision-making procedures, dispute
settlement mechanisms, or any financial contribution arrangements.
Against that background, the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in
2007 was a breakthrough in the evolution of the organization. The
ASEAN Charter entrusts the Association with a legal capacity so that it
may, to some extent, act independently, and on behalf of, the region as a
whole. 4 It makes clear the Association's objectives and principles. 5 It
officially brings human rights into ASEAN cooperation; 6 establishes
dispute settlement mechanisms in all areas of ASEAN activities; 7
streamlines ASEAN's structure and defines the Association's decisionmaking process; and enhances the role of the ASEAN Secretariat. The
ASEAN Summit is to be convened biannually instead of in a three-year
round as it was before. 8 The ASEAN Coordinating Council shall

2. The Twenty-sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference
1993, for example, agreed to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to foster
constructive dialogues on political and security issues of common interest and concern, and
to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive
diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. About the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN
REGIONAL FORUM, available at http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2014). Its current participants include Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Canada, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, European Union, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Timor-Leste, United States, and Vietnam. Id. In addition to the ARF, various mechanisms
have been established to promote peace and cooperation in the wider Asia - Pacific region,
e.g, ASEAN + 1, ASEAN + 3 and the East Asia Summit. Id.
3. ASEAN, ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) (Aug. 8, 1967), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/1967%20ASEAN%20Declaration-pdf.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
4. ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, art. 3.
5. Id. arts. 1, 2.
6. Id. arts. 1, 2, 14.
7. See id. art. 22(2).
8. Id. art. 7(3)(a).
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comprise ASEAN Foreign Ministers and meet at least twice a year. 9
Three Community Councils shall be established, including ASEAN
Political and Security Community Council, ASEAN Economic
Community Council, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
Council. 10 A Committee of Permanent Representatives shall also be
appointed. 11 The Chair of the ASEAN Summit shall also be the Chair
of other key ASEAN bodies. In particular, the Secretary-General of
ASEAN shall have an enhanced role to play in monitoring progress in
implementing ASEAN decisions and ASEAN agreements, reporting to
the ASEAN Summit on important issues which require approval by
ASEAN Leaders, and representing ASEAN's views in meetings with
external parties. 12
Since the signing of the ASEAN Charter, more than sixty ASEAN
instruments have been concluded. 13 Commitments have been made
across many fields of cooperation. ASEAN is trying to build the
ASEAN Community by 2015 on three foundational pillars politicalsecurity, economic and social-cultural, 14 and so ensuring compliance by
ASEAN Member States with these commitments is a pressing priority. 15
However, it remains unclear how compliance with ASEAN instruments
will be ensured and which mechanisms the ASEAN instruments will
employ to monitor the translation of state commitments into
compliance.
This article aims to examine and assess compliance monitoring
mechanisms as provided in the ASEAN Charter and different ASEAN

9. ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
10. Id. art. 9.
11. Id. art. 12.
12. Id. art. 11.
13. ASEAN Secretariat, TABLE OF ASEAN TREATIES/AGREEMENTS AND RATIFICATION
at
available
2012),
(Oct.
http://www.asean.org/images/2012/resources/TABLE%200F%20AGREEMENT%20%20R
ATIFICATION-SORT%20BY%20DATE-Web-October2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2014) (the Table does not specify which documents are treaties, agreements or instruments)
[hereinafter ASEAN SECRETARIAT'S TABLE].
14. In 2003, ASEAN adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord
11), seeking to bring the ASEAN Vision 2020 into reality by setting the goal of building an
ASEAN Community by 2020 that would be comprised of three pillars, namely politicalsecurity community, economic community and socio-cultural community. In 2007, ASEAN
adopted the Cebu Declaration to accelerate the establishment of the ASEAN Community by
five years to 2015. In 2009, ASEAN adopted the Cha-am Hua Declaration reaffirming its
commitment to building an ASEAN Community by 2015. Id.
15. See REPORT OF THE EMINENT PERSONS GROUP ON THE ASEAN CHARTER 4,
available at http://www.asean.org/archive/19247.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014)
[hereinafter "EPG REPORT"].
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instruments concluded since 2007. 16 For that purpose, the article is
divided into four sections including the Introduction and the
Conclusion. The second section examines the implementation and
compliance monitoring provisions in the ASEAN Charter. The third
section assesses different compliance monitoring bodies and
mechanisms as stipulated in the ASEAN instruments signed after the
ASEAN Charter, including self-report by ASEAN Member States;
report by the ASEAN Secretary-General, the ASEAN Secretariat and
ASEAN sectoral bodies; review, evaluation and recommendation by
monitoring bodies; capacity building and technical assistance; and
consultation. The last section argues that, although ASEAN has taken
some initial steps to promote implementation, still much more needs to
be done to ensure compliance and realize ASEAN's goal of building a
common community. Finally, the paper also offers a number of
recommendations to improve ASEAN compliance monitoring systems
and further ensure implementation of ASEAN instruments. It makes the
case for more institutionalized mechanisms to serve coordinating
functions and monitor the implementation of existing and future
instruments and thereby contribute to further advancing ASEAN in a
rules-based direction.
By focusing on "ASEAN instruments," this article limits its scope
of assessment to documents that have been collectively concluded by
ASEAN Member States, as opposed to agreements concluded between
ASEAN as an inter-governmental organization and a third external
party pursuant to Article 41 (7) of the ASEAN Charter 17 such as, the
Agreement between Indonesia and ASEAN on Hosting and Granting
Privileges and Immunities to the ASEAN Secretariat. 18 Under the Rules
16. Specifically, the article examines instruments concluded from November 2007
through October 2012.
17. ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, art. 41 (7) (providing that as an intergovernmental
organization, ASEAN may conclude agreements with countries or sub-regional, regional,
and international organizations and institutions; the procedure for concluding such
agreements has been prescribed by the ASEAN Coordinating Council in consultation with
the ASEAN Community Councils).
18. The Agreement between Indonesia and ASEAN on Hosting and Granting
Privileges and Immunities to the ASEAN Secretariat was signed on April 3, 2012. Id.; see
2012 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on Hosting and Granting Privileges and Immunities to
the ASEAN Secretariat, Indonesia
ASEAN (Apr. 2, 2012), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2012%20Agreement%20betw%20Indonesia%20and%20ASEAN
%20on%20Hosting%20and%20Granting%20P &1%20to%20ASEC-pdf. pdf (last visited
Mar. 19, 2014) [hereinafter 2012 Indonesia ASEAN]. This Agreement is not an ASEAN
instrument but rather an international agreement by ASEAN as an intergovernmental
organization in its conduct of external relations as provided in the ASEAN Charter.
ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, art. 41(7); see 2012 Indonesia - ASEAN, supra.
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of Procedure for Conclusion of International Agreements by ASEAN,
documents such as the Agreement between Indonesia and ASEAN on
Hosting and Granting Privileges and Immunities to the ASEAN
Secretariat are now called "international agreements by ASEAN." 19
This article does not address the agreements concluded by all ten
ASEAN Member States with an external party such as, the 2010
Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Governments of the
Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the Russian
Federation. 20 It also excludes bilateral agreements concluded between
two regional states in their individual capacity and not in their capacity
of ASEAN Member States such as, the 2003 Agreement between the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Government
of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the delimitation of the
continental shelf boundary. 21
In examining different mechanisms that have been adopted to
promote compliance with ASEAN instruments since the ASEAN
Charter, this article relies on the Table of ASEAN Treaties/Agreements
and Ratification prepared by the ASEAN Secretariat as of October
2012. 22 It should be noted that not all ASEAN instruments listed in the
Table are legally binding. Instruments such as the 2012 Vientiane
Action Programme (VAP) Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defense
Ministers on Enhancing ASEAN Unity for a Harmonized and Secure
Community and the 2011 Declaration on ASEAN Unity in Cultural
Diversity: Towards Strengthening ASEAN in Community are not
19. See Rules of Procedure for Conclusion of International Agreements by ASEAN
(Nov. 16, 2011), available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2011/201 l-rules-of-procedure-for-theconclusion-of-international-agreements-by-asean-adopted-on-17-november-2011/
(last
visited May 7, 2014).
20. See 2010 Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Governments of the
Member States of ASEAN and the Government of the Russian Federation, available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2010/2010-agreement-on-cultural-cooperation-between-thegovernments-of-the-member-states-of-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-and-thegovernment-of-the-russian-federation/ (last visited May 7, 2014) . Other examples include,
among others, the 2011 Memorandum of Understanding between Members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the World Organization for Animal
Health (OIE), the 2009 Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the
Member Countries of ASEAN and the Government of the People's Republic of China on
Information and Media Cooperation, and the 2008 Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Partnership among Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Japan
(AJCEP). See ASEAN SECRETARIAT'S TABLE, supra note 13.
21. See Agreement between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Jun. 26, 2003), available at
http://123.30.50.199/sites/en/agreementbetweenthegovernmentofthe-gid-engf2f41-ndengel90a.aspx (last visited May 7, 2014).
22. See ASEAN SECRETARIAT'S TABLE, supra note 13.
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treaties per se that give rise to legal obligations to ASEAN Member
States as in the case of the 2007 ASEAN Convention on CounterTerrorism or the 2004 ASEAN Treaty of Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters. It is, however, not the purpose of this article to
further categorize the ASEAN instruments in the Table or make a fine
distinction between ASEAN treaties from treaty-like documents. For its
own purpose, this article considers all ASEAN instruments listed in the
Table as commitments made by ASEAN Member States that need to be
translated into reality. Further, in the context of ASEAN, binding
documents do not always include compliance monitoring provisions
whereas monitoring mechanisms may exist for a number of non-legally
binding instruments.
IL COMPLIANCE MONITORING PROVISIONS IN THE ASEAN
CHARTER

1. Report of the Eminent Persons Group
ASEAN announced its intention to create a "legal and institutional
framework" through a Charter in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the
Establishment of the ASEAN Charter in 2005. 3 To implement the
Declaration, ASEAN established the Eminent Persons Group on the
ASEAN Charter to brainstorm "bold and visionary ideas" 24 and
recommend key elements of the ASEAN Charter. The Eminent Persons
Group consists of ten eminent individuals from all ASEAN Member
States nominated by their respective governments. In 2006, the
Eminent Persons Group submitted its Report to the ASEAN Summit. In
the Report, the ASEAN Eminent Persons Group stated that "ASEAN' s
problem is not one of lack of vision, ideas, and action plans" 25 but the
"real problem" facing ASEAN is "ensuring compliance and effective
implementation."26 The Eminent Persons Group expressed its concerns
that delay in implementation or non-compliance would not only be
counter-productive to ASEAN cooperation and integration efforts, but
also undermine ASEAN's credibility and disrupt the process towards
building a common community. 27
The Eminent Persons Group
23. Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter (Dec. 12,
2005), available at http://www.asean.org/news/item/kuala-lumpur-declaration-on-theestablishment-of-the-asean-charter-kuala-lumpur-12-december-2005 (last visited Mar. 15,
2014).
24. EPG REPORT, supra note 15, at Executive Summary para. 1.
25. Id. para. 44.
26. Id. para. 6, para. 44.
27. Id. para. 44.
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concluded that ASEAN Member States must take obligations
seriously. 28 They further emphasized that a culture of commitment
must be established to honor and implement ASEAN decisions,
agreements, and time lines. 29
As a result, the Eminent Persons Group put forward the following
recommendations to ensure that obligations are taken seriously. First,
ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms should be established in all
fields of cooperation and they should include compliance monitoring,
advisory, consultation and enforcement mechanisms. 30 Second, the
ASEAN Secretariat should be entrusted with monitoring ASEAN
Member States' compliance with ASEAN instruments and the ASEAN
Secretary-General should report the findings to ASEAN leaders on a
regular basis, 31 including cases of non-compliance. 32 Third, ASEAN
should have the power to take measures to redress cases of serious
breach of commitments to important agreements. 33 In this regard, the
Eminent Persons Group did not further elaborate as to what would
constitute a "serious breach of commitments" and "important
agreements," perhaps leaving it to be worked out later or resolved on a
case-by-case basis. 34
For the Eminent Persons Group, the key to ensuring effective
implementation of ASEAN instruments is through: ( 1) establishing
comprehensive dispute settlement mechanisms, and (2) entrusting the
ASEAN Secretary-General with the role of monitoring. Unfortunately,
the Report of the Eminent Persons Group does not specify how to
ensure the ASEAN Secretary-General's monitoring role. It leaves the
job of monitoring compliance with all ASEAN agreements and
decisions to the ASEAN Secretary-General without mentioning the
need to strengthen the capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat. It does not
touch upon many other important mechanisms to promote and ensure
compliance, including self-reporting by ASEAN Member States,
monitoring by expert committees, verification, evaluation, reviewing,
consultation, and technical assistance.
28. Id. para. 6.
29. EPG REPORT, supra note 15, Executive Summary para. 6.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally EPG REPORT, supra note 15. At a time when many governments in
the region still prefer to see ASEAN activities carried out in accordance with the traditional
ASEAN norms and principles, including non-interference, non-confrontation, and quiet
diplomacy, the recommendations of the EPG, especially those on sanctions against
violators, could be considered extraordinary. Id.
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2. Compliance Monitoring Provisions in the ASEAN Charter
The ASEAN Charter, signed in November 2007 and entered into
force in December 2008, 35 incorporates many recommendations of the
Eminent Persons Group. Specifically, the ASEAN Charter establishes
ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms in all fields of cooperation. 36
In regards to implementing and monitoring the implementation of
ASEAN instruments, it provides that the ASEAN Coordinating Council,
composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ASEAN Member
States, shall coordinate the implementation of ASEAN agreements. 37
Each of the three ASEAN Community Councils (Economic,
Political/Security, and Socio/Cultural) ensures the implementation of
relevant decisions of the ASEAN Summit, coordinates the work of
different sectors under its purview, and submits reports and
recommendations to the ASEAN Summit on matters under its
purview. 38 The ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies implement the
agreements and decisions of the ASEAN Summit under their respective
purview. 39 Further the ASEAN Secretary-General shall facilitate and
monitor the progress in the implementation of ASEAN agreements and
decisions. 40 The ASEAN Secretary-General shall also submit an annual
report on the work of ASEAN to the ASEAN Summit. 41 In terms of
compliance monitoring, this presents a step forward for ASEAN to have
a formal division of labor in implementing and monitoring all ASEAN
instruments. With the ASEAN Charter, at least there is now one body
responsible for implementing the ASEAN instruments, agreements, and
decisions, and another one in charge of monitoring and reporting on the
progress of the implementation to ASEAN leaders.
Nevertheless, how the ASEAN Secretary-General carries out this
monitoring function is a different story. Although the ASEAN Charter
maintains that the ASEAN Secretary-General shall facilitate and
monitor the implementation of all ASEAN agreements and decisions,
there is no provision that authorizes the ASEAN Secretary-General to

35. See ASEAN Foreign Ministers to Celebrate the Entry into Force of the ASEAN
Charter
at
the
ASEAN
Secretariat,
ASEAN,
available
at
http://www.asean.org/news/item/press-release-asean-foreign-ministers-to-celebrate-theentry-into-force-of-the-asean-charter-at-the-asean-secretariat-asean-secretariat-9-december2008 (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
36. See ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, art. 22(2).
37. Id. art. 8(2)(b).
38. Id. art. 9(4).
39. Id. art. lO(l)(b).
40. Id. art. 11(2)(b).
41. ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, art. 11 (2)(b).
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determine the appropriate indicators or tests to evaluate compliance,
verify cases of violations, or simply request ASEAN Member States to
submit their implementation reports. It is not clear how the ASEAN
Secretary-General will be able to gather sufficient compliance
information or whether the ASEAN Secretary-General can obtain
necessary information from non-state sources such as NGOs while
monitoring Member States' implementation of ASEAN instruments.
Nor is it clear how the ASEAN Secretary-General can assemble all
pieces of information on the implementation of hundreds of agreements
and decisions, a number that will keep increasing in the future, and
convey them effectively in one general, annual report to the ASEAN
Summit. One may wonder what effect this report will have "on the
work of ASEAN" 2and whether it will be a generic, annual report on
ASEAN's main activities or a specific and separate report on Member
States' compliance with ASEAN instruments. 4 Clearly, ASEAN needs
more standard procedures for the ASEAN Secretary-General to fulfil
these monitoring responsibilities under the ASEAN Charter.
It is important to note that while the ASEAN Charter has a
provision on monitoring the implementation of ASEAN instruments in
general, it does not specifically deal with the issue of monitoring
compliance with the ASEAN Charter itself. It may be argued that the
ASEAN Charter shall be subject to the same general monitoring scheme
undertaken by the ASEAN Secretary-General with respect to other
ASEAN instruments. But again, the question remains concerning the
details of how the ASEAN Secretary-General fulfils the job. The
ASEAN Charter does not have a provision requesting ASEAN Member
States or ASEAN sectoral bodies to support the monitoring role of the
ASEAN Secretary-General by providing periodic reports on their
implementation of the ASEAN Charter.
Article 5 of the ASEAN Charter simply states that "ASEAN
Member States shall take all necessary measures, including the
enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement
the provisions of the Charter."44 In case of serious breach of the
ASEAN Charter or noncompliance, Article 20 instructs that "the matter
shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for a decision."45 It is not clear,
however, who may refer the matter to the ASEAN Summit and what
42. Id. art. 7(3)(a).
43. See Evolving Towards ASEAN 2015: ASEAN Annual Report 2011-2012, ASEAN
(July 1, 2012), available at http://www.asean.org/resources/publications/aseanpublications/item/asean-annual-report-2011-2012 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
44. ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
45. Id. art. 20(4).
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procedure must be followed. There are no criteria to determine when a
breach is serious enough to merit being referred to the ASEAN Summit.
Further, it is unclear whether the term 'noncompliance' applies to any
of the ASEAN instruments or only the ASEAN Charter.
Under Article 27(2) of the ASEAN Charter, and pursuant to the
Rules of Procedure for Reference of Noncompliance to the ASEAN
Summit,46 ASEAN Member States only have the right to refer to the
ASEAN Summit cases of noncompliance with the findings,
recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute
settlement mechanism, not those of noncompliance with the ASEAN
Charter or other ASEAN instruments. Even if an ASEAN Member State
brings a case of serious violation of an instrument to the ASEAN
Summit, there is not much the ASEAN Summit could do, except
perhaps to issue a statement encouraging concerned parties to comply
with the ASEAN Charter since the ASEAN Summit comprises the
heads of all ASEAN Member States and is limited by its consensusbased decision-making process. 47
III. COMPLIANCE MONITORING PROVISIONS IN ASEAN
INSTRUMENTS IN THE POST-CHARTER AGE
1. Monitoring Bodies

Of the more than sixty ASEAN instruments that have been
concluded since the ASEAN Charter up until October 2012, more than
20 instruments contain provisions on compliance monitoring. 48
However, a great deal of inconsistency exists among these instruments
in terms of who monitors whom, who shall submit or receive
implementation reports, and what to do with the implementation reports.
The ASEAN Charter provides that ASEAN sectoral bodies are
implementing bodies. 49 In many ASEAN instruments, however, they are
monitoring bodies. Whereas the ASEAN Charter assigns a monitoring
role to the ASEAN Secretary-General, 50 in many ASEAN instruments,
the ASEAN Secretary-General or the ASEAN Secretariat merely serves
a technical assistance function without any monitoring mandate. In
46. ASEAN Charter, supra note I.
47. ASEAN Charter, supra note I, art. 20(1) and (2). Providing that, as a basic
principle, decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus. Where
consensus cannot be achieved, the ASEAN Summit may decide how a specific decision can
be made.
48. See ASEAN SECRETARIAT'S TABLE, supra note 13.
49. ASEAN Charter, supra note I, art. I 0( I )(b ).
50. Id. art. 11 (2)(b).
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some cases, both the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN sectoral bodies
have monitoring authority. Article 52 of the ASEAN Charter states that,
"[i]n case of inconsistency between the ASEAN Charter and another
51
ASEAN instrument, the ASEAN Charter shall prevail. " Yet, this
provision is prima facie only applicable to ASEAN instruments that
were concluded and entered into force prior to the adoption of the
ASEAN Charter and not applicable to those concluded after the
ASEAN Charter. 52
For the three pillars of cooperation, ASEAN has three separate
blueprints, namely the 2007 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint,
the 2009 ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprints, and the
2009 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint. On November 20,
2007, ASEAN Leaders signed the Declaration on the ASEAN
Economic Community Blueprint and adopted the ASEAN Economic
Community Blueprint to put in place "rules-based systems to realize the
establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015." 53
According to the Blueprint, ASEAN Economic Ministers are
54
responsible for the overall implementation of the Blueprint. Relevant
ASEAN sectoral bodies, on the other hand, are held accountable for the
specific implementation of the Blueprint. 55 Furthermore, relevant
ASEAN sectoral bodies are also responsible for monitoring the
implementation of the Blueprint under their purview. 56 In other words,
two different, and supposedly independent tasks of implementing and
monitoring are given to the same ASEAN sectorial bodies. Adding to
the complexity, the ASEAN Secretariat also has the responsibility of
monitoring the implementation of the Blueprint, 57 which means that the
same function of monitoring is assigned to two different bodies. It may
be understood that the monitoring function of ASEAN sectoral bodies is
limited to monitoring the implementation of commitments under their

51. Id. art. 52(2).
52. According to the ASEAN Charter, "all treaties, conventions, agreements, concords,
declarations, protocols and other ASEAN instruments which have been in effect before the
entry into force of this Charter shall continue to be valid. In case of inconsistency between
the rights and obligations of ASEAN Member States under such instruments and this
Charter, the Charter shall prevail." Id. art. 52.
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (Nov. 20, 2007), available at
53.
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2007 /2007-asean-economic-community-blueprint-adopted-on-20november-2007-in-singapore-by-the-heads-of-stategovemment/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2014)
[hereinafter 2007 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint].
54. Id. para. 70 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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purview whereas the ASEAN Secretariat's role is extended to
monitoring the overall implementation of the Blueprint. However, if
there is any mechanism for coordination between these two monitoring
bodies, it is not provided for in the Blueprint.
Under the 2009 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, the
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council is the body responsible for
the overall implementation of the Blueprint. 58 The ASEAN SocioCultural Community Council is also responsible for coordination among
sectoral bodies in implementing the Blueprint. 59 All relevant ASEAN
ministerial bodies have the responsibility to ensure effective
implementation of various elements, actions and commitments in the
Blueprint by incorporating them in their respective work plans,
mobilizing resources for their implementation, and undertaking national
initiatives to meet these commitments. 60 The ASEAN Secretariat shall
monitor the implementation of the 2009 ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community Blueprint with a view toward ensuring that all activities are
responsive to the needs and priority of ASEAN. 61
The 2009 ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint does
not specifically assign a monitoring role to any organ of ASEAN.
Instead, it creates the Coordinating Conference for the ASEAN
Political-Security Community Plan of Action to serve as a platform for
coordinating efforts of various sectoral bodies in implementing the
Blueprint. 62 The ASEAN Political-Security Community Council shall
also coordinate the implementation of the Blueprint. 63 Hence, there are
two bodies responsible for coordination, both of which are comprised of
ASEAN Foreign Ministers. No formal division of work between these
two bodies is explicitly provided. The difference could be that whereas
the Coordinating Conference for the ASEAN Political-Security
Community Plan of Action only coordinates efforts within the PoliticalSecurity Community, the ASEAN Political-Security Community
Council may also coordinate activities that cut across the other
Community Councils. 64 All relevant ASEAN senior official bodies are
58. ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint III. I (Mar. 1, 2009), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2009/2009-blueprint-on-the-asean-socio-cultural-community/
(last
visited Mar. 17, 2014) [hereinafter 2009 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint].
59. Id.
60. Id. para. III.2.
61. Id. para. 111.7.
62. ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 30 (Mar. 1, 2009), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2009/2009-blueprint-on-the-asean-political-security-community/ (last
visited Mar. 17, 2014) [hereinafter 2009 ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint].
63. Id.
64. Id. para. 31 .
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responsible for ensuring the implementation of vanous elements,
actions and commitments in the Blueprint. 65
In addition to these blueprints, some other ASEAN instruments
also give the monitoring authority to different ASEAN sectoral bodies
while providing the ASEAN Secretariat with little more than a technical
or administrative role in the process. The 2012 ASEAN Agreement on
Customs, for example, states that the ASEAN Directors-General of
Customs Meeting, with the support of the ASEAN Secretariat, shall
monitor, review and coordinate all aspects relating to the
implementation of the Agreement. 66 The 2012 Protocol Six on Railways
Border and Interchange Stations provides that the ASEAN Senior
Transport Officials Meeting is the body responsible for the monitoring,
review' coordination and supervision of all aspects relating to
implementation of the Protocol 7 and that the ASEAN Secretariat shall
render necessary technical assistance to the ASEAN Senior Transport
Officials Meeting. 68 In fact, few instruments concluded after the
ASEAN Charter are fully consistent with the ASEAN Charter in terms
of mandating the ASEAN Secretary-General or the ASEAN Secretariat
to facilitate and monitor implementation progress. The 2009 ASEAN
Trade in Goods Agreement is among the few instruments that give such
a mandate to the ASEAN Secretariat. Specifically, under this
Agreement, the ASEAN Secretariat has two roles, namely, (1)
supporting the ASEAN Economic Ministers and the Senior Economic
Officials' Meeting in supervising, coordinating and reviewing the
implementation of the Agreement; and (2) monitoring the progress in
the implementation of the Agreement. 69
Interestingly enough, a few ASEAN instruments also establish a
separate committee to monitor or facilitate the implementation of
commitments contained therein. Most of these instruments were
65. Id. para. 29.
66. ASEAN Agreement on Customs art. 53(1) (Mar. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.asean.org/images/archive/DG%2021%2014%20Annex%2003%20AAC%20Tru
e%20Certified%20Copy.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) [hereinafter 2012 ASEAN
Agreement on Customs].
67. Protocol Six: Railways Border and Interchange Stations, art. 7(1) (Dec. 16, 2011),
available
at
http://www.asean.org/archive/documents/Protocol%206%20Railways%20Border%20and%
20Interchange%20Stations.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) [hereinafter 2012 Protocol Six
on Railways Border and Interchange Stations].
68. Id. art. 7(3).
69. 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement art. 90(3) (Feb. 26, 2009), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2009/2009-asean-trade-in-goods-agreement-adopted-on-26-february2009-in-cha-am-thailand-by-the-economic-ministers/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014)
[hereinafter 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement].
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concluded in 2009, one year after the ASEAN Charter entered into
force. The 2009 Memorandum of Understanding on ASEAN
Cooperation in Agriculture and Forest Products, for example,
establishes a Joint Committee that includes the Chairperson of the
National Focal Points Working Group or Industry Clubs, concerned
government officials, representatives of the ASEAN Chambers of
Commerce and Industry, relevant private sectors recommended by the
National Coordinators, and the ASEAN Secretariat as the secretary of
the Joint Committee to oversee the implementation of the cooperation
scheme. 70 Similarly, the 2009 ASEAN Framework Agreement on the
Facilitation of Inter-State Transport and the 1998 ASEAN Framework
Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit also set up a Transit
Transport Coordinating Board composed of a senior official nominated
from each ASEAN Member State and a representative of the ASEAN
Secretariat to oversee and monitor the Agreement's implementation. 71
In the same vein, the 2009 ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement
on Dental Practitioners creates the ASEAN Joint Coordinating
Committee on Dental Practitioners comprising no more than two
appointed representatives from each ASEAN Member State to facilitate
and review the implementation of the Mutual Recognition
Arrangement. 72 Under the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment
Agreement, the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) Council shall oversee,
coordinate, and review the implementation of the Agreement. The AIA
Council shall also facilitate the avoidance and settlement of disputes
arising from the Agreement, and consider and recommend to the
ASEAN Economic Ministers any amendments to the Agreement. 73 Yet
70. Memorandum of Understanding on ASEAN Cooperation in Agriculture and Forest
Products Promotion Scheme para.
19 (Nov.
11, 2009),
available at
http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ADS2009.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014)
[hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding on ASEAN Cooperation in Agriculture and
Forest Products Promotion Scheme].
71. ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Inter-State Transport art.
27(2) (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2009/2009-asean-frameworkagreement-on-the-facilitation-of-inter-state-transport/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014); 1998
ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit art. 29(2) (Dec. 16,
1998), available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/l 998/l 998-asean-framework-agreement-on-thefacilitation-of-goods-in-transit-signed-on-16-december-l 998-in-hanoi-vietnam-by-thetransport-ministers/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
72. ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Dental Practitioners art. VI (Feb. 26,
2009), available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2009/2009-asean-mutual-recognition-arrangementon-dental-practitioners-signed-on-26-february-2009-in-cha-am-thailand-by-the-economicministers/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) [hereinafter 2009 ASEAN Mutual Recognition
Arrangement on Dental Practitioners].
73.
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement art. 42, available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2009/2009-asean-comprehensive-investment-agreement-signed-on-26-
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another example is the 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, which
provides that ASEAN Economic Ministers shall, for the purposes of the
Agreement, establish an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Council that
includes one ministerial-level nominee from each Member State and the
ASEAN Secretary-General to supervise, coordinate and review the
implementation of the Agreement. 4
2. Reports on Implementation Progress by the ASEAN Secretariat or
ASEAN Sectoral Bodies

Among the ASEAN instruments that were concluded after the
ASEAN Charter and have provisions on implementation reports, 75 the
majority tend to place reporting obligations on an ASEAN organ rather
than on ASEAN Member States. Among those that assign reporting
obligations to an ASEAN organ, some require the ASEAN Secretariat
to submit reports and an ASEAN sectoral body to receive reports.
Others, conversely, assign an ASEAN sectoral body the responsibility
to submit reports and the ASEAN Secretariat to receive reports. As
indicated below, there is no consistency with regards to clarifying the
reporting and reported bodies. Nor is there a compelling rationale
provided for requiring the ASEAN Secretariat to report in one case and
an ASEAN sectoral body to report in another case.
For the 2007 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, as
mentioned in the first part of this section, relevant ASEAN sectoral
bodies are responsible for implementing the Blueprint, 76 whereas the
ASEAN Secretariat is tasked with monitoring compliance with the
Blueprint. 77 Implementation of the above programs is to be monitored,
reviewed and reported to all stakeholders. 78 The Blueprint, however,
does not require the implementing body, ASEAN sectoral bodies, to
report to the ASEAN Summit on the progress of implementation of the
Blueprint, but instead assigns that role to the ASEAN SecretaryGeneral.79
The 2007 Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community
Blueprint nonetheless states that the implementing body, that is, the
concerned sectoral Ministers, not the ASEAN Secretary-General, shall
february-2009-in-cha-am-thailand-by-the-economic-ministers/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2014)
[hereinafter 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement].
74. ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, supra note 69, art. 90.
75 . See ASEAN SECRETARIAT'S TABLE, supra note 13.
76. ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, supra note 53, para. 70.
77. Id. para. 73 .
78. Id. para. 70.
79. Id. para. 71 .
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report to the ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN Economic
Community Council. 80 As a result, there is an inconsistency between the
Blueprint and the Declaration, the latter was signed to adopt the
Blueprint. For cooperation in the financial sector, the Blueprint further
provides that "an appropriate implementation mechanism in the form of
regular progress reports to the Leaders" shall be established, 81 despite
the fact that there already exists a provision as to how reports on the
implementation of all sectors of cooperation under the Blueprint shall
be submitted to the ASEAN Leaders. Also, there is no further provision
as to who shall submit the report, what counts as an "appropriate"
mechanism, and what the content of these reports should be.
Under the 2009 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint,
similarly, reports on implementation progress are not prepared by the
implementing countries, that is, ASEAN Member States, or the
implementing bodies, which are ASEAN sectoral bodies, but by the
monitoring body - the ASEAN Secretary-General. 82 The three bodies
that receive the reports include the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN SocioCultural Community Council and the relevant sectoral ministerial
meetings. 83 It is not clear in this Blueprint how the ASEAN SecretaryGeneral can produce the reports when there is no provision obligating
the implementing bodies to provide the Secretary-General with the
necessary information.
The 2009 ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint also
has a similar reporting mechanism whereby implementation progress
shall be reported annually by the ASEAN Secretary-General to the
annual ASEAN Summit through the ASEAN Political-Security
Community Council. 84 In 2011, however, ASEAN Leaders signed the
Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community which aims to promote the
implementation of the three blueprints and strengthen cooperative
activities in these three pillars. In this Declaration, it is the ASEAN
Coordinating Council (ACC), not concerned Ministers from ASEAN
member states or the ASEAN Secretary-General, who shall prepare and
submit implementation reports to the ASEAN Summit. 85
80. Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (Nov. 20, 2007),
available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2007/2007-declaration-on-the-asean-economic-communityblueprint-signed-on-20-november-2007-in-singapore-by-the-heads-of-stategovemment/ (last
visited Mar. 17, 2014).
81. ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, supra note 53, para. 74.
82. ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, supra note 58, para. III.A.4.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations "Bali
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In addition to these instruments on building the ASEAN
Community, reporting mechanisms by the ASEAN Secretariat or
ASEAN sectoral bodies are also provided in a few other ASEAN
instruments. Pursuant to the 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement,
the ASEAN Secretariat shall regularly report to the ASEAN Free Trade
Area Council on the progress of implementing of the Agreement. 86
According to the 2007 Memorandum of Understanding on the ASEAN
Power Grid, the tasks of reporting and receiving reports are not handled
by the ASEAN Secretariat or the ASEAN Secretary-General, but rather
by two different ASEAN bodies. The Heads of ASEAN Power
Utilities/Authorities (HAPUA) Council, assisted by the ASEAN Power
Grid Consultative Committee, has to make the reports. Reports shall
then be submitted to the ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting at the
ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Energy. 87 The ASEAN Secretariat
does not have any major role to play in this process. Similarly, under
the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, the ASEAN
Coordinating Committee on Investment (CCI) is responsible for making
implementation reports and submitting them to the ASEAN Investment
Area (AIA) Council through the Senior Economic Officials Meeting
(SEOM). 88
The 2009 Memorandum of Understanding on ASEAN Cooperation
in Agriculture and Forest Products Promotion Scheme, on the other
hand, provides that reports are made by an ASEAN entity, not an
ASEAN official body. 9 Specifically, the ASEAN Forest Products
Industry Club may report its implementation to the overseeing Joint
Committee on Forest Productions Promotion Scheme. 90 Thus, in this
case, the reporting body is an ASEAN private entity and the recipient
Concord
III,"
para.
C(3)
(2011),
available
at
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/23664_baliconcordiii28readyforsignature29. pdf
(last
visited Mar. 25, 2014).
86. ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, art. 90(3) (Feb. 26, 2009), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2009/2009-asean-trade-in-goods-agreement-adopted-on-26-february2009-in-cha-am-thailand-by-the-economic-ministers/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
87. Memorandum of Understanding on the ASEAN Power Grid, art. V (Aug. 23,
2007),
available
at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2007%20Memorandum%20of>/o20Understanding%20on%20the
%20ASEAN%20Power%20Grid-pdf.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
88. 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, supra note 73, art. 42.
89. ASEAN entities are not official ASEAN organs. They are entities that support the
ASEAN Charter, especially its purposes and principles and are listed in Annex 2 of the
ASEAN Charter. The ASEAN Charter provides that ASEAN "may engage" with these
institutions. See ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, art. 16.
90. Memorandum from Understanding on ASEAN Cooperation in Agriculture and
Forest Products Promotion Scheme, supra note 70, art. IV.
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body is a committee that has both public and private representatives. It
should be noted, however, that this Memorandum of Understanding
uses the term may instead of shall, 91 which suggests that reporting is an
option, not an obligation. 92
Another example of a complicated reporting mechanism can be
found in the Protocol Six on Railways Border and Interchange Stations
which ASEAN concluded in 2012 to implement the 1998 ASEAN
Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit. The
2012 Protocol provides that the ASEAN Senior Transport Officials
Meeting is the monitoring body. 93 The 1998 ASEAN Framework
Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit, however, gives the
monitoring authority to the Transit Transport Coordinating Board. 94
Under the 2012 Protocol, the ASEAN Senior Transport Officials
Meeting has the obligation to submit, through the ASEAN Secretariat,
regular reports on the progress of implementation of the Protocol to the
Transit Transport Coordinating Board. 95
The Transit Transport
Coordinating Board, in tum, has the obligation under the 1998
Framework Agreement to submit reports on implementation progress to
relevant ASEAN Ministerial bodies. 96 In other words, the 1998
Framework Agreements and its 2012 Protocol establish two different
monitoring bodies. The monitoring body in the 2012 Protocol has to
report to the monitoring body in the 1998 Framework, which then has to
report to relevant ASEAN Ministerial bodies. The process is even more
confusing when the ASEAN Secretariat, though given only a technical
assistance role, has the obligation to submit evaluation reports directly
to the Transit Transport Coordinating Board for further actions. 97
Yet another example of unclear reporting responsibilities is the
mechanism established for the 2010 ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy

91. Id.
92. Id. (Emphasis added.)
93. 2012 Protocol Six on Railways Border and Interchange Stations, supra note 67,
art. 7(1).
94. ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit art. 29(2)
(1998), available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1998/1998-asean-framework-agreement-on-thefacilitation-of-goods-in-transit-signed-on-16-december-1998-in-hanoi-vietnam-by-thetransport-ministers/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) [hereinafter 1998 ASEAN Framework
Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit].
95. 2012 Protocol Six on Railways Border and Interchange Stations, supra note 67,
art. 7(2).
96. 1998 ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit art.
29(3) (1998).
97. "Further actions" are not specified in article 29(4) of the 1998 ASEAN Framework
Agreement on the Facilitation of Goods in Transit.
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Cooperation 2010-2015. 98 Under this instrument, reports shall be
jointly prepared by two institutions, the ASEAN Centre for Energy
(ACE) and the ASEAN Secretariat, and submitted to the annual
ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Energy and the ASEAN Ministers
on Energy Meeting meetings. However, there is no instruction provided
in the instrument, regarding a division of work between these two
institutions. 99 Having a similar degree of ambiguity in the chain of
responsibilities, the 2012 ASEAN Agreement on Custom asks the
ASEAN Secretariat to regularly report to the ASEAN Directors-General
of Customs Meeting on the implementation progress 100 and, at the same
time, asks the ASEAN Directors-General of Customs Meeting to submit
a report to the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting. 101 Yet, the
Agreement on Customs does not clarify whether the report submitted by
the ASEAN Directors-General of Customs Meeting to the ASEAN
Finance Ministers Meeting is the one prepared by the ASEAN
Secretariat.
It is important to note that all of the ASEAN instruments in the
examples cited above do not have a provision with respect to the
obligations of ASEAN Member States to provide relevant information
to the reporting bodies. It is not clear in these instruments how
monitoring reports can be prepared, where relevant information can be
obtained and how the reports are handled by the recipient bodies.
Provisions on required reporting frequency are sometimes clear 102 but
other times can be vague 03 or, in some cases, unavailable altogether.
ASEAN, in short, is yet to have a clear reporting system to monitor its
Member States' compliance with ASEAN instruments.
3. Self-reporting by ASEAN Member States

Multilateral treaties usually place an obligation on State parties to
communicate information and submit reports on the legislative,
executive and judiciary measures and programs that they have taken to
implement their treaty obligations. Self-reporting is indeed one of the
most popular techniques employed internationally to monitor treaty
98. ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation 2010 - 2015 Bringing Policies to
at
available
(2010),
Actions
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2010%20ASEAN%20Plan%20of0/o20Action%20on%20Energy
%20Cooperation%20(AP AEC)%202010-2015-pdf.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2014 ).
99. Id. para. 68.
100. ASEAN Agreement on Customs, supra note 66, art. 53(3) (2012).
101. Id.
102. Some instruments provide that reports shall be submitted annually.
103. Some instruments provide that reports shall be submitted regularly.
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compliance by State parties, whether it is a treaty on human rights, the
environment or anti-corruption. 104 Self-reporting also offers State
parties an opportunity to review, assess and improve their own treaty
implementation records. Compared to other compliance mechanisms
such as verification or inspection, self-reporting may be perceived by
States as less intrusive and less sensitive in terms of impact on
sovereignty, and more acceptable. Treaty monitoring bodies, especially
those for a regional organization of developing countries like ASEAN,
are usually unable, in terms of technical capacity and human resources,
to closely monitor each State party's compliance or to inspect and verify
the implementation of every single instrument that a State has ratified.
It makes sense, therefore, for ASEAN to reply on self-reporting by
its Member States, at least in the first stage, for purposes of monitoring
The reality, nevertheless, is that self-reporting
compliance. 105
requirements do not appear very frequently in ASEAN instruments. In
the list of ASEAN instruments concluded from 2008 until 2012, the
2009 Initiative for ASEAN Integration Strategic Framework, the
Initiative for ASEAN Integration Work Plan 2 (2009 - 2015), and the
2010 Protocol to Amend the Protocol to Provide Special Consideration
for Rice and Sugar are among the very few ASEAN instruments that
impose a reporting obligation on ASEAN Member States.
The Initiative for ASEAN Integration Strategic Framework and
the Initiative for ASEAN Integration Work Plan 2 (2009 - 2015) were
adopted on March 1, 2009 with a view to "narrowing the development
gap" within ASEAN and enhancing the organization's competitiveness
by regional cooperation "through which the more developed ASEAN
Members could help those member countries that most need it." 106
Under the Initiative, different groups of ASEAN Member States are
subject to different reporting requirements. Reporting frequency is
clearly provided, according to which ASEAN Member States have to
104. See, for example, human rights and environment treaties deposited with the
United Nations Secretary-General. United Nations Treaty Collections, UN, available at
http://treaties.un.org/pagesffreaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en
and
http://treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=27&subid=A&lang=en (last visited Mar. 31,
2014).
105. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAVES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 154 (1995).
106. Initiative for ASEAN Integration Strategic Framework and Initiative for ASEAN
Integration Work Plan 2 (2009 - 2015), para. 1, NAT'L U. SING. (2009), available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2009/2009-initiative-for-asean-integration-iai-strategic-framework-andiai-work-plan-2-2009-2015-adopted-on-1-march-2009-in-cha-am-thai land-by-the-heads-ofstategovemment/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) [hereinafter 2009 Initiative for A SEAN
Integration Strategic Framework and Initiative for ASEAN Integration Work Plan 2 (20092015)].
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submit their reports to relevant bodies annually. The Initiative for
ASEAN Integration Work Plan is also reportedly reviewed on a
periodical basis to account for the ASEAN Community building
process and the emerging needs of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and
Vietnam. 107 These countries are required to submit annual reports on
the assistance they have received from all sources, concentrating on the
utility, impact and effectiveness of the projects benefiting from the
assistance. Six other ASEAN Member States (Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) are also required to
submit annual reports on their assistance programs for Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam. 108 Although there is no specific provision with
regard to which body shall ultimately consider the reports, since the
ASEAN Secretariat is tasked with consolidating them, 109 it may be
presumed that the reports by ASEAN Member States shall be sent
initially to the ASEAN Secretariat. However, it remains unclear as to
which one of the following three bodies the reports shall go to (or
whether the reports shall go to all three bodies): the ASEAN Summit,
which guides and advises the implementation of the Initiative; the
ASEAN Coordinating Council, which provides recommendations to the
ASEAN Summit on the Initiative's implementation; or the Initiative for
ASEAN Integration Task Force, which provides policy guidelines,
directions and general advice on the Initiative for ASEAN Integration
Work Plan. 110
Another self-reporting mechanism was established under the 2007
Protocol to Provide Special Consideration for Rice and Sugar. The
2007 Protocol was concluded to allow an ASEAN Member State, under
exceptional cases, to request a waiver from the obligations imposed
under the Agreement on Common Effective Preferential Tariff and its
related Protocol, with regard to rice and sugar. 111 ASEAN Member
States that have been granted the waiver have the obligation to submit
an annual report for review to the ASEAN Free Trade Area Council. 112
The ASEAN Free Trade Area Council shall, at its annual meeting,
review the waiver to determine whether the exceptional circumstances

107. Id. para. 25.
108. Id. para. 23.
109. Id.
110. Id. paras. 11-13.
111. Protocol to Provide Special Consideration for Rice and Sugar art. 1(1) (Aug. 23,
2007),
available
at
http://ditjenkpi.kemendag.go.id/website_ kpilfiles/content/5/Protocol_to_provide_special_co
nsiderationJor_rice_and_sugar20071031111849.pdf(last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
112. Id. art. 5(2).
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that justify such waiver still remain and whether the terms and
conditions, if any, attached to the waiver are being met. 113 Based on the
outcome of the annual review, the ASEAN Free Trade Area Council
shall render its decision on whether to continue, modify or terminate the
waiver. 114 The reporting process is, in short, very clear. The ASEAN
Secretary-General or the ASEAN Secretariat does not have any formal
role during this whole process. It should be noted that this is not exactly
a report on implementation, but rather an update on the exceptional
circumstances justifying a waiver from CEPT obligations. Apart from
the two cases examined above, there are few, if any, other self-reporting
mechanisms established under an ASEAN instrument concluded after
the ASEAN Charter until October 2012. This is an indication that,
since the ASEAN Charter was adopted, ASEAN instruments usually do
not have a strong monitoring mechanism when it comes to selfreporting.
4. Review, Evaluation and Recommendations by Monitoring Bodies

Reporting is certainly one of the popular techniques for monitoring
compliance, but it is usually not enough. In many cases, information
obtained through reporting is provided by the States under scrutiny and
since States tend to emphasize what they have achieved over what they
have failed to do, these reports sometimes lack credibility. To resolve
this problem, there often needs to be mechanisms through which reports
are reviewed, verified and evaluated, and recommendations are made by
the monitoring bodies on steps that should be taken to improve
compliance.
The International Labour Organization (ILO), for example, has
established an elaborate procedure for reviewing and evaluating
member States' reports whereby member States have to periodically
(every two years for some conventions and five years for others) submit
their implementation reports to the reviewing body - the Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. 115
The Committee, composed of twenty experts, albeit having no
investigatory powers, can request a State to provide further specific
information and is mandated to make critical evaluations of State
113. Id. art. 5(1).
114. Id. art. 5(3).
115. See International Labour Organization, Committee of Experts on the Application
of
Conventions
and
Recommendations,
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-intemational-labourstandards/committee-of-experts-on-the-application-of-conventions-andrecommendations/lang- en/index.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/1

154

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

2014]

Promoting Compliance

401

reports. It then makes suggestions to improve implementation, which
are published in its annual reports. 116
In the World Trade Organization (WTO), all members are subject
to the Trade Review Policy Mechanism whereby the Trade Policy
Review Body 117 reviews and evaluates States' law and policy
statements and the Secretariat's reports. 118 In preparing its reports,
which contain details about State policy, law and practice, the WTO
Secretariat seeks the cooperation of member States, but has the sole
responsibility for the facts presented and views expressed. Reports of
the Secretariat, statements by States and concluding remarks by the
Trade Policy Review's Chairperson are all published. 119 The aim of the
process is to improve the adherence by all members to the rules and
commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements, hence
contributing to a smoother functioning of the multilateral trade
system. 120
In the area of human rights, State parties to the International
Covenant on Political and Civil Rights submit reports to the Human
Rights Committee on the measures they have adopted that give effect to
the rights recognized. 121 The Human Rights Committee then reviews
and examines the reports and offers recommendations to the State
parties. 122 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) 123 was also established under the International Convention on

116. See id.
117. The WTO General Council meets as the Trade Policy Review Body. The Trade
Policy Review Body is thus open to all WTO members. See WTO, Trade Policy Review
Body, available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tprbdy_e.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2014).
118. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, MRV: A
SURVEY OF REPORTING AND REVIEW IN MULTILATERAL REGIMES 8 (2010), available at
http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/survey-reporting-review-multilateral-regimes.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 17, 2014).
119. Id.
120. Trade Policy Review Mechanism ("TPRM''), WORLD TRADE ORG., available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/annex3_e.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
121. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art. 40.1, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
122. The Human Rights Committee (CCPR) is composed of 18 independent experts
who are persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human
rights. The Committee convenes three times a year for sessions of three weeks duration in
Geneva (Switzerland) or New York (United States). Id.
123. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) was the first
body created by the UN to monitor actions by States to fulfil their obligations under the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The Committee meets in Geneva,
Switzerland and holds two sessions per year consisting of three weeks each to consider state
reports, review the implementation, address arising issues, and make recommendations to
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the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to "make suggestions and
general recommendations based on an examination of reports and
information received from the State parties." 124 The Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 125 the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 126 the Committee against
Torture, 127 the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 128 and the
Committee on Migrant Workers 129 were similarly established by their
relevant human rights treaties to review and evaluate reports and
supervise the protection and promotion of those rights recognized by the
treaties.
Among all ASEAN instruments listed in the ASEAN Secretariat's
Table, the 2007 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint and the 2009
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint are among the rare cases
where there is actually specific guidance for evaluating implementation.
As provided in the 2007 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, the
ASEAN Secretariat shall develop and maintain a set of statistical
indicators, including an integrated tariff and trade database system and
the ASEAN Economic Community scorecards, to monitor and assess
compliance with each element of the ASEAN Economic Community. 130
In fact, the ASEAN Secretariat has set up the ASEAN Economic
Community Scorecard to identify actions that must be undertaken by
ASEAN collectively and by its Member States individually to establish

state parties. Id.
124. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 9.2, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
125. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is the body of
independent experts, originally established under the ECOSOC, empowered to monitor the
implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights. The
Committee was established in 1985 by ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17. Id.
126. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
was established under the International Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women to monitor the implementation of the Convention.
127. The Committee against Torture (CAT) was established pursuant to art. 17 of the
Convention and began to function on January 1, 1988 to monitor the implementation of the
Convention. In addition to the reporting procedure, the Convention establishes three other
mechanisms: consideration of individual complaints, undertaking of inquiries and
examination of inter-state complaints.
128. The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was established pursuant to art.
43 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child to supervise the implementation of the
Convention.
129. The Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) monitors the implementation of the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families. G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A,
U.N. Doc. N45/49 , art. 72 (Dec. 18, 1990).
130. 2007 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, supra note 53 , para. 73
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the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. The ASEAN Economic
Community Scorecard components include: (1) qualitative and
quantitative indications of the ratification, adoption and transposition
into domestic laws, regulations and administrative procedures of agreed
obligations and commitments within the prescribed timeframes as
specified in the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint; (2) tracking
implementation of agreements/commitments and achievement of
milestones in the ASEAN Economic Community Strategic Schedule;
and (3) statistical indicators on the ASEAN Economic Community.131
The ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard is structured into: (1)
single market and production base; (2) competitive economic region;
and (3) e9uitable economic development and integration into the global
economy. 32 Evaluation levels of the Scorecard are categorized as "fully
implemented," "on-going," "not fully-implemented," and "not yet
commenced." The dates for reporting the Scorecard are in April and
October annually. Monitoring of the ASEAN Economic Community
using the Scorecard mechanism started in 2008 and is being conducted
in four phases: 2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013, and 2014-2015. 133 A
report on Phase I (2008-2009) and Phase II (2010-2011) has already
b�en released. The ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard is also
used to review and evaluate the implementation of the 2010 ASEAN
Strategic Action Plan for Small and Medium Enterprises Development
(2010-2015). 134 The implementation and monitoring of the Strategic
Action Plan shall be further guided by a medium-term Strategic
Schedule and annual work programs. 135
The 2009 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint also
provides that the ASEAN Secretariat shall fulfil its monitoring function
by developing and adopting indicators and systems to monitor and
assess the progress of implementation of the various elements and
actions in the Blueprint. 136 In 2011, two years after the conclusion of the
2009 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, the ASEAN
131. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard: Charter Progress
toward Regional Economic Integration Phase I (2008-2009) and Phase II (2010-2011),
ASEAN (2012), available at http://www.asean.org/resources/publications/asean
publications/item/asean-economic-community-scorecard-3 (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 2010 ASEAN Strategic Action Plan for SME Development (2010 - 2015),
ASEAN, art. 6 (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2010/2010-asean-strategic
action-plan-on-sme-development-2010-2015/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2014) [hereinafter 2010
ASEAN Strategic Action Plan for SME Development (2010 - 2015)].
135. Id.
136. 2009 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, supra note 58, at III.D
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Secretariat officially submitted to ASEAN sectoral bodies under the
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, the development of the ASEAN
Socio-Cultural Community Scorecard to assess the achieved goals,
targets and outcomes and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
Blueprint Implementation-focused Monitoring System to monitor the
implementation of activities and programs under the Blueprint. 137 It is
anticipated that the report of the ASEAN Secretary-General to the
ASEAN Leaders on the implementation of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community Blueprint will comprise: (1) a quantitative implementationfocused monitoring Review of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
Blueprint; (2) a quantitative Scorecard of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community - 2012 and 2015; and (3) a brief qualitative assessment of
progress that states the challenges and suggests solutions. 138 Information
that the monitoring system can provide includes: (1) number of actions
taken by ASEAN sectoral bodies or ASEAN Member States; (2) actions
that remain unattended; (3) levels of cooperation; (4) levels of
intervention; (5) outputs of projects and activities and (6) the status of
implementation and activities. The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
Scorecard and Implementation-focused Monitoring System for the
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint Implementation were
endorsed by the Senior Officials Committee in 2011. 39
For most of the other ASEAN instruments, the guidelines and
procedures for monitoring, reviewing and evaluating implementation
are not that specific. The 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, for
example, provides that the ASEAN Secretariat shall have monitoring,
reporting and supporting roles, and the ASEAN Economic Ministers
Meeting and the ASEAN Free Trade Area Council shall have
supervising, coordinating and reviewing roles. 140 However, it does not
specify what the ASEAN Secretariat would do to monitor, and what the
ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting and the ASEAN Free Trade Area
Council would do to supervise. Similarly, the 2012 ASEAN Agreement
on Customs gives the supervising authority on all aspects of the
Agreement implementation to one body, the ASEAN Directors-General

13 7. See Misran Karmain, Development of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
Scorecard
(ASCC
Scorecard)
(May
10,
2011),
available
at
http://www.anamai.moph.go.th/download/Scan_ASCC.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
138. Id.
139. ASEAN Secretariat, Mid-Term Review of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
Blueprint
(2009-2015),
available
at
http://www.asean.org/images/resources/2014/Apr/FA_Consolidated_Final_MTR_Report_FI
NAL-WEB[l].pdf (last visited May 7, 2014).
140. 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, supra note 69, art. 90.
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of Customs Meeting, 141 and gives the monitoring authority to another
body, the ASEAN Secretariat. Nonetheless, there are no further details
on how the implementation of the Agreement shall be supervised and
monitored. 142 In a different case, the 2012 Protocol Six on Railways
Border and Interchange Stations gives all relevant authorities
(supervising, reviewing, coordinating and monitoring) to only one body
(the ASEAN Senior Transport Officials Meeting), 143 but again, provides
no instructions as to how the ASEAN Senior Transport Officials
Meeting shall fulfil its job.

5. Capacity Building and Technical Assistance
No matter how detailed and well-designed they are, reporting and
review mechanisms alone may not be able to ensure effective
implementation of all ASEAN instruments when certain ASEAN
Member States lack the capacity to implement the instruments to which
they are parties. To address the issue of lack of capacity, ASEAN has
adopted an "ASEAN minus X" formula to give less developed countries
a grace period by allowing them to delay the implementation of certain
instrument provisions. The ASEAN Charter provides that, with regard
to the implementation of economic commitments, the "ASEAN minus
144
X" formula may be applied where there is a consensus to do so.
Under the framework of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, for example, six
ASEAN original members (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Brunei) would go ahead with their Common
Effective Preferential Tariff by 2003, while Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar
and Vietnam are given more time (until 2015) to catch up with their
tariff reduction measures. It should be noted, however, that this formula
is only applicable to certain economic instruments. 145 In fact, there have
been fewer instruments adopting this formula in recent years. 146

141. 2012 ASEAN Agreement on Customs, supra note 66.
142. Id.
143. 2012 Protocol Six on Railways Border and Interchange Stations, supra note 67,
art. 7(1), (3).
144. ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, art. 21(2).
145. Id.
146. In August 2012, ASEAN Member States signed the Memorandum of
Understanding among the Governments of the Participating Member States of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the Second Pilot Project for the
Implementation of a Regional Self-Certification System. Implementing the Memorandum
of Understanding among the Governments of the Participating Member States of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations on the Second Pilot Project for the Implementation
of a Regional Self-Certification System, Exec. Ord. 142, 142 O.G. s. 2013 (Oct. 14, 2013)
(Phil.).
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ASEAN Member States, especially Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and
Vietnam, need substantial assistance to strengthen their capacity for
implementing ASEAN instruments. The ASEAN Secretariat also needs
assistance to fulfil its monitoring responsibility, as well as to complete
many other legal tasks it has been assigned under the ASEAN Charter.
An examination of ASEAN instruments concluded in recent years,
however, suggests that capacity-building assistance for ASEAN
Member States has only been provided in a limited number of
instruments. Furthermore, no instrument has specifically mentioned
measures to strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat's monitoring capacity.
As stated in the 2007 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint,
for ASEAN to establish an economic community by 2015, different
measures must be carried out to build and strengthen the individual and
institutional capacity of regional governments so as to ensure the
smooth implementation of economic and trade programs. 147 The
Blueprint also emphasizes that the ASEAN Economic Community will
have to address the development divide and accelerate the integration of
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam through the Initiative for
ASEAN Integration and other regional initiatives. Major areas of
cooperation where capacity building activities need to be taken include
the industry sector, 14 recognition of professional qualifications, closer
consultation on macroeconomic and financial policies, trade financing
measures, enhanced infrastructure and communications connectivity,
development of electronic transactions through e-ASEAN, integrating
industries across the region to promote regional sourcing, and the
private sector. 149
The 2009 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint also has
different provisions on capacity building. Capacity building is provided
in labor management, 150 information and communication technology, 151
civil service, 152 poverty reduction, 153 health, 154 social justice and
welfare, 155 the environment, 156 and cultural creativity, among others. 157

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See 2007 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, supra note 53, para. 19.
Id. para. 73.
Id. para. 7.
2009 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, supra note 58, para. 12.
Id. para. 14.
Id. para. 17.
Id. para. 19.
Id. para. 22.
2009 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, supra note 58, 11, para. 27.
Id. para. 31.
Id. para. 14.
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To ensure its effective implementation, the 2009 ASEAN SocioCultural Community Blueprint tasks relevant ASEAN sectoral bodies to
identify and implement technical studies or training programs on issues,
areas, or topics where capacity building supports are required and to
establish appropriate capacity building programs to assist new Member
States in enhancing the achievement of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community. 158
Similarly, the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment
Agreement emphasizes the importance of according special and
differential treatment to the newer ASEAN Member States through
technical assistance to strengthen their capacity in relation to investment
policies and promotion, including in areas such as human resource
development and highlight commitments in areas of interest to the
newer ASEAN Member States. It recognizes that commitments by each
newer ASEAN Member State may be made in accordance with its
individual stage of development. 159
6. Consultation

Consultation is a process where state parties come together to share
implementation experience, promote understanding and awareness,
discuss ways to overcome difficulties encountered in implementation,
provide advice and assistance in the implementation process, and
prevent disputes from arising. As this is a rather facilitative and nonconfrontational process, it would be assumed to be an ASEAN popular
measure to promote and ensure compliance. However, very few
ASEAN instruments adopted since the ASEAN Charter actually have
provisions on consultation.
From 2008 to 2010, ASEAN concluded four agreements on air
services cooperation, namely the 2008 ASEAN Memorandum of
Understanding on Cooperation relating to Aircraft Accident and
Incident Investigation, the 2009 ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on the
Full Liberalization of Air Freight Services, the 2009 ASEAN
Multilateral Agreement on Air Services and the 2010 ASEAN
Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalization of Passenger Air
Services. These are among the few ASEAN instruments that have
provisions on consultation as a way to promote compliance. The 2008
ASEAN Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation relating to
Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation mentions very briefly that
participating Parties will consult each other from time to time to ensure
158. /d.para.17.
159. 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, supra note 73, art. 14.
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the implementation of this Memorandum of Understanding. 160 Three
other agreements on air services have an almost identical provision
(Article 17) on consultation, according to which the aeronautical
authorities of the Contracting Parties shall consult with one another
from time to time with a view to ensuring the implementation of, and
satisfactory compliance with, the provisions of these Agreements. 161
Unless otherwise agreed, such consultations shall begin at the earliest
date possible, but no later than sixty days from the date the other
contracting party or parties receive, through diplomatic or other
appropriate channels, a written request, including an explanation of the
issues to be raised. Once the consultations have been concluded, all the
contracting parties as well as the ASEAN Secretary-General shall be
notified of the results. 162
IV. CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD
As reflected in the 2006 Report of the Eminent Persons Group,
ASEAN does recognize that the real problem it faces is to ensure
effective implementation and compliance with instruments that it has
It understands that non-compliance or delay in
concluded. 1
implementation may not only hinder regional cooperation and
integration efforts, but also undermine its credibility and disrupt the
process toward building a common community. 164 Initial steps to
establish various mechanisms to promote the implementation of
ASEAN instruments have been taken. First and foremost, the ASEAN
Charter creates a division of work according to which the ASEAN
Sectoral Ministerial Bodies have the responsibility to implement all
ASEAN agreements, 165 the ASEAN Coordinating Council shall

160. 2008 ASEAN Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation, supra note 159,
art. 7.
161. See 2009 ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Air Services, and the 2010 ASEAN
Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalization of Passenger Air Services art. 16,
available at http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/item/aseanmultilateral-agreement-on-the-full-liberalisation-of-air-freight-services-manila-20-may2009 (last visited Mar. 27, 2014); 2009 ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Air Services art.
16, available at http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/item/aseanmultilateral-agreement-on-air-services-manila-20-may-2009-2 (last visited Mar. 27, 2014);
2010 ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalization of Passenger Air Services
art. 16, available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/2010/2010-asean-multilateral-agreement-on-fullliberalisation-of-passenger-air-services/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2014 ).
162. Id.
163. EPG REPORT, supra note 15, para. 6.
164. Id. para. 44.
165. ASEAN Charter, supra note 1, art. 10(1).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/1

162

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

2014]

Promoting Compliance

409

coordinate the implementation, 166 and the ASEAN Secretary-General
shall monitor the progress of implementation. 167 Various ASEAN
instruments concluded in the post-Charter age have further detailed their
expected forms of compliance mechanisms. Some ASEAN instruments
have even established separate committees to monitor or facilitate
implementation progress. Some have specific guidance on how
implementation is reviewed and evaluated, by using, for example, the
ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard and the ASEAN SocioCultural Community Scorecard.
Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go for ASEAN to have
effective mechanisms that can ensure compliance as the Eminent
Persons Group suggested. While the ASEAN Charter obliges ASEAN
sectoral bodies to implement ASEAN instruments in general, 168 there is
no provision regarding a similar obligation of ASEAN Member States.
Although the ASEAN Charter authorizes the ASEAN Secretary-General
to monitor the progress of implementation of all ASEAN instruments
and decisions, 1 9 there are no guidelines or rules of procedure for the
ASEAN Secretary-General and the ASEAN Secretariat to do their jobs.
Among the instruments that have been concluded after the ASEAN
Charter until October 2012, the majority do not have compliance
monitoring provisions.
Under the instruments that do have compliance monitoring
provisions, many issues remain, such as unclear institutional design,
inconsistent procedures, overlapping authorities, lack of guidelines, and
in many cases, an absence of stronger monitoring measures like review,
verification or recommendations. Some instruments ask one specific
body to monitor the implementation, while assigning another body to
supervise and review the implementation. 170 Some give all
responsibilities in terms of monitoring, supervising, supporting and
facilitating to one single body, but do not clarify what those monitoring,
overseeing and supervising functions imply. 171 No instrument gives the
166. Id. art. 8(2)(b).
167. Id. art. 11(2)(b).
168. Id. art. lO(l)(b).
169. Id. art. 11(2)(b).
170. According to the 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, the supervising,
coordinating and reviewing role belongs to the ASEAN Economic Ministers and the Senior
Economic Officials' Meeting while the ASEAN Secretariat is assigned to monitor the
progress in the implementation of the Agreement and assist the ASEAN Economic
Ministers and the Senior Economic Officials' Meeting in supervising, coordinating and
reviewing the implementation of the Agreement. See 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods
Agreement, supra note 69, art. 90(3).
171. Under the 2012 Protocol Six on Railways Border and Interchange Stations, for
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monitoring bodies the power to make recommendations for specific
ASEAN Member States to improve their implementation records. The
ASEAN Secretariat is dependent on ASEAN Member States to provide
compliance data; yet, not all ASEAN Member States are equally willing
to share, or capable of sharing, relevant sufficient data. For ASEAN,
compliance and reporting problems are also, at least partially, attributed
to the lack of capacity. Some ASEAN Member States may have the
resources that would enable them to comply and report on their
compliance. Others, however, may fall short.
It is important, therefore, that ASEAN has guidelines, rules of
procedure, or standard operating procedures for reporting and
monitoring compliance with ASEAN instruments. Reporting procedures
need to be clear and consistent, the implementing states and bodies need
to submit reports to the monitoring bodies and not the other way around.
Reporting frequency needs to be clarified, whether it is annual reporting
for a number of instruments, biennial for some instruments, or on a fiveyear basis for other instruments. The monitoring bodies should have the
right to request an ASEAN Member State to provide specific
implementing information and that ASEAN Member State should be
required to comply with that request. The monitoring bodies should also
be mandated to make critical evaluations of state reports and make
recommendations to improve implementation. Measurements and
indicators used to evaluate compliance, where applicable, should be
further developed. The ASEAN Coordinating Council and the ASEAN
Community Councils should have a more active role. The agenda of the
ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Coordinating Council or the ASEAN
Community Councils should include a regular item on examining the
reports on the progress of implementation of ASEAN instruments. That
way, ASEAN Member States will be under more pressure to take their
commitments seriously. More efforts should also be made and specific
measures should be worked out to strengthen the capacity of ASEAN
Member States, especially Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, to
implement ASEAN instruments and decisions, as well as the capacity of
the ASEAN Secretariat to provide administrative and technical support
example, the ASEAN Senior Transport Officials Meeting is the body responsible for the
monitoring, review, coordination and supervision of all aspects relating to implementation
of the Protocol. The 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement gives the power
to oversee, coordinate, review and facilitate the implementation of the Agreement to the
ASEAN Investment Area Council. The 2009 ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement assigns
the ASEAN Free Trade Area Council to undertake supervision, coordination and review
functions at the same time. Id. art. 90(3)(a); see also 2012 Protocol Six on Railways Border
and Interchange Stations, supra note 67, art. 7(1); 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment
Agreement, supra note 73, art. 42(3)(b).
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to various sectoral bodies that coordinate the implementation of
ASEAN instruments and to assist in monitoring the compliance with an
increasing number of ASEAN instruments and decisions.
For these recommendations to be realized, more political will is
needed. ASEAN Member States need to recognize that it is in their own
interest and the interest of the organization to take stronger actions to
implement various cooperative instruments that they have concluded. A
strengthened compliance monitoring system is a must if ASEAN wants
to cultivate a culture of honoring and implementing commitments and
reach the goal of building a rules-based community.
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TOBACCO CONTROL ACT
Michelle M. Chester
1
"WARNING: Smoking can kill you."

CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 414
II. PLAIN PACKAGING .................................................................... 417
A. Defining Plain Packaging .................................................... 417

B. Packaging Effects on Tobacco Consumption ....................... 418
III. TOBACCO PACKAGING IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA ... 421
A. Australia .............................................................................. 421
1. Australian Constitution and Intellectual Property

Rights ............................................................................ 422
2. Highest Court Ruling...................................................... 424
B. Canada .................................................................................. 425
1. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms and
Freedom of Expression ................................................. 427
2. The Supreme Court of Canada and the Ontario
Superior Court .............................................................. 429
IV. TOBACCO PACKAGING IN THE UNITED ST ATES .............. 430
A. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act ....................................................................................... 431
B. The Central Hudson Test and the Circuit Split .................. 432
C. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc . .............................. 433

t J.D. expected 2014, Syracuse University College of Law. The author would like to
thank her family for their unending support and Professor Tucker Culbertson for his
academic guidance.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Efforts to reduce the number of smokers and the health effects
brought on by smoking and second-hand smoke around the world have
been on the rise. In 2001, Canada passed the first law of its kind,
requiring tobacco companies to put graphic health warnings on their
packaging, and in 2011 revised that law to increase the size of the
pictorial warning. 2 Following Canada's lead, Australia passed a similar,
but more stringent, requirement on tobacco packaging known as "plain
packaging." 3 In August 2012, Australia's highest court upheld what is
considered to be the "world's toughest law on cigarette promotion.',4
Australian Attorney-General, Nicola Roxon5, believes that other
countries will see the success its new packaging requirements have on

2. Canada to boost package warnings - inside and out, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ALLIANCE
(Oct.
4,
2012),
available
at
http://www.fctc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=598:canada-toboost-package-wamings-inside-and-out&catid=235:advertising-promotion-andsponsorship&Itemid=239 (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) [hereinafter FCA].
3. Rod McGuirk, Australian Cigarette Logo Ban Law Upheld By Court, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/15/australiancigarette-logo-ban_ n_ 1778145.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). A full description of plain
packaging is discussed in full in section II.A., infra pp. 4-5.
4. McGuirk, supra note 3.
5. In October 2012 when this statement was made, Nicola Roxon was the AttomeyGeneral and the minister for Emergeny Management for Australia. Nicola Roxon
announces her resignation, ABC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2013), available at
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-02-02/nicola-roxon-annonces-her-resignation/4497384
(last visited Jan. 22, 2014). She announced her resignation in February 2013. Id.
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reducing the number of smokers and that they will adopt similar
requirements. 6 Tobacco companies worry that this law will set a
"global precedent" that will have a serious effect on their business. 7
In the United States, a similar act, the Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act ("FSPTCA"), was signed into law in 2009. 8
This act does not go as far as plain packaging, however, it does require
tobacco companies to print graphic health warnings on their tobacco
packaging; which is an element of plain packaging. 9 Sections 201 and
204 specifically require that:
[p ]ackaging and advertisements for cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
must have revised warning labels with a larger font size. Font colors
are limited to white on black background or black on white
background. Cigarette package health warnings will be required to
cover the top 50 percent of both the front and rear panels of the
package, and the nine specific warning messages must be equally and
randomly displayed and distributed in all areas of the United States.
These messages must be accompanied by color graphics showing the
0
negative health consequences of smoking cigarettes.

While sections 201 and 204 were codified in 2009, their fate is still
uncertain. Currently, there is a split in the circuits about whether these
compelled graphic cigarette-warning labels are constitutional. In April
2012, the Sixth Circuit, in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v.
United States, held that the provocative warnings were reasonably
related to the government's interest in informing consumers and,
therefore, could require tobacco manufacturers to print the images on its
products. 11 However, in August 2012, the D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA struck down the mandate stating that the "FDA has
not provided a shred of evidence-much less 'substantial evidence' ...
showing that the graphic warnings [would] 'directly advance' its
interest in reducing the number of Americans who smoke." 12 The
reason for the split in rulings largely came down to the different
6. McGuirk, supra note 3.
7. Id. The tobacco companies also argue that the new packaging rules in Australia
violate intellectual property rights and devalue their trademark. Id.
8. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 520 (6th Cir.
2012).
9. McGuirk, supra note 3; Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
(FSPTCA) of 2009, Pub.L. No. 111-31, §§ 201, 204, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) [hereinafter
"FSPTCA"].
10. FSPTCA, supra note 9.
11. Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 569.
12. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C.
Cir. 2012).
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standards of review used by each court. 13 The Court in Discount
Tobacco applied a lower standard of review because it found graphic
health warnings to be factual disclosures, while the Court in R.J.
Reynolds applied a more stringent standard of review put in place to
protect commercial speech. 14
This Note will explore plain packaging and graphic health
warnings imposed on tobacco companies. It will focus on conducting a
comparative analysis between the respective laws in Australia, Canada,
and the United States regarding plain packaging, graphic health
warnings, and the jurisprudence regarding compelled corporate speech
in the interest of public health.
In the second section, this Note will discuss plain packaging and
graphic health warnings by further defining plain packaging and
discussing some of the more recent findings on how plain packaging
and graphic health warnings affect tobacco consumption.
In the third section this Note will discuss where Australia and
Canada currently stand on plain packaging and graphic health warnings.
This will be accomplished by examining current laws in each country
and court cases addressing the constitutionality of those laws.
The fourth section of this Note will discuss where the United States
currently stands on plain packaging and graphic health warnings. This
will be accomplished by looking at the FSPTCA and the First
Amendment's protection of commercial speech. Additionally, this
section will address the circuit split on the FSPTCA concerning its
constitutionality. An examination of Discount Tobacco and R.J.
Reynolds will provide a basis for this discussion.
The fifth section of the Note will apply the findings on plain
packaging and graphic health warnings from Canada and Australia to
the United States' FSPTCA. This will be accomplished by addressing
the difference in constitutional regimes and the role of
foreign/comparative analysis in the United States to determine whether
it violates freedom of expression. Further, this Note will look at the
laws of Australia and Canada and propose that the FSPTCA should be
found constitutional if this case were to go in front of the United States
Supreme Court.
Lastly, this Note will conclude with a discussion on the FSPTCA
and will demonstrate how and why the United States Supreme Court
should look to precedent set in other countries to determine its
constitutionality. Specifically, it will address the interest of public
13. Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 558; R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212-13.
14. Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 558; R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212-13.
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health in compelled commercial speech. Further, this section will
demonstrate that if the United States Supreme Court hears this issue, it
should find that the FSPTCA is not in violation of freedom of
expression and is constitutional.
II. PLAIN PACKAGING
This section provides background information on plain packaging.
Part A begins by defining and describing plain packaging, while Part B
discusses the empirical evidence that has been collected on plain
packaging and graphic health warnings.
A. Defining Plain Packaging
Plain packaging strips tobacco-packaging products of any logos,
trade colors, descriptive words, or specialized font size and style. 15 The
brand name is the only graphic image on the package. 16 In fact, all
packaging, regardless of brand, is the same neutral color, contains a
graphic health warning, and a quit smoking help-line phone number. 17
Depending on the country where the tobacco packaging is distributed,
the pictorial health warning sign could cover from 50% to 75% of the
front of the package, and from 50% to 90% of the back of the package. 18
It is intended that plain packaging will
1. reduce the attractiveness and appeal of tobacco products to
consumers, particularly young people;
2. increase the noticeably and effectiveness of mandated health
warnings; and
3. reduce the ability of the retail packaging of tobacco products to
mislead consumers about the harmful effects of smoking or using
tobacco products. 19
Countries considering implementing plain packaging and/or

15. Melodie Tilson, Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products, NON-SMOKERS' RIGHTS
Ass'N/SMOKJNG & HEALTH ACTION FOUND 1 (July 2008), available at http://www.nsraadnf.ca/cms/file/files/Plain%20Pkg%20NSRA %20FINAL%20Aug08.pdf (last visited Jan.
15, 2014).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. FCA, supra note 2; Rebecca Thurlow, Australia Cigarette-Packaging Curbs
Prompt
Suit.,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Nov. 1
21,
2011),
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000142405297020444340457705 l 361355 l 54868.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
19. Health Warnings, AUSTL. Gov'T: DEP'T OF AGING (Dec. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.health.gov.au/intemet/main/publishing.nsf/content/tobacco-wam (last visited
Jan. 15, 2014).
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graphic health warnings have anywhere from 9-19 graphic pictures, any
of which must be on a package at all times. 20 According to merchants
in Australia, where the plain packages have recently been released into
the general market, the plain packages are very hard to differentiate, and
make finding specific brands of tobacco or cigarettes hard to locate on
the shelf. 21
B. Packaging Effects on Tobacco Consumption

According to the Australian Minister of Health, "[ o]ver the past
two decades, more than 24 different studies have backed plain
packaging. . ." 22 However, according to economists at the Montreal
Economic Institute, "empirical research is inconclusive as [to] the actual
effectiveness of [plain packaging], some studies suggest that [it] could
on the contrary have unintended negative consequences." 23 In fact, the
economists at the Montreal Economic Institute claim that the present
graphic health warnings, which "amount [to] partial plain packaging,"
have no impact on consumption and could possibly have a negative
impact on consumption. 24 Most studies that have been conducted agree
that removing brand design elements will reduce brand image
association. 25 However, the real question to be asked is whether the
reduction of brand association will lead to a reduction in tobacco
consumption. According to BMJ Group, "[t]hese point-of-sale tobacco
advertising and cigarette displays create an enticing in-store presence
for youth, and a cue to prompt adult smokers to purchase. " 26
Economists at the Montreal Economic Institute ("MEI") claim that
20. FCA, supra note 2; Thurlow, supra note 18.
21. Benjamin Miller, Traders fear flak at plain pack, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct.
29, 2012), available at http://www.smh.com.au/small-business/trends/traders-fear-flak-atplain-pack-20121029-28ebl.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
22. Press Release, Hon. Nicola Roxon MP & Hon. Tanya Plibersek MP, World
Leading Plain Packaging Laws Given a Clean Bill of Health (Aug. 15, 2012), available at
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parllnfo/download/media/pressrel/l 849762/upload_ binary/l 8497
62.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22media/pressrel/l 849762%22 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2014).
23. Michel Kelly-Gagnon & Youri Chassin, Plain Packaging and its Unintended
MONTREAL
ECON.
INST.
(Aug.
2011),
available
at
Consequences,
http://www.iedm.org/files/note081 l_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
24. Id.
25. M. A. Wakefield, D. Germain & S. J. Durkin, How does increasingly plainer
cigarette packaging influence adult smokers ' perception about brand image? An
17
BMJ
6
(Sept.
30,
2008),
available
at
experimental
study,
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/l 7/6/416.full (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
26. Id. (discussing how tobacco packaging that is brightly colored and appealing to the
eye is more likely to catch the eye of children and encourage adults to purchase tobacco
products).
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it is not the appeal of the brand design that encourages tobacco
The
consumption, but rather, the media, peers, and family. 27
economists argue "that no causal relation has been established between
plain packaging of cigarettes and tobacco consumption. " 28 In other
words, according to the MEI, there is no scientific basis for the
promotion of plain packaging, which they define as "removing all
distinctive elements ... associated with a product and replacing them
with a generic package that usually includes government mandated
warnings. " 29
Further, smoking rates for teens and adults in the United States are
similar to Canada's, where graphic health warnings, or "partial plain
packaging" according to the MEI, have been in effect for over ten
years. 30 Thus, enhancing the idea that plain packaging and graphic
health warnings have no real effect on tobacco consumption. While this
study purports to refute plain packaging and graphic health warnings,
the MEI has been criticized for being a "think tank." 31 Further, the MEI
"admitted receiving 3.4% of its total annual budget in 2004 from the
tobacco industry" and from 2004 to 2006 it received $135,000 from
Imperial Tobacco Canada. 32 Therefore, research by the MEI should be
taken with caution.
However, in a more recent study published in January 2013,
BioMedical Central validated plain packaging, and thus graphic health
warnings. 33 The study concluded that the most likely result of plain
packaging and graphic health warnings would be a reduction in
smoking for both adults and children, with the greatest reduction in
smoking occurring among children. 34 This study recognized the
absence of empirical evidence to determine if plain packing works. 35
Therefore, to study this issue, the expert elicitation method was used to
Kelly-Gagnon & Chassin, supra note 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Exposing Recent Tobacco Industry Front Groups and Alliances, NON-SMOKERS'
RIGHTS Ass'N SMOKING & HEALTH ACTION FOUND. 12-13 (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.nsra-adnf.ca/cms/file/files/pdf/FrontGroups Oct_2008.pdf (last visited Jan. 18,
2014).
32. Id.
33. Pechey et al., Impact of Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products on Smoking in
Adults and Children: An Elicitation ofInternational Experts' Estimates, BMC Public Health
1 (2013), available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-2458-13-18.pdf (last
visited Jan. 18, 2014). BMC Public Health is committed to maintaining high standards
through full and stringent peer review. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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quantify the uncertainty. 36 Thirty-three tobacco control experts were
questioned by telephone and the results were linearly pooled in order to
represent the opinion of the "average expert." 37 While the percent
reduction in smoking varied between experts, the most important
finding from the study was that none of the experts believed plain
packaging would increase smoking in either adults or children. 38
Rather, the implementation of plain packaging would likely lead to a
reduction in tobacco consumption for both adults and children. 39 This
study directly refutes the finding from economists at the MEI, which
states that plain packaging could have negative consequences by
encouraging, rather than discouraging, tobacco consumption. 40
Another study, conducted by researchers at Legacy® and Harvard
School of Public Health, provides evidence as to the effectiveness of
graphic health warnings in reducing tobacco consumption. 41 Further,
the study suggests that the regulation set forth in the FSPTCA in the
United States would benefit all groups of race and socio-economic
status' .42 Stating that "[g]iven the disproportionate burden of tobaccorelated disease faced by the poor and minorities, mandating strong
pictorial warnings is an effective and efficient way to communicate the
risk of tobacco use."43 The study examined reactions to graphic health
warnings by 3,371 smokers. 44 The results of the study showed that
graphic health warnings were more effective than text-only cigarette
warnings because the smokers indicated that "the labels were more
36. Id.
37. Pechey et al. , supra note 33.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Press Release, Harv. Sch. of Pub. Health, Graphic warnings on cigarettes effective
across
demographic
groups
(Jan.
14,
2013),
available
at
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/graphic-wamings-on-cigarettes-effectiveacross-demographic-groups/ (last visited Jan. 21 , 2014 ). "Legacy Research Institute
maintains an assurance with the Department of Health's Office of Human Subject
Protections to conduct clinical studies, and with the National Institute of Health's Office of
Laboratory Animal Welfare to conduct basic research." Accreditation, LEGACY HEALTH,
available at http://www.legacyhealth.org/our-legacy/about-legacy/accreditation.aspx (last
visited Jan. 27, 2014).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Jennifer Cantrell, Donna M. Vallone, James F. Thrasher, Rebekah H. Nagler, Shari
P. Feriman, Larry R. Muenz, David Y. He, & Kasisomayajula Viswanath, Impact of
Tobacco-Related Health Warning Lab/es Across Socioeconomic, Race and Ethnic Groups:
Results from a Randomized Web-based Experiment, PLOS ONE (Jan. 14, 2013), available at
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F 10.1371 %2Fjoumal.pone.0052206
(last
visited Jan. 21, 2014).
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impactful, credible, and [had] a greater effect on their intentions to
quit." 45 Further, the researchers indicated that the study provided
evidence as to the effectiveness of graphic health warnings on tobacco
products and that the graphic health warnings in the FSPTCA "would
achieve the desired effect. .. [and] enhanc[e] the efficiency and costeffectiveness of [the] warning label policy." 46
Regardless of the conclusions from competing studies, no one will
really know what effect plain packaging or graphic health warnings will
have on tobacco consumption until plain packaging laws have been in
effect long enough to measure their impact. Thus, the real questions we
must ask ourselves until then is whether graphic health warnings really
advance a government interest in the reduction of tobacco consumption,
and whether we are willing to limit corporate freedom of speech to find
out?
III. TOBACCO PACKAGING IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA
This section provides a general overview of the status of tobacco
packaging in Australia and Canada. Part A discusses the law currently
in effect in Australia and the impact of plain packaging on Australian
tobacco consumers. Part A. I discusses the Australian Constitution and
intellectual property rights in relation to trade with other countries. Part
A.2 explains the recent ruling by Australia's Highest Court. In Part B,
these same topics are explored in Canada's Tobacco Products Labelling
Regulations. Part B.1 then discusses the Canadian Constitution and free
speech. Finally in Part B.2, the impending litigation in the Ontario
Superior Court and a ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada
(Att'y Gen.) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp., is discussed.
A. Australia
In 2011, Australia passed the first law of its kind requiring tobacco
companies to manufacture their products using plain packaging. This
took their law a step beyond any other country by requiring more than
just graphic health warnings to be printed on tobacco packaging. 47 The
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 ("TPP Act") requires that all
retailers make the switch from the old packages to the new plain
packages by December 1, 2012. 48 The TPP Act will "restrict tobacco
industry logos, brand imagery, colours and promotional text appearing
45.
46.
47.
48.

Harv. Sch. of Pub. Health, supra note 41.
Id.
Thurlow, supra note 18.
Roxon & Plibersek, supra note 22.
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on packs. Brand names will be standard colour, position and standard
font size and style. 49
Further, each package must have a pictorial warning covering 75%
of the front of the package and 90% of the back of the package. 50 This
is an increase in size from previous legislation, which went into effect in
2006, that required 30% of the front and 90% of the back of cigarette
cartons to have graphic health warnings. 51 According to the Minister of
Health, "[nJo longer when a smoker pulls out a packet of cigarettes will
that packet be a mobile billboard." 52
These new packages have statements such as "don't let children
breathe your smoke" and "smoking causes blindness." 53 Further, the
packages have graphic warnings displaying visually disturbing sights
such as diseased lungs, smoker's eye problems, and cancer of the
mouth. 54 Parliament enacted the TPP Act to achieve two objectives:
(1) improve public health, and (2) regulate tobacco packaging in order
to reduce appeal, increase effectiveness of the packaging, and increase
awareness of the health consequences associated with using tobacco
products. 55 In effect, the second objective is merely a means to achieve
the first objective.
1. Australian Constitution and Intellectual Property Rights

All Australians have the right to freedom of speech, association,
assembly, religion, and movement. 56 Further, "Australians are free,
within the bounds of the law, to say or write what [they] think privately
or publicly, about the government, or about any topic." 57 However, the
issues concerning recent tobacco litigation involve section 51,
49. Id.
50. Thurlow, supra note 18.
51. Health Warnings, supra note 19.
52. Roxon & Plibersek, supra note 22.
53. Rod McGuirk, Australian court OKs logo ban on cigarette packs, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.nbcnews.com/health/australian-court-oks-logoban-cigarette-packs-IB5384435 (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
54. Jonathan Pearlman, Tobacco companies to challenge Australian plain packaging
TEL.
MEDIA
GROUP
(Apr.
17,
2012),
available
at
legislation,
http://www.telegraph.eo.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/9208436/Toba
cco-companies-to-challenge-Australia-plain-packaging-legislation.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2013).
55. Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) No. 148 ch. 3 (Austl.), available at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011A00148 (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
Five fundamental freedoms, AUSTL. Gov'T (2013), available at
56.
http://www. immi. gov .au/living-in-australia/choose-australia/about-austral ia/fivefreedoms.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2013).
57. Id.
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intellectual property rights, and the rights of corporations. Section 51
sets out Parliament's power to make laws affecting peace, order, and
good government for the Commonwealth, thus granting parliament
general welfare powers. 58 Specifically pertinent to tobacco litigation in
Australia is section 51(xxxi). 59 According to section 5l(xxxi), the
Parliament has the power to make laws through "[t]he acquisition of
property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in
respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws." 60 The term
"property" takes on a broad definition and tends to extend to property
rights created by statute. 61 Further, the Court in Bank of NSW v. The
Commonwealth, took the word "property" to extend to "inanimate and
anomalous interests .. .include[ing] the assumption and indefinite
continuance of exclusive possession and control." 2
According to the High Court, in order to put into play section
51 (xxxi), "it is not enough that legislation adversely affects or
terminates a pre-existing right that an owner enjoys in relation to his
property; there must be an acquisition whereby the Commonwealth or
another acquires an interest in property, however slight or insubstantial
it may be."63 However, under section 5l(xxxi), the emphasis placed on
the acquisition of property was for the benefit of the Commonwealth
and not merely the "taking" of private property. 64 Thus, the difference
between merely taking versus acquiring is extremely important in
determining if section 5 l(xxxi) has been violated. In order to acquire
property, one must also acquire the proprietary rights to the property. 65
The property must be "dedicated or devoted to uses" in that it is used
for the purpose of the Commonwealth. 66 Further, "there must be an
obtaining of at least some identifiable benefit or advantage relating to
the ownership or use ofproperty."67
Along with questions of infringement on the Australian
Constitution through section 5 l(xxxi), tobacco companies also argued
that the TPP Act restricts trademarks in a very harsh manner by
requiring tobacco companies to display their company names in a
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51 .
JT Int '! SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.).
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51(xxxi).
JT Int '! SA [2012] HCA 129.
BankofNSWv. Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 349 (Austl.).
JT Int'! SA [2012] HCA 1118.
Id.
Id. 1 144.
Id.
Id.1198.
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particular way on their tobacco product packaging. 68 However,
intellectual property law and trademark law in Australia are intended to
advance public policy concerns as well as protect private interests of
rights-holders. 69 Thus, a balancing act must take place between public
policy and rights holders to determine which interest is more
compelling.

2. Highest Court Ruling
On August 15, 2012, the High Court of Australia, in a six-to-one
majority, upheld the
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011, thus rejecting big tobacco's
challenge on plain packaging. 70 In arguing their case, the tobacco
companies maintained that the Court should adopt a liberal construction
of the meaning of "acquisition" in the text of section 51 (xxxi). 71
However, the Court stated "[a] liberal construction cannot and does not
go as far as the tobacco companies asserted, which would treat any
benefit or advantage as a sufficient definition of the constitutional
reference to 'property. "' 72 Relying partially on precedent set forth in
The Grain Pool of Western Australia v. The Commonwealth, 73 Nintendo
Co. Ltd. v. Centronics Systems Pty Ltd.,74 and Phonographic
Performance Co. of Australia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth, 75 the Court
ruled that eliminating advertising through plain packaging does not
amount to an acquisition of property. 76 Justice Hayne and Justice Bell
went on to further state that "[l]egislation that requires warning labels to
be placed on products, even warning labels as extensive as those
required by the Plain Packaging Act, effect no acquisition of
property."77
·
68. Brian Hendy & Steve Krouzecky, Plain packaging tobacco products: is there a
trademark issue? INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Nov. 23, 2011), available at http://www.iammagazine.com/reports/Detail.aspx?g=33e041ff-901 b-41 c3-a991-db4ed821 cda6 (last visited
Jan. 20, 2012).
69. JT Int'! SA [2012] HCA 130.
70. Roxon & Plibersek, supra note 22.
71. JT Int'! SA [2012] HCA 1170.
72. Id.
73. The Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth, [2000] HCA 14 (Austl.).
74. Nintendo Co. Ltd. v Centronics Systems Pty Ltd. [1994] HCA 27 (Austl.).
75. Phonographic Performance Co. ofAustralia Ltd. v Commonwealth, [2012] HCA 8
(Austl.).
76. Matthew Rimmer, The High Court and the Marlboro Man: the plain packaging
decision, CONVERSATION (Oct. 18, 2012), available at http://theconversation.edu.au/thehigh-court-and-the-marlboro-man-the-plain-packaging-decision-l 0014 (last visited Jan. 20,
2012).
77. Id. (citing JT Int'! SA [2012] HCA 42). However, Justice Reydon, in his dissent,
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Interestingly, the Court noted that the object of the TPP Act is to
improve public health by discouraging people from using tobacco
products, but whether this object could be met by these means was not,
and could not, be presently known. 78 However, the Court did go on to
say the tobacco companies did not make any effort to argue, "that the
measures were not appropriate to achieve the statutory objectives or
disproportionate to them, or that the legislation was enacted for
purposes other than those relating to public health." 79 Further, the Court
stated that this was a "rare form of regulation," because it made
companies advertise that their product should not be used. 80 It will be
interesting to see if the tobacco companies bring suit addressing these
issues. The issues noted by the Court that were not addressed seem to
be more in line with the idea of freedom of expression recognized in the
United States Constitution and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms because they employ more of a balancing test to determine
whether a regulation is constitutional. These protections afforded by the
Canadian Charter of Rights and the United States Constitution will be
discussed in detail below. 81
B. Canada

Canada has taken many steps to try to reduce tobacco
consumption. 82 In the 1980' s "[p ]er capita cigarette consumption [in
Canada] was among the highest in the world, with over 40% of fifteen
to nineteen-year olds reported to be daily smokers." 83 In an attempt to
reduce tobacco consumption, Canada has, according to Sweanor,
"checked all the boxes. " 84 Meaning that after having imposed high
taxes on cigarette sales, it has essentially eliminated all advertising and
promotion of cigarettes. 85 Additionally, it has reduced the number of
retail displays, it has implemented laws that require graphic health
warnings, and it has required that additional health information come in
argued that the government was encroaching on the acquisition of the property clause. JT
Int'/ SA [2012] HCA § 170.
78. JT Int'/ SA [2012] HCA, 371.
79. Id. 372.
80. Id.
81. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom is discussed in full in section
III.B. l ., infra pp. 16-19; The United States Constitution and free expression is discussed in
full in section IV.B., infra pp. 24-25.
82. David Sweanor, A Canadian 's Perspective: Limits of Tobacco Regulation, 34 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1595, 1596 (2008).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1598.
85. Id. at 1596.
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every package of tobacco. 86 By implementing all of these regulations,
Canada was able to reduce its per capita consumption for fifteen to
nineteen-year olds in 2006. 87 While this has no doubt been a victory for
tobacco control efforts, Canada has not recently seen any major
reductions in consumption. 88
In 1995, the Federal government of Canada considered and
rejected a proposal implementing plain packaging. 89 However, Canada
was the first country to require tobacco companies to manufacture
tobacco packaging with graphic health warnings. 90 In 2000, Canada
adopted the Tobacco Products Information Regulations ("TPIR") under
the Tobacco Act, which required "graphic health warnings" on tobacco
packaging and "mandated the inclusion of health messages" in the
tobacco packaging. 91
Fast-forward eleven years and the TPIR has been replaced by the
Tobacco Products Labelling Regulations (Cigarettes and Little Cigars)
("TPLR-CLC"). 92 According to Health Canada, the TPLR-CLC is "an
important component of the Federal Tobacco Control Strategy, which
aims to reduce the smoking rates in Canada. " 93 The TPLR-CLC sets
fourth four major differences from the TPIR by requiring that: ( 1)
graphic health warnings cover 75% of the front and back of cigarette
and little cigar packages; (2) new graphic health warning messages and
new health information messages, (3) a pan-Canadian toll-free quit line
and web address be displayed; and (4) easy-to-understand toxic
emission standards be displayed. 94 Further, both the health warning
messages and the health information messages are enhanced with
colors. 95
Currently, Canada requires that 75% of the front and back of the
86. Id.
87. Sweanor, supra note 82, at 1598.
88. Id. at 1596; Tilson, supra note 15.
89. Kelly-Gagnon & Chassin, supra note 23.
90. Press Release, Physicians for a Smoke-Free Can., Australian court ruling shows
that governments should stand up to tobacco industry bullying, (Aug. 15, 2012), available at
http://www.smoke-free.ca/eng_home/2012/news_press_ l 5_ Aug_2012.htm (last visited Jan.
20, 2012).
91. Tobacco Products Information Regulations, HEALTH CAN. (Nov. 30, 2011),
available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hc-ps/tobac-tabac/legislation/reg/prod/index-eng. php
(last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
92. Id.
93. Tobacco Products Labelling Regulations (Cigarettes and Little Cigars), HEALTH
CAN.
(May
7,
2012),
available
at
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hc-ps/tobactabac/legislation/reg/label-etiquette/index-eng.php (last visited Jan. 22, 2014 ).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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packaging contain a graphic pictorial health warning. 96 This is an
increase from 2010, when graphic health warnings only covered 50% of
the front and back of the packaging. 97 According to Cynthia Callard of
Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada, the government is not doing
enough and has fallen behind in researching. 98 While the Canadian
government has hoped to reduce litigation by not implementing plain
packaging, tobacco companies have challenged the increased
regulations imposed by the TPLR-CLC. 99 Tobacco companies argue
that the regulation violates their constitutional right to freedom of
expression, which is guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. 100
1.

Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms and Freedom of
Expression

"Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: . . . (b)
freedom of thought, belief,
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other
means of communication." 101 In Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, the Supreme
Court of Canada ruled that freedom of expression extended to
commercial expression by corporations. 102 Thus, the term "everyone,"
referenced in 2(b) of the Charter, includes corporations. 103 The Court
justified extending freedom of expression to corporations because it
would allow the consumer to obtain necessary information so the
104
consumer could make a decision about what products to purchase.

96. Kelly-Gagnon & Chassin, supra note 23.
97. Id.
98. See Physicians for a Smoke-Free Can., supra note 90.
99. Id.
100. See Leah McDaniel, Tobacco Advertising Rules Go Back to Court. . .Again,
at
available
2012),
24,
(May
STUD.
CONST.
FOR
CENTRE
http ://ualawccsprod. srv. ualberta. ca/ccs/index. php/constitutional-issues/25-other/68-tobaccoadvertising-rules-go-back-to-court-again (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
101. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 2(b), Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.).
102. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Att'y Gen.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (Can. Que.). The
Supreme Court of Canada further upheld the idea that freedom of expression extends to
corporate speech in 2007 in JTI-Macdonald. Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp.,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 (Can.).
103. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 101.
104. See Ford v. Quebec (Att'y Gen.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 766-67 (Can. Que.).
Specifically, the court in Ford ruled that commercial expression enjoys protection from the
Charter because it "plays a significant role in enabling individuals to make informed
economic choices, an important aspect of individual self-fulfillment and personal
autonomy." Id. at 766.
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Further, the government can only strip someone's (person or
corporation) freedom of expression by providing a "demonstrably
justified" reason supported by some evidence for stripping that
freedom. 105 Specifically, Section 1 of the Charter states "The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." 06
The courts interpretation of Section 1 of the Charter puts in place a
proportionality analysis to determine if the government's interest in
restricting freedom of expression is justified. In order to determine if
the government has satisfied its burden, the Court in R. v. Oakes created
a proportionality test. 107 The three-part test of proportionality states:
There are, in my view, three important components of a
proportionality test. First, the measures adopted must be carefully
designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be
arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they
must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even
if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair
"as little as possible" the right or freedom in question . . . Third, there
must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are
responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective
which has been identified as of "sufficient importance". 108
Therefore, if the government wants to limit someone's freedom of
expression it must be "demonstrably justified." 109 The "demonstrably
justified" test set out in Oakes can be translated into a four-part test.
First, the government must have an interest of "sufficient
importance." 110 Second, its means must be rationally connected. 111
Third, its means must impair as little as possible. 112 Lastly, the effects
of the limitation must be proportional to the objective. 113 The Court in
Oakes went on to state that the government's objective must be

105. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 101; see also JTIMacdonald Corp., 2 S.C.R. at 664.
106. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freed oms, supra note 101.
107. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 139 (Can.).
108. Id.
109. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 1, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.); see Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 139.
110. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 139.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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"pressing and substantial." 114 If an act by the government does not
satisfy all four elements then it is seen as unjustifiably infringing on
section 2(b) of the Charter and cannot be upheld. 115
2. The Supreme Court of Canada and the Ontario Superior Court
Imperial Tobacco Ltd. and JTI-Macdonald Corp. represent the
most recent challenges to
the increase in size of graphic health warnings from 50% to 75%
under the TPLR-CLC filed in the Ontario Superior Court. 116 It is
unclear how the Ontario Superior Court will handle this new challenge.
However, in 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney
General) v. ]Tl-Macdonald Corp. found the portion of the Tobacco Act
that increased graphic health warnings from 33% to 50%,
constitutional. 117 While the court did find that the graphic health
warnings were an infringement on free expression, it stated that the
restriction did not violate section 1 of the Charter because it was
pressing and substantial, and "demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." 118
In making its decision, the Court in JTI-Macdonald Corp. set out
three reasons why the regulation was justified. 119 First, the Court stated
that the graphic health warnings were an effective way to notify the
public of the health dangers associated with smoking and that this
conclusion was supported by a "mass of evidence." 120 This justification
satisfies the second element set out in Oakes. 121 The Court further saw
the tobacco companies' resistance to the increase in the size of the
graphic health warning as evidence that the warnings have an effect on
consumers and is a threat to tobacco companies. 122 Second, the Court
found that the increase in warning size was justified and reasonable
because evidence demonstrated that larger warnings might have greater
effects on consumption, and other countries that already required larger

114. Id. at 138-39.
115. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 101; Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at
103.
116. McDaniel, supra note 100.
117. Id.
118. JTI-Macdonald, 2 S.C.R at 628. The Court went on to describe how to determine
if a government objective is "demonstratively justifiable" by referencing a three part
proportionality test set out in Oakes. Id. at 628-29.
119. McDaniel, supra note 100.
120. JTI-Macdonald, 2 S.C.R. 1135.
121. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 139.
122. JTI-Macdonald, 2 S.C.R 1136.
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warnings than Canada supported this requirement. 123 This justification,
it can be argued, satisfies the third element set out in Oakes because
other countries have implemented more stringent regulations, therefore,
the TPLR-CLC is not more extensive than necessary because it is not as
extensive as other similar regulations in other countries.
Lastly, the Court found that the regulation was proportional in that
"[t]he benefits flowing from the larger warnings are clear. The
detriments to the manufactures' expressive interest in creative
packaging are small." 124 This justification satisfies the last element set
out in Oakes because it addresses the proportionality of the regulation in
relation to its objective, deeming that based on the competing interests
of public health and the interests of the tobacco companies, public
health has a greater importance and deserves more protection than the
tobacco companies. While the Court did not address whether the
objective set out by the TPLR-CLC was "demonstrably justified" or of
"sufficient importance" directly, it was not necessary because the
Supreme Court of Canada had already ruled that previous graphic health
warnings were constitutional. 125 Therefore, the Supreme Court already
determined that reducing tobacco consumption among adults and teens
was "demonstrably justified" and of "sufficient importance."
IV. TOBACCO PACKAGING IN THE UNITED STATES
This section provides a general overview of the status of tobacco
packaging in the United
States. Part A discusses the FSPTCA that was passed in 2009 to
regulate tobacco packaging. Next, Part B discusses the commercial
speech test set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission and then begins the discussion of the current split
between the Sixth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit on the constitutionality
of the FSPTCA.Part B.1 explains the ruling in Discount Tobacco in
regards to the FSPTCA., while Part B.2, explains the ruling in R.J.
Reynolds in regards to the FSPTCA.

123. Id. ,i,i 137-38.
124. Id. ,i 139.
125. McDaniel, supra note 100.
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A. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
On June 22, 2009, President Obama signed the FSPTCA. 126
According to the FDA the act "gives the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) the authority to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and
marketing of tobacco products to protect the public health." 127 Further,
it requires tobacco companies to print bigger, more prominent warning
labels on cigarette and smokeless tobacco packaging. 128 The goal of the
FSPTCA is to "curb the trend of new users becoming addicted before
they are old enough to understand the risks and ultimately dying too
young of tobacco-related diseases." 129
To further the goal of the FSPTCA, the FDA has required tobacco
companies to revise their warning labels with larger font sizes and limit
the "color and design of packaging and advertisements, including audiovisual advertisements." 1 0 It has also required that tobacco companies
limit their font colors to white on black background or black on white
background while also prohibiting the use of terms such as "light,"
"low," or "mild." 131 Further, with the implementation of the FSPTCA,
tobacco companies are required to place graphic health warnings on the
top 50% of the front and the back of their cigarette packaging. 132 The
FDA has created nine graphic warning messages, which "must be
accompanied by color graphics showing the negative health
consequences of smoking cigarettes." 133 Further, these nine graphic
health warnings must be "equally and randomly displayed and
distributed in all areas of the United States." 134 Smokeless tobacco
product packaging has similar requirements as cigarette packaging. 135
The graphic warning label must cover 30% of both principle display
panels, "and the four specific required messages must be equally and

126. Stephanie Jordan Bennett, Paternalistic Manipulation Through Pictorial
Warnings: The First Amendment, Commercial Speech, and the Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act, 81 MISS. L.J. 1909, 1910 (2012).
127. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OVERVIEW OF THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION
AND
TOBACCO
CONTROL
ACT:
CONSUMER
FACT
SHEET,
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/ucm246129
.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) [hereinafter "FSPTCA fact sheet"].
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. FSPTCA fact sheet, supra note 127.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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randomly displayed and distributed in all areas of the United States." 136
Currently, the status of the FSPTCA is unknown. 137 Certain
provisions of the FSPTCA are being litigated to determine their
constitutionality. 138 The rulings in Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds
are currently under appeal and, until they are resolved, the future of the
FSPTCA is unknown. 39 These cases effectively created a circuit split
on the issue of the constitutionality of the FSPTCA because different
standards of review were applied. With such a prominent split in
decisions between circuits, it is likely this issue will not be resolved
until it reaches the United States Supreme Court.
B. The Central Hudson Test and the Circuit Split
On August 24, 2012, the D.C. Circuit court in R.J. Reynolds
handed down a decision that created a split between the D.C. Circuit
and the Sixth Circuit on the constitutionality of whether the FDA could
require tobacco companies to print graphic health warnings on their
products. 140 The court in R.J. Reynolds ruled that the government could
not require tobacco companies to "go beyond making purely factual and
accurate commercial disclosure[ s] and undermine its own economic
interest - in this case by making 'every single pack of cigarettes in the
country [a] mini billboard' for the government's anti-smoking message"
- because it would violate the First Amendment. 141 In contrast, the
court in Discount Tobacco found that the FSPTCA was permissible
under the First Amendment. 142
Both cases analyzed the constitutionality of regulating commercial
speech through provisions of the FSPTCA using the test set out in
Central Hudson. 43 Under Central Hudson, the Court determined that if

136. Id.
137. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Litigation Update,
available at http ://publichealthlawcenter. org/sites/default/files/tclc-fs-tobaccocontro lactlitigation-update-4-2013 _ 0.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2014)
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Nicholas J. Wagoner, D.C. Circuit Creates Circuit Split Over Graphic Cigarette
Warning
Labels,
CIRCUIT
SPLITS
(Aug.
27,
2012),
available
at
http://www.circuitsplits.com/2012/08/dc-circuit-creates-circuit-split-over-graphic-cigarrettewarning-labels.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
141. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1212 (D.C.
Cir. 2012). The D.C. Circuit, unlike the Sixth Circuit, found the requirements of the federal
law to go beyond ordinary disclosure requirements and, therefore, different standards of
review were applied. Id.
142. Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 551.
143. Id.; R.J. Reynolds 696 F.3d at 1212.
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commercial speech is to be protected under the First Amendment, the
speech must first involve or concern a legal transaction. 144 If the speech
meets that threshold, and is also not misleading or untruthful, then it is
afforded protection under the First Amendment and the government
must prove that: (1) the regulation serves a substantial interest, (2) the
regulation's means directly advance that interest, and (3) the
regulation's means are not more extensive than necessary. 145 If the
government proves those three elements, then the regulation will likely
be found constitutional. However, if a regulation deals with purely
factual disclosures of product information, then the commercial speech
is not afforded the same heightened protection under Central Hudson,
and instead it is afforded rational-basis review. 146 At issue between the
circuits was the difference in the standard of review applied to graphic
health warnings under the FSPTCA. 147
However, both circuits
addressed whether graphic health warnings directly advance the
government interest and whether they are not more extensive than
necessary, which are both key components to the Central Hudson
test. 148

C. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc.
On March 19, 2012, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in
Discount Tobacco upholding almost all aspects of the FSPTCA. 149 The
Court concluded that tobacco marketing is a major cause of youth
smoking. 150 It stated that "[the tobacco companies] would have us
believe that there is no causal connection between product advertising
and the consumer behavior of children, [but] such a claim stretches the
bounds of credibility, even in the absence of the extensive record
submitted by the government, which indicates the contrary." 151 Further,
the Court stated that the massive amount of money spent on tobacco

144. Brian E. Mason, Tobacco Manufacturers and the United States Government:
Ready for Battle, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. Rev. 555, 564 (2012).
145. Id.
146. Id.; Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 558.
147. Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 551; R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212. A
discussion on the standard of review will be discussed for each case in full in sections
IV.B.l. & IV.B.2., infra pp. 26-31.
148. Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 551; R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1233.
149. Tobacco Product Sales Regulation, NEW ENG. L. Bos. (Feb. 12, 2013), available
at
http ://tobaccopolicycenter.org/tobacco-contro1/recent-cases/tobacco-product-salesregulation (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
150. Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 541.
151. Id. at 539-40.
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advertising (approximately $13 billion in 2005) 152 was largely for "( 1)
attracting new young adult and juvenile smokers, and (2) brand
competition in the young adult and juvenile market." 153 The Court,
relying on and giving substantial deference to Congress's findings,
reasoned through empirical data that it was unlikely tobacco companies
spent $13 billion on advertising to get adults to switch brands when in
reality tobacco users were extremely brand loyal and unlikely to switch
products. 154
In reaching its decision, the Court discussed different aspects of the
FSPTCA. 155 Most notably it discussed graphic health warnings,
Modified Risk Tobacco Product (MRTP) Regulation, and the ban on the
use of color and graphics. 156
First, the Court, in a two-to-one decision, upheld the requirement
that tobacco companies print graphic health warnings on the top 50% of
cigarette packages and 20% of all tobacco advertising. 157 To come to
this part of its conclusion, the Court did not apply the Central Hudson
test because it reasoned that the tobacco companies engaged in
providing misleading information to its consumers. 158 The Court stated
that the tobacco companies "knowingly and actively conspired to
deceive the public about health risks and addictiveness of smoking for
decades." 159 Further, the Court relied on evidence gathered by Congress
(through international experience) 160 to conclude, "larger warnings
[including graphic health warnings] materially affect consumers'
awareness of the health consequences of smoking and decisions
regarding tobacco use." 161
Second, the Court found that the MRTP did not unconstitutionally
restrain commercial speech because it met the requirements set out in
Central Hudson. 162 The Court reasoned that the government could
prevent tobacco companies from placing words such as "light," "mild,"
"low," or similar identifiers on its packaging because it had a substantial
152. Id. at 540.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 521, 540.
155. Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 520-21.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 518.
158. Id. at 527.
159. Id. at 562.
160. Mason, supra note 144, at 584 (stating that Congress heavily relied on the
international consensus found in the World Health Organization Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control in drafting the Tobacco Control Act).
161. Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 530.
162. Id. at 537.
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interest in protecting consumers from misunderstanding these terms by
interpreting them as less harmful. 163 To determine that the government
had established a substantial interest, the Court relied on Congressional
evidence establishing a pattern of deceptive advertising and the
likelihood of future deception. 164 Lastly, the Court found that the
government had satisfied the elements under the Central Hudson test,
requiring the regulation's means to directly advance the interest and not
be more extensive than necessary because "[t]here [was] no indication
that the provision suppresses non-commercial speech relating to
nonspecific tobacco products." 165 The Court went on to further state
that while there may be less restrictive means to deal with the harm
associated with the MRTPR, the MRTPR was not more extensive than
necessary. 166 The Court stated that "the government is at play in the
major leagues, and the alternatives suggested by [the tobacco
companies] have already been tried and found wanting." 167
Third, the Court ruled that the ban on the use of color and graphics
was too broad because it would apply in situations where the tobacco
packaging would have no appeal to youth. 168 The Court stated that the
government could prove that it had a "substantial interest in alleviating
the effects of tobacco advertising on juvenile consumers." 169 However,
it was not able to prove the second prong of the Central Hudson test
because the restriction was too broad. 170 The Court did suggest that a
more narrowly tailored provision would pass constitutional muster
under Central Hudson. 171
D. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
In August 2012, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the FSPTCA's
requirement that tobacco companies place graphic health warnings on
their packaging was unconstitutional. 172 In making its decision, the
Court applied the Central Hudson test, arguing that this case involved
compelled commercial speech. 173 The Court made this decision based

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 534.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 536.
Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 537.
Id.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id.
Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 548.
R.J Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219.
Id. at 1217-18.
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on the previous ruling in United States v. Philip Morris, where
compelled commercial speech was entitled to intermediate scrutiny. 174
Specifically the Court in Philip Morris stated that "the Supreme Court's
bottom line is clear: the government must affirmatively demonstrate its
means are narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial government
goal." 175
Under the first prong of the Central Hudson test, the Court states
that the FDA intended the graphic health warnings "engage current
smokers to quit and dissuade other consumers from ever buying
cigarettes." 176 The Court further stated that the only interest the graphic
health warnings purports to have is the "substantial interest in reducing
the number of Americans, particularly children and adolescents, who
use cigarettes and other tobacco products." 177 The Court did not address
whether this interest is a "substantial government interest," but rather,
assumed that the FDA's interest was substantial. 178 Therefore, the
Court moved directly into determining if the FDA offered substantial
evidence, meaning more than mere conjecture or speculation,
demonstrating that the graphic warnings directly advanced the
government's interest. 179
Under the second prong of the Central Hudson test, the Court ruled
that the FDA must provide evidence that the graphic health warnings
would reduce smoking rates, rather than just educate consumers. 180
Stating that the "FDA has not provided a shred of evidence - much less
the 'substantial evidence' required by the AP A - showing that the
graphic health warnings will 'directly advance' its interest in reducing
the number of Americans who smoke." 181 Further, the Court was
unwilling to use evidence from other countries 182 to show that the
graphic health warnings would reduce smoking rates because the
evidence could not demonstrate that the graphic warnings themselves
directly caused the reduction in tobacco use. 183 Other tobacco control
174. Id.
175. United States v. Phillip Morris, 566 F.3d 1095, 1142-43 (D.C. Cir. 2009); R.J.
Reynolds 696 F .3d at 1217.
176. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1219.
180. Id.
181. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F .3d at 1219.
182. This is contrary to Discount Tobacco where the Court was willing to accept
evidence provided by Congress that relied heavily on international consensus. Mason,
supra note 144, at 584.
183. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1218-19.
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measures had been put in place 184 at the same time making it impossible
to differentiate between the other control measures and the graphic
health warnings. 185 The Court argued that as a result, this evidence
merely provided speculation and conjecture. 186
Further, the Court stated that studies in Canada and Australia do no
more than provide "mere speculation to suggest that respondents who
report increased thoughts about quitting smoking will actually follow
through on their intentions." 187 Moreover, the Court cites other
Australian and Canadian studies that suggest the large graphic health
warnings might convince smokers to reduce their tobacco
consumption. 188 The Court is quick to note that these studies did not
show that the graphic health warnings actually reduced consumption,
and therefore, they were not substantial enough to show that the graphic
health warnings would directly advance the FDA's interest. 189
However, by referencing other nations the Court opened the door to
possible jurisprudence and recognition of foreign nations policy
measures.
In conclusion, the Court stated that the government's attempt to
"level the playing field" in this way was not appropriate. 190 The Court
cited the recent Supreme Court case, Sorrell v. IMS Health, which
stated that even regulations backed by persuasive evidence are subject
to scrutiny before they can be permitted. 191 Therefore, the government
must show a substantial interest in which the regulation directly
advances in order for the regulation to pass constitutional muster. 192 In
this case the government failed to present sufficient evidence that the
regulation would directly advance the government interest, and as a
result, the regulation did not pass constitutional muster under the
Central Hudson test. 193

184. When Canada implemented graphic health warnings it also mandated the
inclusion of health messages within the tobacco packaging. Tobacco Products Information
Regulations, supra note 91.
185. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221.
191. Id. at 1222 (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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V. IS THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION TOBACCO
CONTROL ACT CONSTITUTIONAL?
This section discusses why the Supreme Court of the United States
("Supreme Court") should determine that the FSPTCA does not violate
commercial speech protected by the First Amendment. 194 First, this
section discusses whether the FSPTCA is constitutional by addressing
the provision that implements graphic health warnings. Part A will
discuss the policy measures set forth in Australia and how they can be
applied to help establish the constitutionality of the FSPTCA. Part B
will discuss the court rulings and policy measures in Canada and how
they affect the constitutionality determination. Lastly, Part C will
discuss graphic health warnings under the FSPTCA and why the
Supreme Court should look to policy measures in Canada and Australia.
Further it will discuss why deference should be given to Canadian
courts to find the FSPTCA constitutional under the Central Hudson test.

A. Australia and Canada's Part in Determining the
Constitutionality of the FSPTCA
While the FSPTCA does more than implement graphic health
warnings, the split between the D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit,
shows that the provision addressing graphic health warnings is the most
controversial. Both Australia and Canada now require graphic health
warnings on all tobacco packaging. 195 While it is hard to determine
whether the efforts in Australia have been effective, it is hard to deny
that Canadian tobacco regulation helped reduce the amount of youth
smokers within the last fifteen years. 196
1. Australia's Plain Packaging Guides the Way for the FSPTCA
Australia has gone further than the FSPTCA in terms of regulating
tobacco marketing. Australia has implemented plain packaging and
graphic health warnings while the FSPTCA requires tobacco companies
to print large graphic health warnings on its tobacco packaging. 197
While the Australian plain packaging provisions require graphic health
warnings and strip tobacco-packaging products of any logos, trade

194. The Supreme Court usually addresses issues on which circuits are split once three
circuits have addressed the issue, however, because this is a conflict over the
constitutionality of an administrative regulation it may be heard sooner. Wagoner, supra
note 140.
195. Roxon & Plibersek, supra note 22; Kelly-Gagnon & Chassin, supra note 23 .
196. Sweanor, supra note 82, at 1597.
197. Roxon & Plibersek, supra note 22; FSPTCA fact sheet, supra note 127.
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198
colors, descriptive words, or specialized font size and style, it can be,
and will likely be, a way of measuring graphic health warnings affect on
tobacco consumption, especially on youth. It is unlikely the U.S. will
ever go as far as Australia and implement plain packaging because the
U.S. Constitution protects freedom of speech more stringently than the
Australian Constitution. 199 This largely has to do with the difference in
limited, as opposed to, required speech. If the government compels
restrictions on commercial speech, then heightened scrutiny is
However, if speech is limited to simple factual
necessary. 200
disclosures, heightened scrutiny is not necessary and rather, rationalbasis review is required. 201
The High Court in Australia admitted that it was not certain
202
whether plain packaging would advance the goals of the TPP Act.
Further, Australian Attorney-General, Nicola Roxon, stated that she
believed plain packaging would reduce tobacco consumption, but also
noted that because Australia was the first country to try this approach
other countries would have to watch to determine if this was the route
they wish to take. 203 It is just too soon to know whether plain packaging
will have the desired effects the government hopes it will have. This
uncertainty, especially among youth tobacco consumers, is precisely the
problem the Court in R.J. Reynolds had with implementing graphic
health warnings.
Presently, it is unclear whether implementing plain packaging and
graphic health warnings will advance the Australian government's
interest in reducing tobacco consumption. While this is currently
problematic, once the TPP Act has been in place for a few years, the
problem will diminish because reliable, statistical evidence will be
available. Further, it should be noted that tobacco companies strongly
oppose plain packaging and graphic health warnings, which does
suggest that these restrictions may have a positive effect on reducing
tobacco consumption. It also suggests that these efforts would directly
Fortunately for the tobacco
advance the government's interest.
companies, the FSPTCA is not trying to implement plain packaging.
Rather, the FSPTCA wants to implement graphic health warnings, a less
restrictive approach, and something that has been done in Canada for

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Tilson, supra note 15.
Fivefundamentalfreedoms, supra note 56; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212.
Discount Tobacco , 674 F.3d at 558.
JT Int 'I SA [2012] HCA 1 170.
McGuirk, supra note 3.
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over ten years.
2. Canada's Graphic Health Warnings Set a Precedent for the
FSPTCA

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is very similar to
the U.S. Constitution, especially with regards to the protection of
speech. 204 Further, Canadian courts implement a proportionality test
similar to the Central Hudson test found in the U.S. to determine if the
government's interest in restricting freedom of expression is justified. 205
Taking that into consideration, Canada has required tobacco companies
to print graphic health warnings on their packaging for over ten years. 206
Currently, Canada's graphic health warnings cover 75% of the front and
back of cigarette packaging. 207 While Canada did implement other
means of reducing tobacco consumption when it implemented graphic
health warnings, 208 it would be wrong to say that graphic health
warnings had no effect on the reduction of tobacco consumption. While
the effect that each portion of the TPLR-CLC had on tobacco
consumption may not be certain, it is safe to say that the graphic health
warnings had some positive effect on reducing tobacco consumption.
Further, the Supreme Court of Canada found TPLR-CLC was
justified. 209
The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Oakes proportionality
test when determining whether the TPLR-CLC violated the freedom of
expression provisions contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. 210 The Oakes test requires that the regulation be designed to
achieve the state objective, "impair as little as possible," and that the
means be proportional to the state objective. 211 The Court found that
the TPLR-CLC was "demonstrably justified" and that the objective was
"pressing and substantial."212 Further, the Court stated that there was a
"mass of evidence" to support this conclusion. 213 Canada looked to
204. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 101.
205. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 139.
206. Sweanor, supra note 82, at 1596.
207. Tobacco Products Information Regulations, supra note 91.
208. When Canada implemented graphic health warnings it also also mandated the
inclusion of health messages within the tobacco packaging. Id.
209. McDaniel, supra note 100.
210. Oakes, I S.C.R. at 139.
211. Id.
212. JTI-Macdonald, 2 S.C.R 610. The Court went on to describe how to determine if
a government objective is "demonstratively justifiable" by referencing a three part
proportionality test set out in Oakes. Id.
213. JTI-Macdonald, 2 S.C.R. 601, para. 135.
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other countries to determine whether the graphic health warnings were
effective. 214 The Court did not know how much effect larger warnings
would have on tobacco consumption but found that this notion was
supported through other countries implementing larger graphic health
warnings than they required. 215
Lastly, the Court determined that the detriments of implementing
larger graphic health warnings were minor in comparison to the benefits
the public would receive. Thus, the larger graphic health warnings were
justified. 216 One of the key points from looking at the Canadian law is
that the proportionality test set out in Oakes is very similar to the
proportionality test contained in Central Hudson. This is important
because this directly advances the idea that the Supreme Court should
consider the jurisprudence of the Canadian court decision. The other
important key point is that the policy measures set out in Canada have
been effective and the Supreme Court should take this into
consideration when addressing the proof of direct advancement.

B. FSPTCA 's Graphic Health Warnings are Constitutional
If the Supreme Court is to hear issues regarding the
constitutionality of graphic health warnings it should consider foreign
legal attempts to affect change and it should be influenced by and
recognize jurisprudence from other countries. The issue that appears in
the circuit split addresses the current law regarding corporate speech. 217
The legitimacy of the FSPTCA depends on whether it is an imposition
on the freedom of expression of corporations similar to that observed in
Canada. A key difference in the circuit split is the difference in the
standard of review. 218 The Sixth Circuit found graphic health warnings
were factual disclosures that were not entitled to the heightened scrutiny
set out in Central Hudson, 219 while the D.C. circuit applied the more
stringent standard of review set out in Central Hudson for compelled
commercial speech. 220 Whether the more stringent standard is applied
to graphic health warnings should not matter because they will likely

214. Id. para. 137-38 (citing policy precedent set out in Australia, Belgium,
Switzerland, Finland, Singapore, Brazil and the European Union).
215. Id.
216. Id. 139.
217. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 527
(2012); R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1208.
218. Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 527; R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217.
219. Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 558.
220. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1234-35. The Sixth Circuit applied rational-basis
review, while the D.C. Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny. Id.
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pass constitutional muster under Central Hudson if the Supreme Court
looks to law (both policy measures and court rulings) from other
countries. 221
Under the Central Hudson test, a regulation on commercial speech
must serve a substantial interest, its means must directly advance the
interest, and its means must not be more extensive than necessary. 222
The court in R.J. Reynolds did not think there was enough evidence to
support the requirement of graphic health warnings in the FSPTCA. 223
However, in R.J. Reynolds, the Court failed to look to Canadian or
Australian law to make its decision. 224 It did, however, concede that
reference to other nations success is relevant to the determination of
whether graphic health warnings advance the interest. 225 The issues that
must be addressed to determine if the graphic health warnings under the
FSPTCA pass constitutional muster under Central Hudson are: (1)
whether the means directly advance the interest, and (2) whether the
means are not more extensive than necessary. 226
With new studies being conducted and more policies being put in
place, it is only a matter of time before enough evidence is gathered to
demonstrate that graphic health warnings reduce tobacco consumption.
Further, this issue is not yet before the Supreme Court. Health agencies
in favor of implementing graphic health warnings still have time to
collect more evidence that graphic health warnings will have the desired
effect. The Court in R.J. Reynolds was not willing to infringe on
commercial speech until it was more certain that the graphic health
warnings would have the desired effect. At this time, lack of evidence
is the only thing standing in the way of implementing graphic health
warnings. However, if deference is given to other countries' policies
and judicial decisions the lack of evidence in this country becomes less
persuasive.
The role of uncertainty in innovative policy making makes the
application of Central Hudson difficult.
How we determine the
effectiveness of innovative legislation can be a problem. Therefore,
there is a need for deference to other countries in determining whether
the means (graphic health warnings) advance the government's interest.
221. Disount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 565-66.
222. Mason, supra note 144, at 564.
223. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219.
224. Id.
225. Id. The D.C. Circuit stated that there was not an adeqate amount of evidence
directly advancing the interest, however, it did this by direct reference to empiracal data
from other countries. Id.
226. Mason, supra note 144, at 564.
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The fact that the Ontario Superior Court found TPLR-CLC was justified
speaks directly to how the Supreme Court should view the FSPTCA and
graphic health warnings. The Supreme Court generally does not give
deference to other nation's courts; however, Canada's rights on
commercial speech are so similar to the U.S. that it would be negligent
not to consider how its courts have ruled on the issue. Therefore, the
Supreme Court should look to national court jurisprudence of other
countries.
Further, the Supreme Court should look to national policy
experiences of other countries. The Courts in both Discount Tobacco
and R.J. Reynolds opened the door to this type of national policy
analysis. 227 Canada has had great success in reducing the number of
smokers through the TPLR-CLC. Further, the study just released by the
lain packaging and
BioMedical Center supports the implementation of pl
28
The BioMedical
graphic health warnings that Australia has adopted.
center stated that plain packaging and graphic health warnings would
reduce child consumption by 2% (nearly 100,000 people) and adult
consumption by 1% (nearly 500,000 people) in two years. 229 While
plain packaging does more than just implement graphic health
warnings, a reduction in tobacco consumption by 3% (nearly 9,417 ,421
people in the U.S.) is a significant number. Further, tobacco company
opposition demonstrates presumed efficacy, which the Supreme Court
in Canada found compelling. 230 There are significant differences
between Australia's plain packaging and Canada's graphic health
warnings, however, it is hard to deny that graphic health warnings will
not have some impact on tobacco consumption, especially among youth.
Lastly, implementing graphic health warnings would not be more
extensive than necessary. 231 Graphic health warnings are certainly not
the only way to reduce tobacco consumption. Economists at the MEI
point to media, peers, and family as the reason people are encouraged to
use tobacco. 232 However, if you look at regulations in Australia and
Canada they both have more heavily restricted tobacco packaging than
the FSPTCA proposes. The U.S. has one of the least restrictive
regulations on tobacco packaging. With that in mind, there is no way to
conclude that a graphic health warning covering 50% of tobacco

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 565-66; R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219.
Pechey et al., supra note 33, at 1.
Id. at 3.
JTI-Macdonald, 2 S.C.R. 610, 136.
Mason, supra note 144, at 564.
Kelly-Gagnon & Chassin, supra note 23.
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packaging is more extensive than necessary when other countries
regulations go further. This is again a place where the role of
uncertainty comes into play. Because implementation of graphic health
warnings is an innovative policy in the U.S., deference to other
countries is necessary.
Additionally, it is much easier to regulate the tobacco companies
than to regulate an individuals peers and family. We can educate
people, but what they decide to do in their personal life and how they
decide to pass that on to others is entirely different.
Another option would be to restrict the sale of tobacco products to
everyone born after a certain date. 233 While this could be an effective
measure for future discussion, it also suggests that implementing
graphic health warnings are not more extensive than necessary because
other proposals to regulate tobacco consumption are more ambitious.
Lastly, we have already extensively regulated the media; therefore,
regulating tobacco packaging by implementing graphic health warnings
is the next logical step to reducing tobacco consumption.
VI. CONCLUSION
As efforts to reduce tobacco consumption continue to grow, and
more countries implement plain packaging or graphic health warnings,
the question of whether these efforts are effective will become easier to
answer. The reasons for implementing graphic health warnings in the
U.S. are clear; there is a substantial government interest in reducing the
number of people, old and young, consuming tobacco. However, some
courts are still unclear about whether the means the government has set
forth will achieve this substantial government interest in a manner
consistent with the First Amendment. Moreover, the standard of review
is debated.
Other countries have taken greater efforts to reduce tobacco
consumption by implementing plain packaging and/or graphic health
warnings. Canada has required tobacco companies to print graphic
health warnings on their packaging for over ten years and has seen a
great reduction in tobacco consumption. Further, Australia recently
implemented plain packaging in its efforts to reduce tobacco
consumption. While it is too early to see the full effects of plain
packaging and graphic health warnings, the recent study conducted by
the BioMedical Center endorsed plain packaging and graphic health
233. Richard A. Daynard, Stubbing Out Cigarettes for Good, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3,
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/opinion/two-paths-to-the-gradualabolition-of-smoking.html?_r=O (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
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warnings by stating that plain packaging will have the desired effect of
reducing tobacco consumption and will not encourage people to smoke
Further, the recent study conducted by Legacy® and the
more. 23
Harvard School of Public Health determined that graphic health
warnings will produce the greatest reduction of tobacco consumption
among all races and socio-economic statuses in the U.S. 235
Reducing tobacco consumption is a serious issue today.
Regulating commercial speech by requiring tobacco companies to put
graphic health warnings on their packaging does affect our
constitutional rights. However, when it comes to public health and the
health of our children this becomes a more pressing issue. The court in
R.J. Reynolds was correct to be cautious and require the government to
prove its case. 236 However, as time passes and the effects of other
country's polices on tobacco control can be felt, it will be clear that
graphic health warnings reduce tobacco consumption. Further, the
amount of opposition demonstrated by tobacco companies suggests that
graphic health warnings would directly advance the government
interest. With the uncertainty of the efficacy of an innovative policy
such as the FSPTCA, deference to other country's policy measures and
foreign court rulings is necessary. We want to ensure that our
constitutional rights are not infringed without good cause, however,
good cause has been shown and it is time to take action.

234. Pechey et al., supra note 33, at 1.
235. Harv. Sch. of Pub. Health, supra note 41.
236. See R.J Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1221-22.
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INTRODUCTION

According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) there are
approximately 168 million child laborers in the world. 1 Despite the
overall decline in child labor, the ILO estimates that the decline in child
labor has been slowing. 2 Many of these children are victims of modem
slavery. 3 Modem slavery takes many different forms, including forced
labor. 4 In 2012, the ILO estimated that 20.9 million people were
victims of forced labor globally. 5 Of these, twenty-six percent, or 5.5
million, fell under the age of 18. 6
The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), a federal statute of the United
States, has emerged as a potentially powerful tool in the effort to
combat child labor globally. The statute grants federal courts subject
matter jurisdiction over claims arising from torts committed against
non-U.S. nationals in violation of international law. 7 Since the 1980s,
human rights activists and victims of human rights violations have
brought ATS claims in the U.S. against the perpetrators of human rights
violations. 8 Recently, a number of such claims have been brought on
behalf of children who argue that international law has been violated by
virtue of their subjection to labor constituting slavery or forced labor.
This paper argues that both the enslavement and forced labor of
children constitute violations of customary international law, for which
the ATS provides a civil remedy. The paper first introduces the ATS.
It then explores how U.S. federal courts have treated slavery, forced
labor, and child labor claims under the statute. Thereafter, it reviews
the practice of States and the relevant sources of international law and
argues that there is a norm of international law prohibiting slavery and
forced labor generally, as well as the enslavement and forced labor of
children. Lastly, it argues that the unique status of children within the
1. ILO, !LO Says Global Number of Child Labourers Down by a Third since 2000,
INTERNATIONAL
LABOR
ORGANIZATION
(Sept.
23,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS _ 221568/langen/index.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
2. Id.
3. ILO, SPECIAL ACTION PROGRAMME TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR, ILO GLOBAL
ESTIMATE
OF
FORCED
LABOR
14
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/- ed_norm/- declaration/documents/publication/wcms_l82004.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
4.
ILO, Forced Labor, available at http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forcedlabour/lang----en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
5. PROGRAMME TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR, supra note 3, at 13.
6. Id. at 14.
7. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2012).
8. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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law of nations merits a special analysis of the elements of forced labor,
specifically because of children's status within the international
community as persons in need of protection. Under international law,
not only is children's ability to assert their rights different from that of
their adult counterparts, but also children possess limited capacity to
consent to certain types of labor, dependent largely on their age and the
conditions of labor.
II. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The Alien Tort Statute provides federal courts with "original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations." 9 While the First Congress passed the
statute within the Judiciary Act of 1789, it was invoked as the basis for
a court's jurisdiction in only one case in over 170 years. 10 This changed
in 1980 when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Filartiga v.
Pefia-lrala. 11 Reversing the district court's determination that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, the Second Circuit held that the Alien Tort
Statute provided the district court with jurisdiction over the plaintiffs
wrongful death claim. The Court held that the Paraguayan plaintiffs
successfully alleged conduct that violated a norm of international law,
namely the Paraguayan defendant's torture of their relative. 12 There, the
Court determined that "[ a]mong the rights universally proclaimed by all
nations ... is the right to be free of physical torture." 13
Following Filartiga, the Supreme Court held that while the ATS is
a jurisdictional statute, 14 the substantive law governing A TS claims
should be derived from the law of nations because "international law is
a part of our [federal] law." 15 Further, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the
Court held that federal courts possess limited discretion to recognize
norms of international law. 16 However the Court emphasized that lower
courts should restrain their discretion in identifying previously
unrecognized violations of the law of nations. Nevertheless, since
Filartiga, the A TS has become an important tool for human rights law,
and federal courts now entertain suits by non-nationals against civil

9. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2012).
10. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 692 (2004).
11. See generally Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
12. Id. at 890.
13. Id.
14. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 694.
15. Id. at 730 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
16. Id. at 73 l.
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rights abusers for certain violations of human rights. 17
Significantly, in Filartiga the Court recognized the potential for
the change and evolution of customary international law over time. 18 In
fact, it identified human rights law as a primary example of this: "In the
modem age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined
to lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect for
fundamental human rights is in their individual and collective
interest." 19 Federal courts have been fairly uniform in finding that the
law of nations evolves over time. 2 Furthermore, in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, the Supreme Court endorsed this interpretation by recognizing
claims brought for violations of the ''present-day law of nations." 1
Last year, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, the
Supreme Court limited the applicability of the ATS over certain
claims. 22 After noting that "there is no indication that the ATS was
passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the
enforcement of international norms," the Court held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to ATS claims. 23
Yet Kiobel 's effect on ATS litigation is far from clear, and the
decision "[wa]s careful to leave open a number of significant questions
regarding the reach and interpretation of the [ATS]." 24 Clearly, Kiobel
restricts ATS's applicability to so-called "F-cubed [ATS] actions,"
actions involving non-U.S. foreigners suing a foreign defendant based

°

17. Virginia Monken Gomez, The Sosa Standard: What Does It Mean for Future ATS
Litigation?, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 469, 470 (2006).
18. Filartiga , 630 F.2d at 890.
19. Id.; but see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J. concurring).
20. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1999);
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal.
1987).
21. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (emphasis added).
22. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659, 1669 (2013). The
presumption against extraterritoriality "is a longstanding principle of American law 'that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). Therefore, '"unless
there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed' to give a statute
extraterritorial effect, '[the Court] must presume it is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions."' Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010) (quoting
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 248).
23. Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669.
24. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Similarly, in a separate concurrence, Judge
Alito suggested that the decision "obviously leaves much unanswered, and perhaps there is
wisdom in the Court's preference for this narrow approach." Id. at 1669-70.
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on conduct that occurred outside of the U.S. 25 Yet where the plaintiff
or defendant is a U.S. citizen or where the conduct that gave rise to the
claim occurred within the U.S., Kiobel will not affect ATS's
applicability. 26 Further, ATS will apply to a claim even when "all the
relevant conduct took place outside the United States . . . [where] the
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States with
sufficient force to displace the presumption. " 27

A. Identifying Norms of Customary International Law
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court established the
standard used to identify a norm of customary international law, the
violation of which gives rise to an actionable claim under the A TS. The
standard requires "any claim based on the present-day law of nations to
rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world."28 Further, the norm must be "defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms [the Supreme
Court has] recognized." 29 Elaborating on this latter requirement, claims
cannot rely on "violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the
historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted [in 1789]."30 In
considering whether a particular norm is sufficiently definite to give rise
to a cause of action, a court determination "should (and, indeed,
inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the practical
consequences of making that cause available to litigants. " 31
Despite the Supreme Court's enunciation of a standard by which to
identify norms of customary international law, lower courts'
interpretation of the standard lack uniformity. They have produced a
number of discrete tests regarding the identification of international
norms. The most frequently-utilized standard requires norms to be
sufficiently specific, universal, and obligatory.
Additionally, the
Second Circuit requires that norms constitute "rules that States
universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and
mutual concern. " 32
25. Matteo M. Winkler, What Remains of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel?, 39 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 171, 178 (2013).
26. Id. at 186.
27. Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669; see also Winkler, supra note 25, at 188.
28. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 732.
31. Id. at 732-33.
32. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003).
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The interpretation of the sufficiently specific, universal, and
obligatory standard varies widely among circuits. For instance, the
Seventh Circuit interprets the standard broadly, arguing that the
standard "like so many statements of legal doctrine . . . is suggestive
rather than precise; taken literally it could easily be refuted. No norms
are truly 'universal'; 'universal' is inconsistent with 'accepted by the
civilized world'; 'obligatory' is the conclusion not the premise; and
some of the most widely accepted international norms are vague, such
as 'genocide' and 'torture. "' 33 Despite its broad interpretation, which
on its face undercuts the standard's effectiveness in limiting the number
of norms giving rise to actionable ATS claims, the Seventh Circuit
purports to employ this standard.
By contrast, at the extreme, some courts have incorporated a
"lowest common denominator approach" into the specific, universal,
and obligatory standard. 34 In Doe v. Nestle, the District Court applied
the standard, suggesting, "where there are a variety of formulations [for
an international norm], the court should look to the formulation that is
agreed upon by all-a lowest common denominator or common 'core
definition' of the norm. " 35 This is probably the highest standard applied
in determining whether a norm under the law of nations exists 36 and a
misinterpretation of Sosa.

B. Sources ofInternational Law
To determine whether a plaintiff properly alleged a violation of the
law of nations, courts must review sources of international law. The
United Nations enumerated the sources of international law in Article

33. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber, Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011); see
also Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc'y, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1216,
1229 (W.D. Wash. 2012), for a different interpretation of this standard.
34. See Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see also In re S.
African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Another reason for
mentioning this standard is that Doe is one of the four cases reviewed about domestic
courts' treatment of forced child labor claims under the ATS. Id.
35. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1080; see also In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F.
Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). These cases both cite to Justice Katzmann's concurrence in
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 264 (2d Cir. 2007), in which he
interpreted Sosa to require a "discemable core definition that commands the same level of
consensus as the 18th-century crimes identified by the Supreme Court." Interestingly,
Justice Katzmann in applying this standard held that a norm of aiding and abetting liability
under the law of nations exists. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 264 (J. Katzmann, concurring). In
Doe, the majority came to the opposite conclusion by applying its lowest common
denominator standard.
36. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 264 (J. Katzmann, concurring); Nestle, 748 F. Supp.
2d at 1080.
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38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: (1) general and
particular international conventions; (2) international custom; (3)
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and, as a
subsidiary source, (4) the works of the most qualified publicists. 37
Domestic courts in the U.S. have made reference to Article 38 in
determining the sources of international law to which they should
refer. 38 They have also cited the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law § 102, 39 which defines customary international law as law
"result[ing] from a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation."40
In The Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court enumerated the
sources to which courts should refer to identify a norm under the law of
nations:
For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to
the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research,
and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with
the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial
tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the
law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really
·

lS.

41

Specifically, the Court in The Paquete Habana, reviewed States'
historical practice, 42 States' contemporary practice, historical treaties,
opinion of international tribunals, and the works of jurists regarding the
wartime capture of unarmed fishing vessels from ancient to
contemporary times. 43
Although all international treaties provide some evidence of the
custom and practice of nations, "a treaty will only constitute sufficient
proof of a norm of customary international law if an overwhelming

37. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1) 33 U.N.T.S.
993. While the ICJ refers to customary international law as just one source of international
law, readers of U.S. court opinions should be wary because some have used the term
"customary international law" as a synonym for the "law of nations" in ATS cases. See, e.g.
Filartiga, 630 F. 2d at 876.
38. See, e.g., Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 399 (4th Cir. 2011); Kiobel, 621 F.3d
at 132; see also Filartiga, 630 F. 2d at 876.
39. See, e.g., Karadzic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 102 (1987).
41. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
42. See id. at 697 (considering evidence not only of affirmative State practice, but also
the practice's historical condemnation).
43. Id. at 686-700.
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majority of States have ratified the treaty, and those States uniformly
and consistently act in accordance with its principles." 44 The U.S.'
failure to ratify conventions does not preclude their use as evidence of
the law of nations. 45 Indeed, in certain circumstances conventions not
ratified by the U.S. may not only be used as evidence of the law of
nations, but also may be evidence of a norm binding upon the U.S. 46
Material sources of international law are afforded different weight
depending upon the degree to which they evidence the existence of a
consensus among States. 47 Thus, a treaty may be afforded greater
48
weight depending on the number of States that have ratified it.
Further, certain weight is afforded to non-binding material sources of
international law, such as unratified treaties or Declarations because,
although they lack binding force, they evidence the existence of a
consensus among States. 49
The analysis to determine whether a custom exists under
international law, as exemplified by The Paquete Habana, must be a
fact-specific, as well as a historically and legally intensive, process.
Despite the practical difficulties that such an application poses for
courts, Filartiga and its successors continually re-engaged the federal
courts in the task of recognizing norms of customary international law
grounded in human rights law. 50
III. DOMESTIC COURTS' APPLICATION OF THE SOSA
STANDARD TO ATS LABOR CLAIMS
This section will review the variety of treatments that domestic
courts have afforded to plaintiffs who argue that defendants violated the
law of nations by engaging in slavery, forced labor, and child labor.
Courts seem more willing to identify a norm of customary international
law prohibiting slavery or forced labor, than a norm prohibiting child
labor generally. 51 Despite reluctance to identify a norm of international
44. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 137.
45. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 180 (2d Cir. 2009).
46. See, e.g. id. at 180-81. In Abdullahi v. Pfizer, the court found that conducting
medical experimentation on humans without their consent violated a norm of international
law, despite the United States' failure to ratify a relevant convention. Id.
47. JAMES CRAWFORD, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (8th ed. 2012).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Kathleen M. Kedian, Customary International Law and International Human

Rights Litigation in United States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of the Paquete Habana,
40 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1395, 1400 (1999).
51. Compare Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1023 (7th Cir.
2011) (refusing to recognize that a norm exists prohibiting the employing of children in
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law with regard to all child labor, after applying the Sosa standard to
child labor, two courts have indicated that under certain facts, especially
where an employer subjected children to slavery or forced labor,
plaintiffs' claims should be actionable under the ATS. 52
Therefore, domestic courts seem receptive to recognizing a norm
of international law prohibiting the enslavement and forced labor of
children under the appropriate facts. Yet in practice, primarily because
of procedural obstacles and secondarily due to the reluctance of courts
to recognize norms of the law of nations, plaintiffs bringing ATS claims
based on child labor have largely been unsuccessful. 53
While this should not deter prospective plaintiffs, their arguments
should be structured to demonstrate that their claims are based on
conduct that rises to the level of either traditional notions of slavery or
more modem conceptions of forced labor. Yet this does not mean that
child laborers' causes of action based on slavery or forced labor should
be treated as equal to those claims brought by their adult counterparts.
Instead, courts must consider claims in conjunction with children's
unique status within the international community, specifically as
persons in need of protection. In particular, courts should pay special
attention to how this status affects children's ability to consent and
assert their rights within various forms and conditions of labor.
This section first reviews domestic courts' treatment of A TS
claims based on slavery and forced labor and continues by reviewing
the treatment of child labor claims. It then argues that a norm of
customary international law exists prohibiting child labor that is
tantamount to slavery and forced labor, and that such conduct is
therefore actionable under the ATS.

A. Treatment ofATS Claims Based on Slavery and Forced Labor
Domestic courts generally recognize that slavery violates the law
of nations. Even in cases where slavery is not directly at issue, courts
routinely refer to slavery as one of the few norms that clearly violates

work that is harmful to their health, safety, or morals), and Doe Iv. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d
932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002) on reh 'gen bane sub nom. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d
708 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that forced labor is so widely condemned that it has surpassed
being merely a norm of customary law and has attained the status of ajus cogens violation);
see also infra sections A and B. While Unocal's decision was vacated, it was only vacated
after the plaintiffs and Unocal settled the case for an undisclosed amount. Ron A. Ghatan,
Note: The Alien Tort Statute and Prudential Exhaustion, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1273, 1276
(2011).
52. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075; Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023.
53. See infra Treatment ofATS Claims Based on Child Labor, at section B.
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customary international law. 54
Further, some courts have also
recognized that forced labor may be actionable as a violation of
customary international law under the ATS. 55
While ultimately rejecting a plaintiffs claim, in Velez v. Sanchez,
the Second Circuit, noted that slavery "in which one human being
purports to own another" violates the law of nations. 56 There, it asserted
that of the norms of customary international law, the prohibition of
slavery is "one of the most well-established." 57 The Court opined that
over time the norm prohibiting slavery has evolved to include a variety
of its modem forms, including forced labor and servitude. 58 Other
courts have similarly found that forced labor constitutes a violation of
customary international law. 59
In fact, in Unocal the Ninth Circuit went further and held both that
slavery and forced labor were }us cogens violations. 60 Additionally,
while the Ninth Circuit strictly limits the norms of international law that
may be asserted against private individuals, in Unocal it opined that
"forced labor, like traditional variants of slave trading, is among the
'handful of crimes ... to which the law of nations attributes individual
liability,' such that state action is not required." 61

B. Treatment ofATS Claims Based on Child Labor
This author found four cases in which plaintiffs alleged a violation
of the law of nations based on the defendant's employment of
children. 62 Of them, two were dismissed on procedural grounds. 63 In
this section, an analysis of these cases is presented to demonstrate some
of the procedural difficulties that A TS plaintiffs face, as well as to
acquaint the reader with the wide variety of factual scenarios that have

54. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995)).
55. See, e.g., Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 946.
56. Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 319 (2d Cir. 2012).
57. Velez, 693 F .3d at 319 (citing Yasmine Rassam, Contemporary Forms of Slavery
and the Evolution of the Prohibition of Slavery and the Slave Trade Under Customary
International Law, 39 VA. J. INT' LL. 303, 310 ( 1999)).
58. Velez, 693 F.3d at 319.
59. See Adhikari, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 685; Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp.
2d 1355, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. at 891-92.
60. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 946.
61. Id. at 946.
62. Specifically, these are: Mother Doe Iv. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 113234 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Ellul v. Congregation of Christian Bros., 2011 WL 1085325 (S.D.N.Y.
201 l); Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023; Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
63. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1134; Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325.
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given rise to ATS claims. In the remaining two cases, the court reached
a substantive analysis of whether plaintiffs properly alleged a violation
of the law of nations under Sosa. 64

1. Child Labor Claims Dismissed on Procedural Grounds
This section briefly recounts some of the procedural difficulties
faced by plaintiffs who have sought to recover under the A TS based on
a theory that child labor violates the law of nations. It suggests that
meeting the Sosa standard is but one obstacle for plaintiffs bringing
such claims.
In Ellul v. Christian Brothers, plaintiffs brought a claim under the
ATS in which they alleged a number of violations of customary
international law, including the forced labor of children. 65 There
claimants alleged that beginning in the 1940s and continuing for
decades, a program created by the Australian government took children
from the United Kingdom and Malta and moved them to orphanages
and work camps in Australia. 66 Thereafter, the children "were treated
shamelessly, abused, and neglected, subjected to forced labor, and
denied education. " 67 In 2011, three of the children, then adults, brought
suit under the ATS. 68
The Court dismissed their claims on a number of procedural
grounds, including the tolling of the statute of limitations. 69 Firstly, the
Court dismissed the claim because it lacked jurisdiction over both
defendants. 70 The plaintiffs' complaint named the wrong association of
Christian Brothers and failed to complete service on the correct
association. 71 Further, the plaintiffs named the Christian Brothers of
Rome, but failed to provide evidence that the Christian Brothers
Oceania, against whom they alleged violations of customary
international law, was acting under the control or authority of the
Christian Brothers of Rome. 72 The plaintiffs also sued the Order of the
Sisters of Mercy. 73 The court dismissed the allegations against this
defendant because it found that "it is not an organization with a
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023; Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 946.
Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325 at *I.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325 at *1, 3-4.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
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structure and purpose to act as an entity... [and] the common purpose
to which Plaintiffs point-charity-is too vague to unify these regional
organizations into a single legal entity." 74
The dismissal of these two defendants exemplifies one of the
difficulties faced by ATS plaintiffs, namely a failure to obtain personal
jurisdiction over defendants, a difficulty which presumably was the
reason that suit was not brought directly against Christian Brothers
Oceania. Further, in rare circumstances, plaintiffs may seek to recover
from organizations such as the Order of the Sisters of Mercy that are not
legally cognizable in the U.S.
Secondly, the Court dismissed the claim for the expiration of the
statute of limitations. The A TS has no express statute of limitations, but
courts have borrowed a ten-year statute of limitations from the Torture
Victim Protection Act. 75 Despite this, for certain claims, courts apply
equitable tolling. 76 Yet, in Ellul, the court noted that equitable tolling
"is appropriate only in rare and exceptional cases, in which a party is
'prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising [its] rights. "' 77
Further, the court held that because plaintiffs were aware of the factual
basis for their cause of action equitable tolling was inappropriate.
In Doe v. Al Maktoum, the Court dismissed a claim brought against
the Finance Minister of the United Arab Emirates and other unnamed
defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. 78 There, plaintiffs alleged
that defendants engaged in a number of violations of customary
international law, including forced child labor. 79 The plaintiffs, former
child jockeys, alleged that defendants kidnapped, trafficked, and
enslaved young boys from South Asia and Africa. 8° Further, they
alleged that at various times the children were "starved, deprived of
sleep, injected with hormones to [halt] grow[th], and sexually abused"
by the defendants. 81
The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that it had
personal jurisdiction over the defendant because plaintiffs relied on the
affidavit of a researcher who relied on hearsay websites and newspaper
stories about the defendant's ownership of personal property in the U.S.,

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325 at *3.
See, e.g., Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 491 (6th Cir. 2009).
Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325 at *3.
Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.
Id.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1133-34.
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his purchase of race horses in Kentucky, and infrequent visits. 82 The
court held that his contacts were not sufficient under the Kentucky longarm statute because of an absence of substantial, continuous, and
systematic contacts with the forum. 83

2. Child Labor Claims Dismissed for Failure to Allege a
Violation of the Law ofNations
Two courts have analyzed the question of whether child labor
constitutes a violation of the law of nations. 84 Yet in only one case,
Flomo v. Firestone, has a court engaged in a detailed and substantive
analysis of the question. This section explores those cases.
In Doe v. Nestle, the Court opined that "it is clear that in some
instances 'child labor' constitute[s] a violation of an international norm
that is specific, universal, and well-defined." 85 Yet it dismissed the
claim on other grounds 86 and exerted little effort to backup this claim.
Citing to John Roe I v. Bridgestone, 87 the Court noted it would be
difficult to distinguish between instances of child labor that violate
customary international law and those that do not.
In Flomo v. Firestone, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed whether child labor constitutes a violation of customary
international law and, affirming the District Court's holding, found that
it did not. Flo mo, a procedurally complicated case, 88 exemplified not
only the procedural difficulties facing ATS claimants, but also the
difficulty of establishing a violation under Sosa. 89

82. Id. at 1141-43.
83. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
84. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023; Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
85. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
86. There, the court ultimately held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that an
international norm existed for aiding and abetting liability. To establish their claim against
Nestle, the plaintiffs relied on an aiding and abetting theory. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at
1057. Yet not all courts reject such claims. In Unocal, the Ninth Circuit held that ATS
claims could rely on such a theory. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 947-53. In Nestle, plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants knew or should have known of the child labor because of their
first hand knowledge and by the "numerous, well-documented reports of child labor" by
governmental and non-governmental actors. Their argument followed that despite their
knowledge, defendants not only purchased the cocoa from the farms, but also provided the
farms with resources "knowing that their assistance would necessarily facilitate child labor."
FAC 152; Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1066, 1075.
87. John Roe Iv. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1020 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
88. See Jessica Bergman, The Alien Tort Statute and Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Company: The Key to Change in Global Child Labor Practices?, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 455, 479 n.8 (2011).
89. Id.
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In Flomo, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated
customary international law when they employed children in
circumstances constituting "the worst forms of child labor. " 90 By the
time their claim was analyzed by the Circuit Court, the plaintiffs'
allegations of slavery and forced labor had been dismissed. 91 The
plaintiffs, who worked on rubber plantations in Liberia, alleged that the
defendant economically coerced children into working full time by
setting their fathers' daily quota of trees to tap so high that the fathers
had to recruit their children to work with them in order to retain their
jobs. Further, plaintiffs alleged that defendants imposed the quota
knowing it could be met only "if children join[ed] their fathers ... and
work[ed] from dawn to dusk." 92
The complaint detailed the alleged work in which children
engaged. These allegations included that plaintiffs began working at
4:30 a.m. by cleaning 1,500 tapper cups; that they tapped trees with
sharp tools facing the risk of blinding from raw latex; applied dangerous
chemical fertilizers to the rubber trees; and carried two 75-pound
buckets of latex at a time in order to be paid with their family's daily
food allotment. 93
It should be noted that, for the purposes of litigation under the
ATS, the facts presented do not make this an ideal test case. First,
Firestone did not directly employ the children. Instead, plaintiffs
claimed Firestone coerced children into working and "actively
encouraged [child labor]." 94 Secondly, this is not a case of direct
liability, but instead relies on a theory of agency liability. The fathers'
direct employer, Firestone Liberia, was a subsidiary of the defendant in
this case, Firestone National Rubber Company (FNRC). 95 After several
challenges early in the litigation, plaintiffs limited their theory of

90. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023.
91. Id.
92. Brief for Petitioner at 4, John Roe I, et al. v. Bridgestone Corp., 2005 CV05available
at
8168JFW,
http://iradvocates.mayfirst.org/sites/default/files/11.17.05%20Complaint.pdf (last visited
Feb. 4, 2014).
93. Id. One of the organizations that brought the suit on behalf of the plaintiffs,
International Rights Advocates, provides videos of the children and of the Firestone
Plantation. StopFirestone, Firestone & Child Labor in Liberia, YouTUBE (May 29, 2008),
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FfzvdWqVIGk (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
For images, see Stop Firestone, INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FORUM, available at
http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/stop-firestone (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
94. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 92, at 4.
95. Bergman, supra note 88.
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liability to FNRC. 96
Despite these legal obstacles, the attorneys were probably
influenced to bring the case by the great flurry of international attention
directed at the situation of Liberian workers on rubber plantations in
Liberia. 97 Following months of national and international scrutiny
directed toward the status of human rights on Liberian rubber
plantations, the Human Rights and Protection Section of the United
Nations Missions in Liberia (UNMIL) released a report detailing the
situation. 98 This report set rubber plantations as a priority for United
Nations Missions in Liberia because "[i]n the context of Liberia's postconflict rehabilitation, the situation . . . [they] presented significant
security, political, economic and human rights challenges for the
Government which have not yet been resolved." 99 Further, the report
noted that "working conditions on the plantations violate fundamental
human rights standards. The situation is particular [sic] poor in relation
to child [sic]; child labor is indirectly encouraged by work practices and
lack of access to education." 100
In Flomo, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of
defendant's motion for summary judgment, but the Court conducted its
own Sosa analysis to determine that no norm of customary international
law prohibited child labor. 101 Yet prior to announcing its holding, the
Seventh Circuit expressed disquiet over the use of customary
international law as a means to recover under the ATS. 102
96. Id.
97. See U.N. Mission in Liberia, HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIBERIA'S RUBBER PLANTATIONS:
TAPPING
INTO
THE
FUTURE
(2006),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/473dade10.html (last visited
Jan.
28,
2014)
[hereinafter UNMIL]. Firestone's Liberian plantation is huge, and its website stated that it
has more than 6,500 employees in Liberia. Resources, FAQs, FIRESTONE NATURAL RUBBER
COMPANY, available at http://www.firestonenaturalrubber.com/faqs.htm#l (last visited Jan.
28, 2014).
98. UNMIL, supra note 97, at 5.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1016.
102. Id. Its argument was as follows: Its reluctance originated from problems with
notice and legitimacy. In particular, the court opined that notice was a problem because
norms created by custom cannot be identified as clearly as those specifically identified by a
legal text. Further, customary international law's legitimacy and, in democratic countries,
democratic legitimacy, was a problem because through the use of custom, the international
community imposes legal duties on the independent sovereign in the form of mandatory
norms. The Court reasoned that while international law is ideally created by consensus, in
practice it rarely is. Yet it seemed to suggest that some of its concerns were mitigated
because Congress maintained the ability to limit the scope of the ATS, and therefore "the
statute ... is not a blanket delegation of lawmaking to the democratically unaccountable
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In applying Sosa, the Seventh Circuit examined the language of the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 32(1); Minimum
Age Convention; and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention,
Article 3(d) individually to determine whether each gave rise to a norm
of customary international law. The Court concluded that child labor,
with regard to all of the Conventions, was too vague and encompassing
1
a category to give rise to a norm of customary international law. 3
Firstly, it rejected the argument that the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child (1989), specifically Article 32 (1) gave rise to a
norm of customary international law. 104 The Article provides that
children have a right not to perform certain work, in particular that
which is hazardous, interferes with education, or is harmful to the
child's health. 105 The Court held that the language was too "vague and
106
Secondly,
encompassing" to establish a norm of international law.
the Court similarly rejected the Minimum Age Convention as a source
of customary international law. 107 This Convention forbids children
108
The
under fourteen from doing any work other than "light work."
the
of
because
norm
no
created
Convention
court opined that the
109
Lastly, in evaluating the Worst
vagueness of the term "light work."
Forms of Child Labour Convention, the Court noted that while it was
"more promising" than the other Conventions, it found that Article 3(d)
was "still pretty vague." 110 In particular, it enumerated three reasons for
its vagueness, namely: (1) its failure to specify a threshold of actionable
harm; (2) the "inherent vagueness of the words 'safety' and 'morals;"'
and (3) its provision that the domestic law of nations determines which

international community of custom creators." Id. Yet the Court noted concern that "[i]f [a
democratic country] has consistently rejected the international custom, it is possible for the
custom to apply to it." Id. Despite the court's concern, this last concern should be almost
completely mitigated by the persistent objector rule, in which a country that consistently
rejects an international norm will be considered a persistent objector, and therefore
exempted from the rule. See Joel P. Trachtman, Persistent Objectors, Cooperation, and the
Utility of Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 221 (2010).
However, this is not the case for States that come into existence after the norm because the
persistent objector rule will generally not apply to them. Id.
103. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1022.
104. Id.
105. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 32(1), Nov. 20, 1989
[hereinafter UNCRC].
106. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1022.
107. Id.
108. ILO Minimum Age Convention, art. 7, June 26, 1973.
109. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1022.
110. Id.
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types of work fall into Article 3(d). 111
The Court referred to the Convention's Recommendation 190 for
more detail on Article 3(d), but ultimately dismissed its importance
because a Recommendation "create[s] no enforceable obligation." 112
Here, the Court failed to consider whether the Recommendation, while
not binding on States, could help the Court to discern whether a custom
of international law exists, and if so, its scope. The Court also held that
the plaintiffs failed to provide the Court with sufficient evidence of the
practices and customs of nations as to demonstrate that States perceive
that they have a legal obligation to follow the norm. 113
After this discussion, the Court found that "[g]iven the diversity of
economic conditions in the world, it's impossible to distill a crisp rule
from the three conventions." 114 Yet during this discussion, it was not
clear whether the Court based this opinion on a cumulative
consideration of all of the conventions, or whether it was based on its
analysis of them individually. A proper evaluation of the plaintiffs'
ATS claim would entail an explicit analysis of all of the sources taken
together, which would ensure that the Court addressed whether the
sources of international law give rise to a norm.
The Court concluded by enumerating a number of deficiencies in
the plaintiffs factual allegations. Specifically, the Court noted that it
was unaware of how frequently employees employed children to help
them fill their quotas; whether Firestone took effective measures to stop
children from working; how many children worked on the plantation;
the ages of those children who worked on the plantation other than
those who brought suit; how much work the average child did; and the
difficulty of the work. 115
The application of the Sosa standard aside, the Court's concluding
discussion was problematic.
The Court noted that its "biggest
objection" to the lawsuit was that it was unaware of "the situation of
Liberian children who don't live on the Firestone plantation." It
reasoned that the children who work on the Firestone plantation may be
111. ILO, Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, art. 3(d), Nov. 19, 2000, ILO No.
182 [hereinafter WFCLC].
112. Flomo , 643 F.3d at 1023.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1024. It was not clear why the Court required some of this information as
the Court did not fully explain its relevance. For instance, presumably had the Court found
that the employment of the children violated international customary law, it would not
matter how many children worked there. This is because the children who brought the
claim should be entitled to recover for the torts committed against them in violation of the
law of nations without reference to any other child employees of Firestone.
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better off than other Liberian children because their fathers are well paid
by Liberian standards. It continued by suggesting that they "would be
worse off if their fathers, unable to fill their daily quotas, lost their jobs
or had to pay adult helpers, thus reducing the family's income;" thus the
Court did not "know the net effect on their welfare of working on the
plantation."
This argument is paternalistic; completely undermines the
plaintiff's autonomy and freedom to decide what is or is not better for
them; and is a social, not legal, argument. While the argument may not
be wholly without merit, 116 any strain put on families is irrelevant in an
analysis of whether child labor constitutes a norm of international
law. 117 Further, if an employer violates customary international law, it
is logically perverse for a court to justify that human rights violation by
suggesting that the plaintiffs would be worse off if their human rights
were upheld. The Court's role here was to determine whether a norm of
customary international law existed, not whether enforcing such a norm
would benefit the very plaintiffs who presumably, having consented to
the suit, believed that suing the defendant was in their best interests.

3. Concluding Note on Prior ATS Cases Asserting Child Labor
Claims
While no plaintiff has successfully pied a child labor A TS claim
that has survived a motion for summary judgment, domestic courts
seem receptive to recognizing a norm of international law prohibiting
the forced labor and slavery of children under certain facts. In Nestle,
while dismissing the claim on other grounds, the court noted that it was
"clear that in some instances 'child labor' constitutes a violation of ...
international law." 118 Further, in Flomo, while the court found no
international norm proscribing "work which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health,

116. For instance, after plaintiffs served their complaint, Firestone adopted a "zero
tolerance" policy with regard to child labor whereby it would fire any employee found to be
employing the labor of a child. It is plausible that some workers or their families were
negatively affected by this policy. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Company, 2010 WL
4174583 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
117. The best argument for its relevance is that courts have noted that when
considering whether a norm of international law exists, the court must consider the practical
consequences of identifying a norm. Yet the practical consequences factor is limited to a
judgment about the "practical consequence of making that cause available to litigants in
federal court," and not the practical consequences to present litigants. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at
732.
118. Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
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safety or morals of children;" 119 it recognized that other forms of child
labor might be actionable. Specifically, it opined that evidence "that
[S]tates feel themselves under a legal obligation to impose liability on
employers of child labor... is readily available for the other types of
child labor listed in ILO Convention 182, such as. . . forced child
labor." Therefore, where plaintiffs overcome the procedural obstacles
posed by ATS claims and furnish sufficient evidence to demonstrate
that their employer engaged in slavery or forced labor, courts may be
receptive to their claim.
IV. A NORM OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
PROHIBITS SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOR SUCH
THAT ATS CLAIMS BASED ON SLAVERY AND FORCED
LABOR SHOULD BE ACTIONABLE UNDER THE ATS
This section will argue that a norm of customary international law
prohibiting both slavery and forced labor has evolved within the
international community. 120 Taken together, the numerous treaties and
the practices of States demonstrate that the prohibition of slavery and
forced labor of children satisfy the ATS' s requisite elements, namely
that a norm be specific, universal, obligatory, and of mutual concern.
Further, this section will argue that children's status within
international law differs from that of adults, and therefore plaintiffs'
pleadings asserting ATS claims based on the forced labor of children
should address their unique status. In particular, plaintiffs should note
their conditions of labor. In doing so, they should direct special
attention to children's potential lack of capacity to consent to both
employment contracts and labor that will cause long-term mental or
physical harm. Also, pleadings should address children's potential
difficulty in asserting their own interests over that of an adult
supervisor. Further, these factors should be included in a court's
analysis of whether the conditions of the labor violated a norm
prohibiting child labor that is tantamount to slavery or forced labor.

119. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023.
120. See Federico Lenzerini, Suppressing Slavery Under Customary Law, 10 ITALIAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (2000) (providing a comprehensive history of slavery in international law,
as well as the contemporary state of customary international law regarding slavery, and
argument for the recognition of a norm of customary international law prohibiting slavery
and forced labor). Lenzerini argues that slavery has attained jus cogens status. Id. at 156.
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A. Specificity: Defining Slavery and Forced Labor Under
Customary International Law

Slavery and forced labor are specific norms whose definition can
be readily determined through reference to the relevant sources of
international law. The international community defines slavery as "the
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised." 121 This definition
originated in the 1926 Slavery Convention and has not been subject to
great change. 122 The international community has reaffirmed this
definition in a number of main instruments dealing with slavery. 123
International sources, 124 as well as at least one domestic court in
an ATS claim, 125 define forced labor as "all work or service which is
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily." 126 While the treaty
excepts certain forms of labor from the definition, 127 the exceptions are
explicitly enumerated in the treaty and should not bar a court from
finding the specificity element satisfied.
In evaluating ATS claims, courts should treat forced labor as a
form of slavery. 128 Courts should distinguish between and evaluate
claims of traditional slavery and forced labor using these definitions.
Yet while distinguishable, these definitions are related, and courts
should recognize both as violations of customary international law.
B. Universal and Obligatory: The Prohibition of the Slavery and
Forced Labor of Children is a Norm Universally Practiced to
which States Accede out of a Sense ofLegal Obligation

Identification of a norm of customary international law requires a
finding that the norm is universally practiced and acceded to out of a
sense of legal obligation. 129 One element looks objectively to States'
121. Id. at 158-59.
122. Id. at 159.
123. Id. (citing to United Nations, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery art. 7, April 30,
1957, 226 U.N.T.S.3 [hereinafter Supplementary Convention]; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 7, Nov. 10, 1998, U.N. Doc. NConf./183/9 (1998)).
124. See ILO, Forced Labour Convention, art. 2(1), June 10, 1930, ILO No. 29
[hereinafter ILOFLC].
125. Velez, 693 F.3d at 320.
126. See WFCLC, supra note 111.
127. See id. art. 2(2)(a)-(e).
128. See Lenzerini, supra note 120, at 165 (treating force labor as a modem variant of
slavery).
129. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 131 (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233,
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practice, while the other evaluates States' subjective reasons for
engaging in that practice. The latter element requires that States
subjectively feel that they are legally obligated to practice the norm.
Yet the objective and subjective elements may be interrelated.
Specifically, a State may practice a norm as a result of a sense of legal
obligation to abide by it, or in the alternative, a sense of legal obligation
to engage in a practice may result from a State's preexisting practice
thereof. Because of this interconnection, this section will consider the
objective and subjective elements together.
C. State Practice: Evidence of the Universal Adherence to the
Proscription of Slavery and Forced Labor
State practice demonstrates that States universally prohibit
slavery. 130 The first national prohibition of slavery dates to 1794 in
France. 131 Many States followed. By 1957, States had ratified at least
300 international treaties suppressing slavery and the slave trade. 132
Following World War II, global condemnation of slavery and forced
labor continued and was expressed in the UN's human rights treaties
entered into after the War. 133 Today States universally prohibit slavery,
and slavery has been abolished in every nation of the world. 134 The
long history of the global prohibition of slavery left a lasting legacy in
the way that States and people understand slavery, "[R]eviving slavery
has remained beyond the bounds of any contemporary movement's
dreams or any [S]tate's ambition. Slavery rhetorically remains the evil
of choice for any movement or government that seeks to mobilize
sentiment against exploitative practices and coercive domination
anywhere in the world." 135

248 (2d Cir. 2003)).
130. This section is meant to demonstrate that today slavery is universally prohibited.
Therefore, the history provided is only meant to provide the reader with the most minimal
reference as to the antislavery movement's timeline.
131. Lenzerini, supra note 120, at 149.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 150.
134.
John D. Sutter, Slavery's Last Stronghold, CNN, available at
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/03/world/mauritania.slaverys. last.strongho Id/index. ht
ml (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) (noting that Mauritania was the last country to abolish
slavery, doing so in 1981; yet the practice was not criminalized until 2007).
135. SEYMOUR DRESCHER, ABOLITION: A HISTORY OF SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY
461-62 (2009).
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D. Treaties: Evidence that the Proscription of Slavery and Forced
Labor is Universal and Obligatory
The ratification of treaties serves as evidence of both objective
State practice and the subjective State belief in the obligatory nature of
a norm. Ratification serves as evidence of State practice in that States
are required to comply with the treaty norm. Further, by ratifying a
treaty States understand that they are legally bound by the treaty, which
satisfies the subjective element. The main treaties regarding slavery,
forced labor, and child labor have been ratified almost universally,
suggesting that almost all States subjectively feel that they are binding.
Further, their nearly universal ratification, in conjunction with the ILO's
status treating them as "core" treaties, demonstrates the development of
a norm of international law proscribing the slavery and forced labor of
children.

1. Treaties and Declarations Addressing Slavery and Forced
Labor
International treaties and declarations serve as evidence of the
objective practice and subjective belief of States with regard to the
prohibition of slavery and forced labor. In particular, the number of
ratifications of the main treaties involving slavery and forced labor
evidences States' universal subscription to the norm. Meanwhile, the
number of ratifications as well as the international community's
treatment of these treaties as "core" treaties evidence that States accede
to the norm out of a sense of legal obligation.
Sources of international law consistently demonstrate a universal
proscription of slavery in its traditional form. 136 The Universal
Declaration on Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights recognize an affirmative right that "[n Jo one should be
held in slavery." 137 The International Covenant on Civil and Political
136. See Maria Fernanda Perez Solla, Slavery and Human Trafficking: International
Law and the Role of the World Bank, 6 (Apr. 2009), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussionpapers/Labor-Market-DP/0904.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014) (citing United Nations, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4, Dec. 10, 1948 [hereinafter UDHR]; United
Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 8.1, Mar. 23, 1976
[hereinafter ICCPR]; European Court of Human Rights, The European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 4.1, Mar. 3, 1953 [hereinafter ECHR];
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 6.1, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; United Nations,
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, art. 11.1, July 1, 2003 [hereinafter ICPRMW]).
137. UDHR, supra note 136, at art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 136, at art. 8.1.
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Rights 138 reiterates the right of individuals not to be held in slavery and
asserts a prohibition of slavery "in all of [its] forms." 139 It also goes
further and recognizes the right of individuals not to be subjected to
forced or compulsory labor. 140
Treaties proscribing forced labor have been widely ratified. Of the
most important treaties on this subject, the Forced Labour Convention
(1930), has been ratified by 177 States, 141 and the Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention (1957) has been ratified by 174 States. 142
The Forced Labour Convention defines forced or compulsory labor
as, "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the
menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered
himself voluntarily." 143 The Convention provides that ratifying States
must "undertake[] to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in
all its forms within the shortest possible period." Further, the
Convention requires States to criminalize forced or compulsory labor
for private actors. 144
The Abolition of Forced Labor Convention provides that ratifying
States "undertake[] to suppress and not to make use of any form of
forced or compulsory labour" under a number of circumstances
including when it is used for political coercion, education, economic
development, and labour discipline. 145 Further, States are required to
"take effective measures to secure the immediate and complete abolition
138. The United States, as well as 166 other States, has ratified the Covenant. ICCPR:
Chapter IV: Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 16, 1966), available at
http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY &mtdsg_no=IV
4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
139. ICCPR, supra note 136, at art. 8(1).
140. Id. at art. 8(3)(a), (c)(i) (providing exceptions to the definition of compulsory
labor).
141. Only eight States have not ratified the Convention. See ILO, Forced Labour
Convention,
May
1,
1932,
ILO
No.
29,
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11310:0::NO: 11310:Pl 13 lO_INS
TRUMENT_ID:312174:NO (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
142. Only eleven States have not ratified this Convention. See ILO, Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention, Jan. 17, 1959, ILO No. 105, available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=IOOO: 1131 O:O::NO::Pl 1310_INSTRUMENT_ID:3
12250 (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
143. WFCLC, supra note 111, at art. 2(2)(1). But see, WFCLC, supra note 111, at art.
2(2)(a)-(e). (enumerating exceptions to the convention).
144. See Report III (Part IB): General Survey Concerning the Forced Labor
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No.
available
at
105),
International
Labour
Conference
5
(2007),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocume
nt/wcms_089199.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
145. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention art. 1, Jan. 17, 1959.
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of forced or compulsory labour." 146
The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery explicitly
deals with an expanded notion of the conducts that constitute slavery. 147
The U.S., along with 122 other States, has ratified the Convention. 148
While fewer States are party to the Convention, it is still widely
supported and is useful as a vehicle to explore those practices that States
consider similar to slavery. It includes, but is not limited to debt
bondage, serfdom, and "any institution or practice whereby a ... young
person under . . . 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural
parents or by his guardian to another person ... with a view to the
exploitation of the ... young person of his labor." 149
2. Treaties and Declarations Addressing Child Labor
In recognition of the unique circumstances facing children, the ILO
specifically addressed the slavery or forced labor of children in the
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999). Since 1999, 174
States have ratified the Convention. 150 The U.S. was one of the first to
do so. 151 "[A]ll forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such
as. . . forced or compulsory labour" are included within the
Convention's definition of the worst forms of child labor. The worst
forms of child labor also include "work which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health,
safety or morals of children." 152
To demonstrate the emergence of a norm prohibiting child labor

146. Id. art. 2.
147. United Nations, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, art. 7, April 30, 1957, 226
U.N.T.S. 3.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions, ILO, available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc91/pdf/rep-iii-2.pdf (last visited Feb.
5, 2014 ). This includes some of the most populous countries that failed to ratify the Forced
Labour Convention. Compare id. with /LO Countries that Have not Ratified this
Convention, ILO, available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=lOOO: 1131 O:O::NO::Pl 1310_INSTRUMENT_ID:3
12174 (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). Specifically, the United States, China, Afghanistan, the
Republic of Korea, and Brunei Darussalam. See id. The only States to neither ratify the
Forced Labour Convention nor the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention are the
Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tuvalu. See id. This suggests that only those latter States are
not bound by the prohibition of child labor proscribed by each treaty individually.
151. List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions, supra note 150.
152. WFCLC, supra note 111, at art. 3.
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that is tantamount to slavery or forced labor, reference can be made to a
number of other sources of international law. 153 While they have lesser
force, because either they are not binding or because the U.S. has been a
persistent objector, they should be consulted in conjunction with
binding sources of international law to demonstrate the emergence of a
norm of international law forbidding child labor that is tantamount to
slavery or forced labor.
These sources demonstrate a consistent concern about children's
participation in the workforce.
The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that employment that is
"harmful to [children's] morals or health or dangerous to their life or
likely to hamper their normal development" should be criminalized. 154
The Declaration of the Rights of the Child explicitly forbids not only
child labor before "an appropriate minimum age," but also forbids
"caus[ing] or permit[ing] [the child] to engage in any occupation or
employment which would prejudice his health or education, or interfere
with his physical, mental or moral development." 155 The Convention on
the Rights of the Child also requires that States take affirmative
measures to implement Article 32. 156 Specifically, it requires that they
provide a minimum age of employment, regulate employees' hours and
conditions of work, and establish sanctions for violations and
effectively enforce the laws regarding child labor. 157
In 1990, more world leaders gathered at the United Nations than
ever before to attend the World Summit for Children. 158 There, they
adopted a Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of
Children, as well as a Plan of Action, detailing the implementation of
the Declaration. 159 While the Declaration addressed a myriad of
concerns, in part it committed to "work for special protection of the

153. Solla, supra note 136, at 10 (citing ICCPR, supra note 136, at art. 8(3); ECHR,
supra note 136, at art. 4(2); ACHR, supra note 136, at art. 6(2); ICPRMW, supra note 136,
at art. 11 (2)).
154. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res 2200
(XXI), U.N. GOAR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 (XXI), at 10 (Dec. 16, 1966). The
United States is not a party.
155. Declaration of the Rights of the Child [hereinafter DRC], G.A. Res 1386 (XIV),
U.N. GOAR, 14th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1386 (XIV), at 9 (Dec. 10, 1959). The United
States is not a party.
156. UNCRC, supra note 105, at art. 32.
157. Id.
158. A promise to children, UNICEF, available at http://www.unicef.org/wsc/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2013).
159. Id.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/1

224

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

2014]

Establishing Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute

473

working child and for the abolition of illegal child labor." 160 The Plan
of Action reaffirmed a number of obligations of the CRC and suggested
that all States should take steps to eliminate employment that is
hazardous, interferes with education, or is harmful to the health and full
development of children. Further, it suggested that States should seek
to protect children engaging in "legitimate employment" by ensurinfi
that they have the opportunity for a healthy and full development. 1 1
The Plan of Action urged specific contributions from States at the
national level as well as contributions from international development
agencies, regional institutions, all relevant United Nations agencies, as
well as others at the international level. 162
E. JLO 's Designation of Slavery, Forced Labor, and Child Labor
Conventions as "Core" Conventions

While the universal practice of the prohibition of slavery and
forced labor is evidence of State's perception that the norm is
obligatory, its obligatory character is also evidenced by the importance
afforded to the conventions by the ILO and its member States by the
conventions' designation as "core" conventions. That designation
suggests that the conventions have attained a status beyond merely
binding upon the parties and explains in part why states accede to them
out of a sense of legal obligation, namely because they protect
fundamental human rights. 163
The ILO regards the Forced Labour Convention, Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention, Worst Forms of Child Labour, and the
Minimum Age Conventions as 'core' conventions. 164 Core conventions

160. World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children,
UNICEF 1 7 (Sept. 30, 1990), available at http://www.unicef.org/wsc/declare.htm (last
visited Jan. 29, 2014).
161. Plan of Action for Implementing the World Declaration on the Survival,
Protection and Development of Children in the 1990s, UNICEF 1 23, available at
http://www.unicef.org/wsc/plan.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2014) [hereinafter PAIWD].
162. Id. at 1134-35.
163. In 2000, the ILO's Director-General, Mr. Juan Somavia, commenting on the ILO
having reached 1,000 ratifications of its core Conventions, said, "[T]hese ratifications move
the world's workers closer to the day when the principles of these core labour standards,
which we consider as fundamental human rights, are enshrined both in international law and
in the domestic labour codes of all ILO member States." Press Release, ILO, ILO 'Core'
Conventions Ratifications Surge Past 1,000 Mark, ILO Press Release IL0/00/36 (Sept. 22,
2000),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/media-centre/pressreleases/WCMS _007909/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2013 ).
164. In fact, with only a total of eight Conventions designated as such, these
Conventions represent half of the ILO ' s core conventions. lnFocus Programme on
Promoting the Declaration, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION'S FUNDAMENTAL
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are those "fundamental to the rights of human beings at work. .. [t]hese
rights are a precondition for all the others in that they provide a
necessary framework from which to strive freely for the improvement
of individual and collective conditions of work." 165
Distinguishing these conventions from others, the ILO seeks to
achieve global "basic human rights" and "decent work." 166
Accomplishing this goal requires the abolition of both forced labor and
child labor. Describing its inclusion of child labor within the core
conventions, the ILO recognized that children not only possess the same
human rights as their adult counterparts, but also a right to certain
measures of protection because of their age, inability to assert their own
interests, and lack of experience. 167
F. Mutual Concern: The Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labor
is a Norm of "Mutual Concern" among States

Beyond proving that a norm is specific, universal, and obligatory,
the Second Circuit also requires that States abide by the norm "out of a
sense ... mutual concern." 68 The slavery and forced labor of children
satisfies this element. Firstly, the international attention directed at
slavery, forced labor, and child labor through treaties and declarations
demonstrates that States are indeed mutually concerned about these
forms of labor. In Filartiga, the Second Cirucit held that States'
entrance into "express international accords" demonstrated that the
matter was of mutual concern to States. 169 Secondly, within our global
economy, labor frequently is a matter of mutual concern. While labor of
a strictly domestic nature continues to exists, 170 a great deal of labor is
international in nature, frequently dealing in products and services
within the international stream of commerce.

CONVENTIONS 8 (2002), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/- ed_norm/- -declaration/documents/publication/wcms_095895.pdf (last visited Jan. 29,
2013).
165. Id.at?.
166. Press Release, supra note 163.
167. WFCLC, supra note 111, at 43. "Children enjoy the same human rights accorded
to all people. But, lacking the knowledge, experience or physical development of adults and
the power to defend their own interests in an adult world, children also have distinct rights
to protection by virtue of their age. One of these protections is from economic exploitation
and from work that is dangerous to the health and morals of children or hampers the child's
development." Id.
168. Flores, 414 F.3d at 248.
169. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888.
170. Interestingly, some of the exceptions to the Minimum Age Convention, discussed
below, are intranational, such as those who work in the home.
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In fact, the factual allegations of each ATS child labor claim to
date entails the mutual concern of States. In Ellul, plaintiffs alleged that
defendants engaged in child trafficking and then, among other
allegations, kept the children in circumstances constituting forced
labor. 171 These activities are international in character because they
involve the trafficking of children across nations' borders. Similarly, in
Doe v. Al Maktoum, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants trafficked
them to the United Arab Emirates as well as other Persian Gulf
countries from Africa. 172 Further, they alleged that defendants enslaved
them as child jockeys in Dubai and other areas, where forced labor was
exacted from them. 173 This conduct was international in nature because
defendants not only trafficked children to multiple countries, 174 but also
compelled them to work against their will. 175 While no detailed facts
are given about the camel races, it is not unlikely that they involved
patrons from all over the world, especially when they took place in a
city that attracts international business people and tourists, like Dubai,
suggesting that the children provided a service to patrons from all over
the world.
Firestone and Nestle involved multi-national corporations who
harvested and exported the ingredients for their products, rubber and
chocolate respectively, from the plantations on which plaintiffs worked.
Where multi-national corporations, which send their products to
numerous countries around the world, violate international law, their
conduct necessarily implicates the mutual concern of States. For
instance, the cost of labor in one country affects the cost of products in
another. In addition, the conduct of multi-national corporations may
affect international relations between States. Relations may be strained
if a corporation based out of one country does business in another,
exacts forced labor from its residents, and passes on the benefit from
such forced, and presumably cheaper, labor in the cost of its products
abroad.

171. Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325.
172. Id. Further evidence of its connection the mutual concern that this case posed is
that the defendants hold high political offices in the United Arab Emerates. Id. at 1133.
One of the defendants was both the Vice President and Prime minister of the United Arab
Emirates. Id. Another was its Finance Minister. Id.
173. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1130, at 1133.
174. An allegation that requires that defendant was involved in an international child
trafficking ring.
175. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.
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G. Application of the Elements ofForced Labor to Children's

Claims Warrants Special Consideration
Forced labor claims 176 merit special analysis in the context of
claims by children in light of the principles codified in international
agreements concerning child labor. Ensuring that employers do not
violate children's fundamental human rights poses unique challenges
which the U .N. has addressed in a number of treaties and covenants
previously reviewed. In particular, these international agreements
provide a framework within which to evaluate the last two of the three
elements of forced labor, specifically labor "for which the said person
has not offered himself voluntarily" and labor that "is exacted from any
person under the menace of any penalty." 177

1. Labor Not Offered Voluntarily and Children's Incapacity to
Consent to Employment Contracts and Work that Causes Harm
Whether workers enter labor agreements voluntarily merits special
consideration within the context of the child laborer. Plaintiffs may
contest children's capacity to consent to employment contracts, as well
as their ability to consent to work that causes mental or physical
harm. 178 International agreements recognize the right of children, as a
class, to certain forms of protection in part because the scope of their
ability to consent in certain situations is questionable.

2. Lack of Capacity to Consent to Employment Contracts
Minimum age laws are one way of determining the age at which
States recognize the capacity of the child to enter employment contracts.
To determine whether an international norm exists setting the
permissible minimum age at which a child may consent to an
employment contract, plaintiffs and courts should consult international
treaties requiring the adoption of a minimum age for employment, in
particular the Minimum Age Convention. 179
Since its founding, the ILO sought to regulate the minimum age of
employment. In fact, its agenda for its first General Assembly meeting

176. As previously noted, forced labor is "(1) all work or service (2) which is exacted
from any person under the menace of any penalty and (3) for which the said person has not
offered himself voluntarily." ILOFLC, supra note 111, at art. 2(1).
177. WFCLC, supra note 111, at art. 2( 1).
178. This may occur either directly, through harm directly caused by the labor; or
indirectly, through lost opportunities when the child forfeits other opportunities, in
particular education, to participate in the labor force.
179. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 108.
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in 1919 included the topic. 180 In 1959, the Declaration of the Rights of
the Child explicitly prohibited child labor before "an appropriate
minimum age." The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights suggested States should adopt regulations setting a
minimum age and violations of such laws should be punished. 181 The
Convention on the Rights of the Child reaffirmed this concern and
required that State parties adopt a minimum age of employment. 182
In 1973, the ILO reviewed the issue of the minimum age of
employment and expressed a renewed concern for it in the Minimum
Age Convention. 183 Since then, of the 183 members of the ILO, 165
have ratified the Convention. 184 The U.S. has not ratified the
Convention; nevertheless, its minimum age laws are fairly consistent
with the Convention. 185
The Convention requires ratifying Members to establish national
policies designed to eradicate child labor and over time to increase the
minimum age of employment "to a level consistent with the fullest
physical and mental development of young persons." The Convention
forbids the minimum age set by the State to be either lower than the age
of complletion of compulsory education or lower than the age of
fifteen. 1 6 Yet, in recognition of the child's economic role and lack of
available schooling, it recognizes an exception whereby "a Member
whose economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed
may, after consultation with the organizations of employers and workers
concerned, where such exist, initially specify a minimum age of 14
years." 187

180. PHILIP E. VEERMAN, THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND THE CHANGING IMAGE OF
CHILDHOOD 311 (1992). It also included the topic of employment that threatened children's
health. Id.
181. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 154.
182. UNCRC, supra note l 05.
183. VEERMAN, supra note 180, at 314-15.
184. Ratificaitons of C138- Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), ILO,

available

at

http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=I000:11300:0::N0:11300:Pl 1300_INSTRUMENT
_ID:312283 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
185. Id. While the U.S. allows work at fourteen, which is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Convention, for the purposes of this paper what is relevant is that the
minimum age laws in the U.S. do not deviate from the laws set by other States by much.
The Fair Labor Standards Act sets the minimum age of employment at fourteen years of age
and limits the number of hours that children under sixteen may work. Youth & Labor,
DEP'T OF LABOR, available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/youthlabor/agerequirements.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
186. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 108, at art. 2(3).
187. Id. art. 2(4).
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The Convention also distinguishes between types of employment.
For work "which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried
out is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young
persons," the minimum age is set at eighteen. 188 However, where
protections are in place for children under eighteen, children may be
employed in such occupations at the age of sixteen. 189
Certain types of work are excluded from the minimum age
requirements set in place by the Convention. The Convention exempts
work done by children "in schools for general, vocational or technical
education" and work done by children who are at least fourteen "in
undertakings, where such work ... is an integral part of' their education,
a training program, or program designed to help the child choose their
future occupation. 19 Further, members may choose to exclude limited
categories of employment from their minimum age requirements.
Despite this, the Convention forbids members from excluding work that
jeopardizes children's health, safety, or morals. 191
Child plaintiffs arguing that they did not enter into work
voluntarily should refer to the Minimum Age Convention and the
domestic laws of States to determine whether a norm of international
law exists recognizing their lack of capacity to consent to their
employment contracts. Because the Minimum Age Convention requires
ratifying Members to enact minimum age laws, plaintiffs would
strengthen their claims by demonstrating that States related to their
claim ratified the treaty. In so doing, they would demonstrate the
existence of a norm invalidating their consent to the employment
contract.
Specifically, reference to the Convention and to the domestic laws
of States provides greater insight into a norm concerning the minimum
age of labor. An ILO Report, Targeting the Intolerable, presented a
survey on the minimum age laws of 155 of the ILO member States. 192
It reported that while most States conformed to the minimum ages of

°

188. Id. art. 3(1).
189. Id. art.3(3).
190. Id. art. 6.
191. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 185, at art. 4(3).
192. International Labour Conference, 1998, Report VI(l) Child Labour: Targeting the
Intolerable,
86th
Sess.
at
24,
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/ 1996/96809 344 engl. pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
Please note that it is not clear whether its review of the domestic legislation included only of
members who have ratified the Convention or all members. Also, this source is dated, and
therefore those making claims under the ATS may need to conduct an investigation to
ensure its information is up to date.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss2/1

230

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Volume 41, N

2014]

Establishing Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute

479

labor imposed by the Minimum Age Convention, some fell below. 193 In
particular, thirty States permit children under fourteen to work, and six
of these States permit the employment of children as young as twelve. 194
This suggests that a norm of customary international law may have
arisen which would invalidate an employment contract between an
employer and employee below the age of twelve, at least for certain
types of labor. Because some States exclude certain sectors from their
minimum age requirements all together, this is not the end of the
inquiry. 195
To identify a norm, plaintiffs must be attentive not only to the
minimum ages set by the legislation of States, but also to the sector and
circumstances of their work or employment. The Minimum Age
Convention and many of its ratifying States distinguish between or
exclude certain types of work or employment from their minimum age
laws. 196 While this makes identifying a specific norm more difficult,
diligent plaintiffs may be able to identify a norm. For instance, while
States create exceptions for certain employment sectors, no state
excludes "industry." 197 Therefore, a thorough analysis of minimum age
laws and their exceptions suggests that at the very least a norm of
international law has arisen prohibiting a child under twelve from
consenting to an employment contract in the industry sector. 198

3. Lack a/Capacity to Consent to Work That Causes Mental or
Physical Harm
Numerous international agreements recognize that children have a
right to be protected from exploitation; a right that should make it
impossible for child laborers to consent to exploitative work. Various
treaties, including the ILO' s core conventions, emphasize children's
rights to development and protection from exploitation and harm.
Furthermore, the treaties not only require the recognition of this right,
but also a related right, a right to their own development. These issues
193. Id.
194. Id. In fact only thirty-three States have set a basic minimum age for admission to
any kind of employment or work, as required by the Convention. Id.
195. Id. (reporting that the most common exclusions include family undertakings (60
States); domestic service; employment in undertaking with a limited number of employees
(frequently 10); apprentices; the self employed; and in most States where a competent
authority exempts an employer (135 States)).
196. Report VI(l) Child Labour: Targeting the Intolerable, supra note 192, at 24.
197. Id.
198. It is also possible that a more thorough analysis would actually put this age higher
if the States that permit 12 year olds to consent to an employment contract require a higher
minimum age for those children working in the industry sector.
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are related because frequently exploitation necessarily occurs at the
expense of development. Thus, within the discourse on the subject of
child labor, critics often cite the interruption of the child's education
and intellectual growth generally as short- and long-term
consequences 199 of such practices.
International agreements pay a great deal of attention to these
concerns.
The Geneva Declaration of the Rights of Children
emphasizes that children must be protected from all exploitation and
provided with the means for spiritual and physical development. 200 The
Declaration of the Rights of the Child provides that "[t]he child shall
enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and
facilities ... to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally,
spiritually and socially... in conditions of freedom and dignity." 201 The
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 202
( 1966) reiterates this concern for the exploitation of children: "Children
and young persons should be protected from economic and social
exploitation."203 The Convention on the Rights of the Child204 forbids:
199. While the child and the child's family suffer the primary consequences, the State
also suffers consequences from having its citizens' education and intellectual growth
artificially stunted.
200. Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Sept. 26, 1924.
201. DRC, supra note 155, at art. 2.
202. There are 160 States party to the Covenant. UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION,
available
at
http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY &mtdsg_no=IV 3&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). The United States is a signatory, but has
not ratified it. Id.
203 . International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 154,
at art. 10.
204. Ratified by 192 countries, more than any other convention. UNICEF, Convention
on the Rights of the Child: Frequently Asked Questions, available at
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). It has been ratified
by all states except for the United States and Somalia. Id. While the U.S. has not ratified it,
at least one source reports that the Obama administration had, at least at one time, sought to
reignite efforts to ratify the Convention. John Helprin, Obama Administration Seeks to Join
U.N. Rights of the Child Convention, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2009), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/23/obama-administration-seek n 2195 l l .html
(last visited Feb. 5, 2014). More importantly, it is most likely that the U.S. 's refusal to
ratify the convention is fueled by a fear that it will interfere with parental rights, and not its
position on child labor. Lawrece J. Cohen & Anthony T. DeBenedet, M.D., Why is the U.S.
Against
Children's
Rights?,
TIME
(Jan.
24,
2012),
available
at
http://ideas.time.com/2012/01 /24/why-is-the-us-against-childrens-rights/ (last visited Feb. 5,
2014). The Convention has gained such widespread recognition, that even non-state entities
have adopted it, such as the Sudan People's Liberation Army. Id. Yet because the U.S. has
refused to ratify it, the U.S. is characterized as a persistent objector to the treaty. Id.
Therefore, while it should be used as supplementary evidence that a norm of international
law has arisen regarding children and their right to be free of forced labor, a U.S. court is
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(1) the economic exploitation of children; (2) children from performing
work likely to interfere or be hazardous to their education; (3) and work
that is likely to be "harmful to the child's health or physical, mental,
spiritual moral or social development. " 205
The concerns enumerated in these Conventions should be
considered when plaintiffs claim that they did not voluntarily enter into
work. Children's ability to consent to work that harms them mentally or
physically is far more limited than their ability to consent to work that is
not harmful to their health. For evidence of this, plaintiffs should refer
back to the Minimum Age Convention to determine whether there is a
higher minimum age in place for the kind of work that they performed.
Upon a thorough analysis of these sources of international law,
plaintiffs may be able to identify norms of international law that limit a
child's capacity to consent to employment where the work is mentally
or physical harmful. While the specific articulation of such a norm is
beyond the scope of this paper, plaintiffs should carefully analyze the
conditions of their labor to determine whether the child possessed the
capacity to consent to the specific labor in which they engaged. Absent
consent, such labor can only be tantamount to forced labor.

4. Labor Exacted Under the Threat ofA Penalty and Children's
Difficulty Asserting Their Own Interests
The question of whether labor is exacted under the threat of a
penalty necessitates special considerations within the context of child
labor claims. Children, as a class and as individuals, may experience
difficulty asserting their interests over that of authority figures,
specifically adults. Without the ability to assert one's interest over that
of an adult supervisor, the child may engage in labor under the menace
of penalty in a wider variety of situations than would an adult.
International agreements recognize this potential danger and affirm
the child's right to protection from coercion and exploitation. 206 While
evaluating the factual context of forced labor claims by children under
the ATS, federal courts should be mindful of these two affirmative
human rights bestowed upon a child. They should recognize that
employers acting contrary to these rights are in violation of the child's
affirmative rights under international law.
Courts will need to
determine whether the employer exacted labor under the threat of a

unlikely to give it much weight in its analysis of whether such a norm exists.
205. UNCRC, supra note 105.
206. See discussion supra Section IV(C)(a)(i)(2) (titled Lack of Capacity to Consent to
Work That Causes Mental or Physical Harm).
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penalty, but claims should be actionable when a court does indeed so
determine, so long as the other elements of forced labor are satisfied.
Lastly, the elements of forced labor may be intertwined such that it
is unclear whether a child's labor was exacted under the menace of
penalty or not offered voluntarily. Under certain circumstances,
plaintiffs should dispute the validity of an employment contract on the
basis of the child's lack of capacity to consent to the labor. Yet the
definition of forced labor requires both that the labor is under the
menace of a penalty and not entered into voluntarily, so plaintiffs
should be sure to plead both elements clearly.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, child labor tantamount to slavery or forced labor
violates international law, and therefore plaintiffs bringing claims
alleging such conduct are entitled to recovery under the ATS. Because
of the procedural and pleading obstacles, claimants will continue to
have difficulty recovering under the ATS. Nevertheless, claimants are
more likely to succeed if they carefully plead the elements of a forced
labor claim, rather than if they rely strictly on the theory that child labor
violates the law of nations.
The elements of forced labor merit special analysis with respect to
the child claimant. Where possible, pleadings should specifically
address how the child's conditions of labor and lack of consent to labor
violate international law. Yet courts must also be careful to consider the
question of whether a norm of international law exists for a particular
claim, taking into consideration all relevant sources of international law
cited by the plaintiff.
Whether the risk of liability from an ATS claim currently deters
defendants from violating international law is a question outside of the
scope of this paper. If the frequency of ATS claims increases, a
deterrent effect may become noticeable. 207 Yet, this effect will be
limited to those persons who foresee the possibility of a U.S. federal
court maintaining personal jurisdiction over them.
While courts continue to shape the contours and scope of ATS
jurisprudence,208 it remains a powerful strategy for human rights
207. At least one author believes that potential defendants should be aware of the
possibility of ATS liability. See Anna A. Komikova, International Child Labor Regulation
101: What Corporations Need to Know About Treaties Pertaining to Working Youth , 34
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 207, 208 (2008).
208. For instance, just last year the Supreme Court held that where the conduct
underlying an ATS claim occurred outside of the U.S., the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies and claims must "touch and concern the territory of the United
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activists to ensure compliance with international law, and therefore a
possible remedy for at least some children who are victims of slavery or
forced labor.

States ... with sufficient force." Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669. Yet the parameters of Kiobel
and what constitutes sufficient force is far from clear.
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